State v. Baton

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BEVILACQUA
• Citation: State v. Baton, 488 A.2d 696 (R.I. 1985)
• Decision Date: 26 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 83-428-C,83-428-C
• Parties: STATE v. Larry E. BATON. A.

Page 696

488 A.2d 696

STATE v. Larry E. BATON.

No. 83-428-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 26, 1985.

Dennis J. Roberts II, Atty. Gen., Anthony DelBonis, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Providence, for plaintiff.

Joseph Romano, Jr., Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendant, Larry Baton, from a judgment of conviction entered against him in the Superior Court, before a trial justice sitting with a jury, on an indictment charging him with first-degree murder and burglary in connection with the death of his estranged wife, Holly Baton. Following the denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial justice sentenced him to consecutive life sentences on September 17, 1982. The relevant facts are as follows.

On August 11, 1981, Detective Sergeant Louis Dusseault of the Rhode Island State Police physically arrested defendant at gunpoint in a shopping area in Stonington, Connecticut. At the time of the arrest, Dusseault was aware of a warrant issued the day before by a justice of the Fourth Division District Court of Rhode Island for defendant's arrest for the murder of defendant's wife. He was aided in the arrest by other members of the Rhode Island State Police and the Stonington police, which included Officer Mitchell. While in the parking lot, Dusseault read defendant his Fifth Amendment rights from a rights card, then placed him in a squad car, which then took him to the Stonington police station. During the trip, Dusseault testified, he again advised defendant of his rights and defendant responded that he knew them. When he asked defendant if he wanted an attorney, defendant replied, "No, not at this time. I may need one--I may need one later." The defendant, however, countered Dusseault's testimony at the motion to suppress and testified that he had remained totally silent in the squad car, but he did acknowledge that no threats or coercive promises were made during this period.

The Stonington police station was chaotic because of a fatal accident that had just occurred in the town. The defendant was brought to a detective's room that contained a number of people, including Sergeant Dusseault, Officer Mitchell, and Detective Luigi A. Reali of the Rhode Island State Police, and was read his rights from a waiver-of-rights form. Dusseault, who had read the rights, handed defendant the form to read himself and then went over each of the eight items to ensure that defendant understood them. The defendant claimed that he did understand them and continued to fill in the time, date, and location, then initialed the first six items and finally signed the form. He did not initial item No. 7, which indicates, "After having been informed of my constitutional rights, I do understand these rights, and I agree to give a statement at this time," nor did he initial item No. 8, which states, "I do not want an attorney called or appointed for me at this time." Dusseault interpreted the refusal to initial these two items to mean that defendant did not want an attorney then, but might want one later. When Detective Reali subsequently afforded defendant the use of a telephone, he claims that defendant replied, "No, I don't want to call anyone. I don't want them to know where I am."

The defendant vehemently negated this testimony at the motion hearing and contended both that no one advised him of his rights in the detective's room and that no one asked him if he wanted an attorney. He claims he never told Dusseault or Reali that he did not want an attorney at that time but might want one later, and he claims that he did not initial items No. 7 and 8 because he did want his attorney present. Furthermore, he testified that he insisted on making a phone call to his parents first and that he wanted to see an attorney. ¹ After asking Reali if he could make a phone call, he claims, Reali responded that he could make as many calls as he wanted but he wanted to talk to him first.

The defendant and the officers then moved to a smaller room for the taking of the statement so that they could avoid the confusion resulting from the accident. Reali testified both that he again advised Baton of his right to an attorney and that he again read the waiver-of-rights section at the top of the statement form. Together they read the statement form, which was in a question-and-answer format, and defendant thereon signed his name and wrote, "[y]es, they are true" after each of these questions and answers. He also drew a picture of the scene where Holly Baton was found, read the statement over, initialed the mistakes, and finally signed every page. Both Reali and defendant agreed that defendant was not abused and was offered sustenance during this period.

While they were in the smaller room, Attorney Charles Rogers called the police station. The conversation was taped, but the time of the call was not recorded. The chief of the Stonington police department, Carl Johnson, who was very busy because of the accident, was on another call when Officer Adriano told him that Rogers was on the phone, so he told Adriano to tell Rogers to wait. A few minutes later, Rogers buzzed again and Johnson told Adriano to get Rogers's number so that he could call him back. Rogers, however, waited and insisted upon talking to Johnson. He finally got through and told Johnson he wished to speak to a "Mr. Bateman" and that he did not want defendant to give a statement. Johnson then told John Turner of the Rhode Island State Police to tell Reali that Rogers was on the phone, but he did not tell him that defendant should refrain from making a statement. Reali testified that he did not know that Rogers was trying to reach Baton until after the statement was finished. Once he knew, he immediately put defendant on the phone.

Once again, defendant refuted the state's testimony and maintained that the officer came in three times to inform them that Rogers was on the phone and that Reali said, "O.K.," but kept on with the statement. When the officer came in the third time, Baton testified at the motion to suppress, he jumped up and said he wanted to speak to the lawyer.

The tape recording of the conversation between defendant and Rogers reveals that when Rogers asked defendant if he wanted him as counsel, defendant responded, "Well if you want to." Rogers then asked if defendant wanted him, and defendant responded, "Well, sure," whereupon defendant told Rogers that he had been advised of his rights and that he had already given a statement.

On appeal, defendant raises the following issues: (1) that he was unlawfully arrested in the State of Connecticut; (2) that his confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel; (3) that his confession was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and (4) that the trial justice violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeopardy when he imposed consecutive life sentences for first-degree murder and burglary.

I

The defendant claims that the Superior Court justice erred in finding that the statement he made to the Rhode Island State Police was admissible under the law for the following two reasons: (1) his arrest in Connecticut by a Rhode Island State police officer was illegal and (2) his confession was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Because of these violations, he contends, any statements he made should have been suppressed.

A

A police officer may not effectuate an arrest without probable cause, and probable cause exists when the officer has personal knowledge or has been reliably informed of the facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the arrestee has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a criminal act. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949); State v. Burns, R.I., 431 A.2d 1199, 1203 (1981). In determining whether probable cause exists, the court views "the cumulative effect of all the facts and circumstances present at the time of the arrest * * * as through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police office on the scene * * *." State v. Welch, R.I., 441 A.2d 539, 541 (1982) (quoting In re John C., R.I., 425 A.2d 536, 538, cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S.Ct. 3159, 69 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1981)).

The trial justice, in the case at bar, found that Officer Mitchell of the Stonington police department had probable cause to arrest defendant in the parking lot because Mitchell had knowledge of the arrest warrant issued by the Rhode Island District Court and consequently had a right to rely on the determination of the neutral magistrate. The actual physical arrest, made by Sergeant Dusseault of the Rhode Island State Police, was legal because it was made under the aegis of Officer Mitchell. Mitchell was present at the scene and actively involved in the search for defendant. He spotted defendant in the parking lot, and Dusseault, acting as his agent, made the arrest. Even if Dusseault had acted unilaterally, the arrest was still legal because Dusseault, acting as a private person in the State of Connecticut who had probable cause to believe the arrestee had committed a felony, had the right to make an arrest. Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 520, 413 A.2d 1340, 1349 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Duncan v. Rundle, 424 Pa. 385, 387, 227 A.2d 659, 661 (1967).

Since the trial justice could have reasonably determined that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to establish probable cause for defendant's arrest, we shall adhere to his finding.

B

Although a conviction based upon an involuntary confession deprives the defendant of due process of law, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 915 (1964), and State v. Fuentes, R.I., 433 A.2d 184, 189 (1981), a truly...