State v. Batson

Citation831 P.2d 924,73 Haw. 236
Decision Date04 June 1992
Docket NumberNo. 15509,15509
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William BATSON, also known as Amos Cruse II, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Hawai'i

Syllabus by the Court

1. The trial court, as trier of fact, may draw all reasonable and legitimate inferences and deductions from the evidence adduced, and findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless, after a review of the whole record, the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

2. A trial court's acquiescence in the making of a factual finding expressly requested by a defendant in a criminal case cannot thereafter form the basis of alleged error in the making of the same finding. To reach any other result would be to invite "appeal by ambush."

3. Evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or a jury.

4. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Even if it could be said in a bench trial that the conviction is against the weight of the evidence, as long as there is substantial evidence to support the requisite findings for conviction, the trial court will be affirmed.

5. Substantial evidence as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. As trier of fact, the trial judge is free to make all reasonable and rational inferences under the facts in evidence, including circumstantial evidence.

6. Where a statute proscribes an offense that can be committed by factually alternative types of conduct, the charge may be laid out in the conjunctive but not the disjunctive.

7. A defendant must be put on sufficient notice of the nature and cause of the accusation with which he is charged. Phrasing a complaint or indictment in the disjunctive would not provide such notice as it would leave the defendant uncertain as to which of the acts charged was being relied upon as the basis for the accusation against him.

8. The most appropriate method to allege one offense committed in two different ways is to allege in one count that the defendant committed the offense in one way "and/or" in the second way. However, it is sufficient that one offense allegedly committed in two different ways be charged conjunctively in a single count.

9. Under an indictment charging second degree murder by commission and omission in the conjunctive, the prosecution is not required to prove separate and distinct cases of murder by commission and omission against the defendant in order to establish guilt. Any combination of substantial evidence legally sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion that the defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another person would mandate affirming the conviction.

10. The omission of a duty is the equivalent of an act, and when death results, the standard for determination of the degree of homicide is identical.

11. A combination of individual acts of physical abuse and omissions to discharge parental duties and responsibilities, when coupled with the requisite state of mind, may rise to the level of murder.

12. Given the difficulty of proving the requisite state of mind by direct evidence in criminal cases, proof by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the defendant's conduct is sufficient; thus, the mind of an alleged offender can be read from his acts, conduct, and inferences fairly drawn from all the circumstances. This is particularly the case when the record establishes a continuing course of repeated and escalating episodes of violence, beatings, abuse, and neglect.

William H. Jameson, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.

Charlotte J. Duarte, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before LUM, C.J., and WAKATSUKI, MOON, KLEIN and LEVINSON, JJ.

LEVINSON, Justice.

The defendant-appellant, William Batson (Batson), also known as Amos Cruse II, appeals his second conviction 1 of the murder of his eleven-year-old son, Amos Cruse III (Amos), in violation of HRS § 707-701.5 (1986). 2 The conviction in the present appeal was by way of jury-waived trial. On appeal, Batson urges that portions of two of the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment of conviction as to second degree murder. 3 We disagree and affirm.

I.

For a complete understanding of the issues presented, they must be placed in the context of the factual record. It is therefore necessary to set out the facts in some detail.

Amos was born on March 15, 1976, in Portland, Oregon, to Batson and his girlfriend, Mary Ann Seitz (Seitz). Batson and Seitz never married. Seitz, who retained legal custody of Amos, raised Amos in Portland without Batson. Batson had minimal personal contact with Amos until he flew from Hawaii to Portland; there he found the boy and transported Amos to Honolulu without Seitz's permission in late April or early May 1987. Thereafter, Amos lived with Batson and his current girlfriend, Kathryn Morales (Morales), until he died.

Upon arrival in Honolulu, Amos was in apparent "fine" health and exhibited no injuries or bruises. He had no difficulty speaking or walking, although he tended to do the latter slowly and clumsily. Amos was approximately five feet tall and weighed about 100 pounds. He was slim, but a "hearty" eater.

From approximately May 1 to June 23 or 24, 4 Amos resided with Batson and Morales at the Hawaiian Monarch Hotel (hotel). Shortly after Amos's arrival in Honolulu, Batson observed what he regarded as behavior problems in Amos, consisting primarily of persistent bed wetting and failure to complete assigned chores and homework. (Batson had obtained some study materials for Amos instead of enrolling him in school; because Batson had taken Amos without Seitz's permission, he did not want to be questioned by the authorities.) These problems frustrated Batson; he began to "discipline" Amos because of the bed wetting, nonperformance, and what was believed to be periodic lying.

Both Batson and Morales attempted to "talk" to Amos about his deficiencies. When "talking" did not yield the desired results, Batson became frustrated, angry, and violent, and began to beat Amos, sometimes severely, in Amos's ribs and stomach with his boot, his fists, his open hand, or whatever happened to be in his hand or was available. Morales personally observed Batson strike Amos on multiple occasions with his hand or closed fist, a belt, or a cowboy boot. Sometimes while he was being beaten, Amos was able to remain standing, and at other times he fell down. Batson would tell Amos to get up, and when Amos did so, Batson would hit him again. On one occasion, Amos asked Batson to stop the beating and promised to be "good."

Batson testified that after the first beating Amos manifested no reaction. A few days later, however, Amos appeared to be in pain, was awkward and slow in moving, and "favored" the upper portion of one side. Batson admitted thinking that there was something wrong with Amos' rib area and upper body. Batson further admitted that he continued to hit Amos for bed wetting with his fist and belt, but that he altered the locations of the beatings on Amos's body.

In mid-May, Batson administered Amos a particularly severe beating because Amos had wet his bed again, striking Amos with his boot in the stomach, ribs, and chest. Following the beating, Amos displayed difficulty in walking, stiff legs, lack of balance and an apparent problem with his stomach. It was obvious to Morales that Amos was injured and in pain.

As a result of the beatings, Morales observed a cut on the top of Amos's head (which remained visible until his death), a split lip, bruised ribs, and a lump on his chest. When Morales inquired as to the cause, Batson told her that Amos had wet the bed again and had lied about it, resulting in Batson losing his temper and beating Amos. By this time, Amos was demonstrably sick, could not walk well, was unsteady and wobbly when he stood, seldom spoke, and only nodded or shook his head when being addressed. Batson admitted that Amos had received the scalp laceration because Batson had punched Amos in the face, causing Amos to fall and strike his head against a cabinet.

Amos was also placed in the bathtub as "discipline" for his bed wetting and to keep him close to the toilet. Batson would put Amos in the bathtub when friends came to visit. There also came a time when Batson ceased taking Amos out of the hotel room because of Amos's physical condition.

While still at the hotel, Morales asked Batson to take Amos to a doctor on at least three occasions, because she believed that Amos required treatment for the injuries sustained from Batson's beatings. At first, Batson told Morales that he could not take Amos to a doctor because he was afraid that, if he did so, he would be charged with having kidnapped Amos. Later, Batson merely stated that Amos' condition was none of Morales's business and that he would take care of the situation.

Batson testified that at about this time, and in addition to the symptoms he had noticed earlier, Amos' appetite progressively deteriorated to the point where it disappeared completely.

Despite Batson's uncontroverted opportunity and financial ability to pay for treatment, he never sought medical assistance for Amos's condition. According to...

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