State v. Bd. of License & Excise of the City of Trenton

• Citation: 48 N.J.L. 438,5 A. 323
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
• Decision Date: 30 July 1886
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CLOSSON v. BOARD OF LICENSE AND EXCISE OF THE CITY OF TRENTON.

5 A. 323

48 N.J.L. 438

STATE ex rel. CLOSSON

v. BOARD OF LICENSE AND EXCISE OF

THE CITY OF TRENTON.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

July 30, 1886.

On certiorari. Facts are stated in the opinion.

W. M. Lanning, for prosecutors.

A. J. Smith, for respondent.

REED, J. This writ brings up the proceeding of the board of license and excise of the city of Trenton in granting a license to one James V. Crawford to sell strong, spirituous, and malt liquors at a certain place in the city of Trenton. The board is organized under the provisions of "An act to establish a license and excise department in certain cities." P. L. 1880, p. 191.

One of the reasons filed, attacks the constitutionality of this act. The ground upon which the alleged unconstitutionality was placed, was its conflict with that clause of the amended constitution which prescribes the passage of local or special legislation regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties. The act provides that it shall be lawful for any city in this state containing more than 15,000 inhabitants to provide by ordinance for a department to be called the "License and Excise Department." It then provides for the organization of the board, and that the compensation, duties, and rules and regulations of the board, and the penalties to be inflicted upon those who violate them, shall be fixed by ordinance. It finally contains a proviso that the provisions of the act shall not apply to any city in which the granting of such licenses is now vested in a board of excise or excise commissioners, or in any city where the court of common pleas now grant licenses.

This legislation is, in my judgment, clearly special. There can be no reason suggested why cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants should have a system of granting licenses differing from that of cities with a less population. In respect to the subject-matter of the legislation all cities are a class, and an attempt to segregate cities into distinct classes for this purpose by a standard of population is not classification, but an arbitrary selection of one or more localities for legislation. This legislation is, in respect to this feature, similar to the act of 1883 providing that in boroughs of the third class the licensing power should be in the courts of common pleas. The last act was pronounced unconstitutional in the case of Hightstown v. Glenn, 47 N. J. Law, 105. The vice of that act was declared to consist in an attempt to classify municipalities upon...