State v. Bean

• Citation: 762 A.2d 1259
• Decision Date: 20 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 96-642.,96-642.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Vermont v. Ronald Matthew BEAN.

762 A.2d 1259

STATE of Vermont v. Ronald Matthew BEAN.

No. 96-642.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

October 20, 2000.

Peter R. Neary, Rutland County Deputy State's Attorney, Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.

Present: DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ., and JENKINS, Superior Judge, Specially Assigned.

DOOLEY, J.

Defendant, Ronald Bean, appeals from a conviction for kidnapping and violation of an abuse prevention order, arising out of an incident on February 18, 1993 in which he restrained Judith Bean, his mother, in her home and threatened to kill her. He argues that the trial court erred in failing to find him incompetent to stand trial and to allow him to represent himself. We agree that in order to prevent assertion of an insanity defense defendant should have been able to represent himself. We reverse and remand.

To evaluate defendant's claims on appeal, we begin with a history of the lengthy proceedings below. On February 18, 1993, Rutland City Police arrested defendant for violation of an abuse prevention order protecting his mother. At the initial appearance on February 22, 1993, the State charged defendant with violation of the prevention order and kidnapping. Defendant indicated to the court that he wished to proceed pro se until he could consult with an out-of-state attorney, and then attempted to enter a guilty plea to both charges. The court refused to accept the pleas and assigned defendant a public defender until his competency to waive his right to counsel could be evaluated.

In the months after the initial appearance, defendant continued to insist that he be allowed to represent himself. He underwent several psychiatric evaluations. In a competency hearing in September 1993, the court found defendant competent to stand trial. The examining psychiatrist testified that defendant is "gamey" and has a "manipulative flair," making statements that he is Jesus Christ or God, for example, for shock value, and tries to manipulate the system in what he perceives to be his own interests. The psychiatrist also testified that defendant's failure to cooperate with defense counsel was due to his own calculated choice, and not the result of delusional thoughts or emotional disturbance. He explained that defendant did not want to use an insanity defense because he did not want to be in a mental hospital. He called this a calculated choice "not based on any problem in his thinking, delusional thoughts or a mood such as a depression."

In the course of the hearing, the psychiatrist requested that he be given access to defendant's past treatment files. Defendant interjected:

I object to him receiving such information.... I don't want to be found insane. I don't want this man having that information that could possibly have me found insane. Your honor, I broke my neck to get out of a mental institution. I am not going to go through the chance of having that happen again. I'd rather be in jail, even it is for the rest of my life.

At the conclusion of the hearing the court ruled orally that defendant was competent. At that time defendant indicated that he wished to be represented by the court-appointed public defender after all, and the court granted that request.

In July 1994, the assigned public defender moved to withdraw as counsel citing "irreconcilable differences" between counsel and defendant. The motion was granted, and new counsel was assigned. The court also granted defendant's motion to suppress statements he made at the initial appearance, a motion filed by the original defense counsel. An interlocutory appeal of that ruling to this Court resulted in an affirmance of the suppression order, see State v. Bean, 163 Vt. 457, 658 A.2d 940 (1995), and a delay of almost a year in the trial court. During the period that the case was on review in the Supreme Court, new counsel attempted to withdraw at defendant's request, but the motion was denied.

In May 1995, counsel for defendant requested another competency hearing, against the wishes of his client. The court-appointed psychiatrist once again found defendant competent to stand trial and further testified the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. A psychologist testifying for the defendant claimed defendant was not competent to stand trial. The court found defendant to be competent. In its written opinion, the court relied on the opinion of the court-appointed psychiatrist that defendant overlays psychiatric symptomatology at will, without being in fact mentally ill. The court found that defendant uses psychiatric symptoms to obtain his own goals.

On November 20, 1995, defense counsel filed a notice pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 12.1(a) that defendant may raise the defense of diminished capacity, the first formal notice of the use of a mental impairment defense. At a status conference before trial, defense counsel again raised the issue of defendant's competency. On the day before defendant's trial, the court ordered another competency evaluation. At that time, defendant's counsel told the court that defendant refused to assist him in preparation of the defense and had not talked to counsel about the offense in any manner. Further, counsel stated:

I have concern about his competency at the time, or right now. He has also instructed me not to use an insanity defense which is in fact the defense in this case .... And he has expressed that if we were going to use an insanity defense, that he would want to proceed pro se, and that he would not need a lawyer.

He then formally gave notice "that this is an insanity defense case."

The hearing on defendant's competency was held the next day. The doctor appointed by the court testified that the defendant did not want to pursue the insanity defense and was displeased with his defense counsel, but that he felt he would be able to cooperate with defense counsel to the extent "required by the court." The court found, based on the doctor's conclusion, that defendant was competent to stand trial. In its written opinion, the court again found that although defendant was at times delusional, he was also intentionally obstructionist and uncooperative, and that the effects of his delusions did not rise to the level of impairing his capacity to understand the proceedings against him or assist in his own defense.

The trial proceeded, and during the second day, while defense counsel was cross-examining a witness, defendant tried to interrupt this questioning when it became obvious defense counsel was still pursuing the insanity defense. The court would not allow this interruption. The following day, after the State rested, defendant made a motion to proceed pro se claiming that his lawyer had not represented his interests. When the court denied that motion, defendant asked to be excused from the courtroom and did not return during the duration of the trial. Arrangements were made to place defendant in a room outside the courtroom with a closed circuit television to observe the proceedings. Apparently, he did not watch the television set.

Defendant first argues that the record shows that he was incompetent to stand trial as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in not concluding so. We agree that a defendant incompetent to stand trial may not be tried. See 13 V.S.A. § 4817(a); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396-98, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). In order to be found competent to stand trial, a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). Our statutes provide extensive procedures governing the determination of competency to stand trial. Defendant does not contest the procedural regularity of the competency determinations in this case. Instead, he argues that despite the mental health evaluations that found him competent, his conduct was so bizarre that it showed him to be incompetent.

His argument is based largely on State v. Pollard, 163 Vt. 199, 205-06, 657 A.2d 185, 189-90 (1995), in which we found a determination that defendant was competent to be erroneous even though it was supported by the opinion of the examining physician that defendant had a factual understanding of the charges and of the trial functions of the court and its officers. We held that defendant's garbled manner of speech, his refusal to take his lawyers' advice, and his bizarre behavior precluded a finding that he had sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Id. at 206, 657 A.2d at 190.

In evaluating defendant's argument, we stress that it is the trial court's responsibility, in the first instance, to evaluate the evidence and to determine whether defendant's competency meets the constitutional standard. See 13 V.S.A. § 4817(b). If the court's findings are supported by credible evidence and not clearly erroneous, they must be upheld. See State v. Thompson, 162 Vt. 532, 535, 650 A.2d 139, 141 (1994). In reaching its conclusion, the court may consider its observations of the demeanor of the defendant. See id.

In this case, there was evidence to support the court's finding that, despite defendant's bizarre behavior, he was competent to stand trial. Defendant was evaluated several times by various physicians. Unlike the evidence in Pollard, the physicians testified that defendant had a rational, rather than merely a factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. More important, the mental health evidence suggested how to reconcile defendant's apparent bizarre behavior with a conclusion defendant was competent. The psychiatrist who performed evaluations on defendant in March 1993, March 1995 and July 1995 found that defendant "preferred to drift into...