State v. Beaton
| Decision Date | 02 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2017-155 |
| Parties | State of Vermont v. Joseph A. Beaton |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.
Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division
DOCKET NO. 1276-9-14 Wmcr
Trial Judge: Katherine A. Hayes
Motion Judge: Michael R. Kainen
In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:
Defendant appeals the superior court's denial of his motion to correct sentence, in which he argued that he was entitled to credit for time he spent in his residence under conditions of release. We affirm.
On September 26, 2014, defendant was charged with aggravated assault and burglary while carrying a deadly weapon. He was released on conditions, including condition 11, which imposed a 24-hour curfew, "except for work, medical appointments, meeting with [his] attorney or court appearance, including travelling to and from." On September 3, 2015, the conditions were amended to add condition 35, which stated: "As to condition #11—Defendant may leave his residence on Saturdays between 1-3 PM to grocery shop and attend to other personal needs in Wilmington."
On October 13, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation to amend the conditions of release as follows:
35. As to condition #11—Defendant may leave his residence on Saturdays between 1-3 pm to grocery shop and attend other personal needs in Wilmington. Defendant may leave his residence on Fridays between 4:30 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. to grocery shop and attend to other personal needs in Wilmington.
That same day, the court granted the motion in an entry order format, listing the amended condition 35 exactly as stipulated by the parties. Instead of amending condition 35 by adding the second sentence as stipulated and approved by the court, however, the October 13, 2015 amended-conditions-of-release form kept condition 35 the same but replaced condition 11 with the amended condition 35. Thus, condition 11 now became:
11. Curfew: Defendant may leave his residence on Saturdays between 1-3 p.m. to grocery shop and attend to other personal needs in Wilmington, Vermont. Defendant may leave his residence on Fridays between 4:30 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. to grocery shop and attend to other personal needs in Wilmington.
In April 2016, "to avoid unintentional violations of any of his conditions," defendant moved to amend condition 11 "to state that curfew does not apply to verifiable employment, medical, legal, and alcohol or drug treatment meetings." On May 31, 2016, the conditions of release with respect to curfew were amended as follows:
On June 20, 2016, the curfew conditions were amended a final time as follows:
Defendant was twice charged with violating the conditions, once in March 2015 and once in May 2015. The State agreed to dismiss the March charge, but was permitted to discuss the violation at sentencing. On November 7, 2016, defendant pleaded no contest to one count of aggravated assault and guilty to one count of burglary while carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon, one count of unlawful mischief, and one count of violating a condition of release. At the February 16, 2017 sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant credit for time served during the period he had been released on conditions, which amounted to 874 days.
In April 2017, defendant filed a motion to correct sentence, arguing that the trial court erred in denying him credit for time served while he was released on conditions. Relying on State v.Kenvin, 2013 VT 104, 195 VT 166, the superior court denied the motion, stating that "[t]he amount of time [defendant] was allowed out, and the discretion he had to make his schedule lead the court to conclude that this was not the functional equivalent of custody."
On appeal, defendant argues that: (1) this Court should not apply to this case our holding in a recent opinion issued during the briefing of this appeal, State v. Byam, 2017 VT 47, ¶ 18, in which we overruled Kenvin to the extent that it "permitted credit for home detention outside the statutory programs for home confinement and electronic monitoring" and instead adopted a "bright-line" rule that "a defendant who is released pretrial under curfew established by conditions of release and who is later sentenced to jail time is not entitled to credit under 13 V.S.A. § 7031(b) for the time spent on curfew under conditions of release"; and (2) the superior court erred in denying his motion to correct his sentence and thus refusing to grant him credit for time he spent while under conditions of release. The State responds that Byam should be applied to this case, but that even if it is not, under the law as set forth in Kenvin, defendant is not entitled to credit for any period of time he spent subject to his conditions of release.
We agree with the State on the latter point. We need not consider whether Byam should be applied here because, even applying the law as set forth in Kenvin, we conclude that defendant is not entitled to credit for any period he spent while living in his residence under the conditions of release set by the trial court. In Kenvin, we concluded that § 7031(b), which requires sentencing courts to give convicted defendants credit for days spent in custody connected with the sentence imposed, "calls for a case-by-case factual determination as to whether a defendant's conditions of release amount to custody under § 7031(b)." 2013 VT 104, ¶ 20, 195 Vt. 166 (quotation and alteration omitted). That determination involves a legal question that we review de novo. Id.
In Kenvin, we determined that the defendant was not eligible for credit pursuant to § 7031 for the period during which he was restricted "to his home but allowed him to travel to a cell-phone-reception area, attend appointments, and walk his dog." Id. ¶ 23. In so concluding, we reasoned as follows:
Defendant's conditions did not specify a person responsible for his custody and did not dictate the locality of his residence. Defendant was not institutionally confined and failed on this record to show some comparable institutional confinement in his situation living at home . . . He was free to spend his days as he wished in his home, to travel to a location where cell-phone service was available at his leisure, and to walk his dog to any place, whenever he desired, so long at the walks began and ended at his home and did not exceed one hour apiece. The conditions allowed defendant to attend meetings with his attorney as well as medical appointments. D...
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