State v. Beattie
| Decision Date | 19 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 2019-0460,2019-0460 |
| Citation | 248 A.3d 358,173 N.H. 716 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Shane M. BEATTIE & a. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Allison B. Greenstein, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Waystack Frizzell, Trial Lawyers, of Colebrook (Jonathan S. Frizzell and Sandra L. Cabrera on the brief, and Mr. Frizzell orally), for the defendants.
The defendants, Shane and Trina Beattie, appeal an order of the Superior Court (MacLeod, J.) dismissing, with prejudice, their preliminary objection challenging the State's taking of 0.93 acres of their land in fee simple, as well as permanent and temporary easements. The Beatties argue that the trial court erred when, in dismissing their preliminary objection, which challenged the necessity and net-public benefit of the taking, the trial court applied the fraud or gross mistake standard of review set forth in RSA chapter 230 rather than a de novo standard pursuant to RSA chapter 498-A. See RSA 230:14, :19 (2009 & Supp. 2019) ; RSA 498-A:1, :9-b (2010). The State counters that the trial court did not err because RSA chapter 230, not RSA chapter 498-A, governs the outcome of this case. We agree with the Beatties, and reverse and remand.
The pertinent facts are as follows. In November 2013, the Governor and Executive Council appointed a three-person commission to determine whether there was occasion for the laying out or alteration of New Hampshire Route 2 in Lancaster. See RSA 230:14. The proposed project contemplated the replacement of the existing bridge spanning the Connecticut River between Lancaster and Guildhall, Vermont. In February 2014, the New Hampshire Department of Transportation sent a Notice of Hearing to the Beatties because the proposed project might require acquisition of their property, or it might be in close proximity to their property. The notice informed the Beatties that the commission would hold a public hearing on the proposed project in March 2014. The Beatties did not attend the hearing. In April 2014, the commission issued its report determining that there was occasion for the project.
In July 2018, the State offered to purchase those portions of the Beatties’ land that it considered necessary for completion of the project. The Beatties declined the State's offer, and, in September 2018, the State filed a declaration of taking with the New Hampshire Board of Tax and Land Appeals (BTLA). The declaration identified a 0.93 acre portion of the Beatties’ land that the State intended to take in fee simple, an additional 9,506 square foot area over which the State intended to take a permanent easement to accommodate the slopes and embankments necessary to support the highway, and an additional 8,543 square foot area over which the State intended to take a temporary easement for use while constructing the project.
In response to the State's declaration of taking, the Beatties filed an answer and preliminary objection with the BTLA. See RSA 498-A:9-a, I (2010) (providing that "any condemnee may file a motion in the office of the board raising preliminary objections to [a] declaration of taking"). The Beatties challenged the necessity and net-public benefit of the taking, and, accordingly, requested that their preliminary objection be transferred to the superior court. See RSA 498-A:9-b, I. Following the transfer, in January 2019, the State filed a response and a motion to dismiss the Beatties’ preliminary objection. Citing RSA 230:14 and :19, the State argued that, because the Beatties had failed to allege fraud or gross mistake on the part of the commission, their preliminary objection must be dismissed as a matter of law.
In its July 2019 order granting the State's motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that, although RSA chapter 498-A is the comprehensive eminent domain procedure act, courts must look to the enabling statute — in this case, RSA chapter 230 — for the proper standard of review. Accordingly, the trial court analyzed RSA 230:14 and :19, and determined that, in their preliminary objection, the Beatties were required to allege fraud or gross mistake on the part of the commission. Because the Beatties did not do so, the trial court found that they had "failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," and concluded that "their preliminary objection must therefore be dismissed." This appeal followed.
"In reviewing the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss, our standard of review is whether the allegations in the [non-moving party's] pleadings are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery." Plaisted v. LaBrie, 165 N.H. 194, 195, 70 A.3d 447 (2013). "We assume that the [non-moving party's] pleadings are true and construe all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to [them]." Id. "However, we need not assume the truth of statements in the [non-moving party's] pleadings that are merely conclusions of law." Cluff-Landry v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester, 169 N.H. 670, 673, 156 A.3d 147 (2017). "We then engage in a threshold inquiry that tests the facts in the petition against the applicable law, and if the allegations constitute a basis for legal relief, we must hold that it was improper to grant the motion to dismiss." Plaisted, 165 N.H. at 195, 70 A.3d 447. "When, as here, the parties’ arguments require us to engage in statutory interpretation, our review is de novo." New England Backflow v. Gagne, 172 N.H. 655, 661, 233 A.3d 313 (2019).
"In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole." Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721, 82 A.3d 917 (2013). "We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning." Id. "We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include." Id. "The legislature is not presumed to waste words or enact redundant provisions and whenever possible, every word of a statute should be given effect." Garand v. Town of Exeter, 159 N.H. 136, 141, 977 A.2d 540 (2009) (quotation omitted). "We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result." Carrier, 165 N.H. at 721, 82 A.3d 917. "Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole." Id. "This enables us to better discern the legislature's intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme." Id.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant statutory framework. RSA 230:14, I, provides, in pertinent part, that the Governor may "appoint a commission of 3 persons who, upon hearing, shall determine whether there is occasion for the laying out or alteration of [certain highways] ... as proposed by the commissioner of transportation." RSA 230:14, I. "If such a determination is made by the commission, the commissioner may purchase land or other property that is reasonably necessary for the construction, reconstruction, or alteration and shall lay out the remainder of such highway or alteration." Id. "Any such land or property which cannot be acquired by agreement with the owner or owners thereof may be acquired in accordance with RSA 498-A and all issues that are appealed relating to necessity, public use, and net public benefit shall be determined in accordance with RSA 230:19." Id. In turn, RSA 230:19 provides, in pertinent part, that "there shall be no appeal from [the commission's] findings on the matter of occasion for the laying out of the highway or alteration thereof in the absence of fraud or gross mistake." RSA 230:19.
RSA chapter 498-A provides, in pertinent part, that "any condemnee may file a motion in the office of the board raising preliminary objections to [a] declaration of taking." RSA 498-A:9-a, I. Under the statute, a "[p]reliminary objection shall be limited to and shall be the exclusive method of challenging," among other things, "[t]he necessity, public use, and net-public benefit of the taking." RSA 498-A:9-a, I. "If a condemnee files a preliminary objection under RSA 498-A:9-a, I(c) concerning necessity, public use, or net-public benefit, the board shall transfer that preliminary objection to the superior court ...." RSA 498-A:9-b, I. "Upon receipt of the transfer from the board, the superior court shall require a response from the condemnor and may conduct an evidentiary hearing before it rules on the preliminary objection." RSA 498-A:9-b, II. The stated purpose of RSA chapter 498-A is "to provide a complete and exclusive procedure to govern all condemnations of property for public uses including the review of necessity, public uses, and net-public benefit, and the assessment of damages therefor." RSA 498-A:1, I. "It is not intended to enlarge or diminish the power of condemnation given by law to any condemnor and it is not intended to enlarge or diminish the rights given by law to any condemnee to challenge the necessity, public uses, and net-public benefit for any condemnation." Id. The statute expressly repeals all inconsistent acts or portions of acts. RSA 498-A:29 (2010).
On appeal, the Beatties argue that the trial court erred by applying the fraud or gross mistake standard of review set forth in RSA chapter 230 because RSA chapter 498-A "supersedes" RSA chapter 230 on procedural matters, and, therefore, exclusively governs such matters. See RSA 498-A:1, :29. They contend that a standard of review is a matter of procedural law, and that, under RSA chapter 498-A, the applicable standard is de novo. The State counters that "in order to successfully state a claim...
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