State v. Beaty

• Decision Date: 29 June 1990
• Docket Number: 17385,Nos. 17384,s. 17384
• Citation: 794 P.2d 290,118 Idaho 20
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Bobby Dean BEATY, Defendant-Appellant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Elsie Mae WALLING, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 290

794 P.2d 290

118 Idaho 20

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Bobby Dean BEATY, Defendant-Appellant.

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Elsie Mae WALLING, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 17384, 17385.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 29, 1990.

Johnson & Meikle Law Office, Idaho Falls, for defendants-appellants. David A. Johnson, argued.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen. and James E. Leuenberger, Deputy Atty. Gen., (argued), Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

Substitute Opinion the Court's prior opinion, dated February 14, 1990, is hereby withdrawn.

BENGTSON, Judge Pro Tem.

Bobby Dean Beaty and Elsie Mae Walling each appeal from judgments of conviction for possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver. I.C. § 37-2732. They had entered conditional pleas of guilty, reserving the right to challenge on appeal orders denying their respective motions to suppress evidence. I.C.R. 11(a)(2). The evidence was obtained by police during a search with a warrant. The appellants argue that the police seized the evidence illegally because the magistrate who issued the search warrant had been misled by the failure of police officers to furnish material, exculpatory information when applying for the warrant. The district court, while concluding that probable cause for the issuance of the warrant did not exist, denied the motions to suppress because the warrant was facially valid and there was an absence of any knowing or reckless falsity in the officer's testimony presented to the magistrate. We agree with the district judge's conclusion that probable cause did not exist for the issuance of the search warrant; however, we disagree with his ruling that the search was nevertheless permissible.

The facts are as follows. At approximately 6:00 p.m. on June 22, 1987, the Idaho Falls Police Department received a telephone call from an unknown person who reported that several people were selling drugs (cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana) out of Room 220 at the Motel 6 on West Broadway in Idaho Falls. The caller claimed to have been present earlier in the day when an Idaho Falls woman purchased "two pounds" from people in the motel room. The caller identified two of the people as Beaty and his brother, Marvin Beaty. The caller said that Marvin Beaty lived on Vassar Way in Idaho Falls, that another person who was present was named "Greg" and that one of their vehicles was a small, silver pickup with Oregon license plates.

The Idaho Falls Police Department then commenced an investigation. Detective Todd Ericsson contacted the Motel 6 and determined that Rooms 219 and 220 were registered to Walling who listed a Toyota vehicle with Oregon license plates on the motel registration form. As the result of a minor accident that evening in the motel parking lot, the police talked with persons in a 1981 Chevrolet pickup bearing Oregon license plates; the driver was identified as Beaty, and the passengers as Greg Terry and Karen J. Wilson, all of whom were determined to be occupants of Rooms 219 and 220.

Ericsson had arrested Marvin Beaty several years previously on drug charges. Wilson had been arrested the prior day, June 21, and charged with shoplifting at a supermarket in Idaho Falls. At that time she had in her possession marijuana, methamphetamine, valium, various capsules, and a social security card and a copy of her birth certificate identifying her as Elsie Walling.

During police surveillance of the motel, the occupants of Rooms 219 and 220 were observed carrying packages in and out of the rooms. Beaty was observed carrying a police scanner into one of the rooms.

Around 10:00 to 10:30 p.m. on June 22, 1987, Detective Frei gained entry to both rooms. He was dressed as a maintenance man, claiming he needed to "check the water." The rooms were messy, but Frei observed no evidence of drug trafficking or other illegal activity. Approximately two hours later, at 12:35 a.m. on June 23, Ericsson and the Bonneville County prosecuting attorney appeared before the magistrate, at her residence, for the purpose of obtaining a warrant to search Rooms 219 and 220, the 1981 Chevrolet pickup, the 1968 Toyota, and the persons present for marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, evidence of drug trafficking, and for proof of the identities of the owners/occupants of the rooms and vehicles.

Ericsson testified orally before the magistrate to most of the foregoing facts. However, although he knew Frei had been in the motel rooms and had seen no evidence of illegal activities, he failed to disclose that information to the magistrate. Before issuing the warrant, the magistrate asked Ericsson if he had any additional information incident to this matter. In response, Ericsson did not inform the magistrate that Frei had entered the motel rooms about two hours earlier. Ericsson later testified at the suppression hearing before the district court that he had advised the prosecuting attorney of Frei's entry before applying for the search warrants, that neither felt it was significant, and that there was no conscious decision to keep any information from the magistrate.

The magistrate found probable cause to issue the search warrant, and the search of the motel rooms was conducted at approximately 1:00 a.m. the same morning. The police seized drugs, paraphernalia, and cash, and arrested all four occupants of the rooms. Beaty and Walling were charged with three counts each of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

Beaty and Walling each moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search contending there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and that the omitted exculpatory information may have affected the magistrate's determination that probable cause existed. The district judge noted that the latter issue had yet to be addressed by an Idaho appellate court. He held that the appropriate legal standard was whether the failure to provide the court with such information was deliberate, or with reckless disregard, and material under State v. Lockett, 232 Kan. 317, 654 P.2d 433 (1982), and that there must be a substantial probability that had the information been given to the magistrate, it would have altered her determination of probable cause. State v. Donaldson, 100 N.M. 111, 666 P.2d 1258 (App.1983); United States v. Reivich, 610 F.Supp. 538 (D.C.Mo.1985).

The district court denied the motions to suppress concluding that, while the totality of the circumstances did not support a finding of probable cause, the search was permissible because the omitted information would not have been material in the magistrate's determination of probable cause, the warrant was facially valid, and there was an absence of any knowing or reckless falsity in the officer's testimony. Beaty and Walling then entered conditional guilty pleas to three counts each of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.. Their appeals have been consolidated for all purposes.

The fruits of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant later found to have been issued without probable cause may still be admissible under the Leon good-faith rule, i.e., if the officers acted in "objectively reasonable reliance" on the invalid warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). However, the good-faith rule does not apply in situations where:

(1) the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth (the false information exception);

(2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in such a manner or under such circumstances that no reasonably well-trained officer should rely on the warrant (the neutral and detached magistrate exception);

(3) the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable (the so lacking probable cause exception); or

(4) the warrant is so facially deficient in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the officer cannot reasonably presume the warrant to be valid (the facially deficient warrant exception).

See State v. Prestwich, 115 Idaho 317, 766 P.2d 787 (Ct.App.1988), aff'd on review, 116 Idaho 959, 783 P.2d 298 (1989). In Leon, the United States Supreme Court stated that:

[O]ur good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances--including whether the warrant application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate--may be considered.

468 U.S. at 922, n. 23, 104 S.Ct. at 3420, n. 23.

The application of the good-faith rule by the district court presents a mixed question of law and fact. We defer to factual findings made upon substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of the law as stated in Leon to the facts as found in the instant case. State v. Prestwich, 115 Idaho 317, 766 P.2d 787 (Ct.App.1988).

In light of the record before us, we focus our attention on the "false information" exception to the Leon good-faith rule. As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959, 783 P.2d 298 (1989), the false information exception finds its origin in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). See State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 693 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1984). The Idaho Supreme Court adopted Franks in State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 592 P.2d 852 (1979). ¹

At issue in the instant cases is whether omission, rather than inclusion, of certain information misled the magistrate. We can conceive of no cogent reason why Franks should not be extended to challenges to affidavits based on deliberate or reckless omissions of...