State v. Beaudry, 96-453

• Decision Date: 15 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-453,96-453
• Citation: 937 P.2d 459,282 Mont. 225
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward C. BEAUDRY, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 459

937 P.2d 459

282 Mont. 225

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Edward C. BEAUDRY, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 96-453.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Jan. 23, 1997.

Decided April 15, 1997.

Lorraine A. Schneider; Simonton, Howe & Schneider, Glendive, for Defendant and Appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Cregg Coughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, John Huntley, Fallon County Attorney, Baker, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GRAY, Justice.

Edward C. Beaudry (Beaudry) appeals from the judgment entered by the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Fallon County, on his guilty plea to the felony offense of possession of dangerous drugs, having reserved the right to appeal the court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying Beaudry's motion to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his residence by his probation officer.

Beaudry was convicted of three counts of felony burglary, two counts of felony theft and one count of misdemeanor theft in 1993. He received a three-year deferred sentence, and was placed on probation, in February of 1994. Beaudry's probation included conditions prohibiting him from using alcohol and using or possessing dangerous drugs and from entering bars. It also required him, upon "reasonable cause," to submit to a warrantless search of his person, vehicle or residence by his probation officer.

John Hodge (Hodge) was Beaudry's supervising probation officer. During the time leading up to the search of Beaudry's residence which is at issue in this case, Hodge learned of numerous probation violations, as well as additional potential violations, by Beaudry. Four urine samples taken from Beaudry in 1994 and 1995 indicated that he was using drugs. Beaudry admitted to Hodge on four occasions between March 8, 1994 and June 22, 1995 that he had consumed beer, and Hodge saw Beaudry at bars on two other occasions. In addition, Beaudry was charged with shoplifting in June of 1995, and subsequently pleaded guilty. Moreover Hodge learned that Beaudry had stolen and pawned a .44 caliber handgun. Fallon County Sheriff Tim Barkley also informed Hodge that a second .44 caliber handgun had been stolen and that Beaudry was a suspect in that theft.

On October 24, 1995, Hodge conducted a warrantless search of Beaudry's residence in Baker, Montana, with the aid of a law enforcement officer. Beaudry was not present at the time of the search and did not consent to it. Hodge discovered dangerous drugs during the search.

On November 21, 1995, the State of Montana (State) charged Beaudry with criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony. Beaudry pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Beaudry moved to suppress all evidence seized during Hodge's warrantless search of his residence on the basis that the search violated his constitutional right to privacy and to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The State acknowledged that the search was conducted without a warrant, but argued that Hodge had "reasonable grounds" to conduct the warrantless search. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court made findings relating to the information Hodge possessed at the time of the search; those findings indicated that Hodge had evidence of drinking, drugs and theft by Beaudry. On that basis, the court determined that Hodge had reasonable cause to search Beaudry's residence and denied Beaudry's motion to suppress.

Beaudry subsequently withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the charged felony offense of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Thereafter, the District Court entered judgment, deferring imposition of sentence for one year subject to specified terms and conditions. Beaudry appeals.

Did the District Court err in denying Beaudry's motion to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of his residence by his probation officer?

We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. We also review whether the findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Burchett (1996), 277 Mont. 192, 195-196, 921 P.2d 854, 856.

In this case, the District Court denied Beaudry's motion to suppress based on facts and findings largely undisputed by Beaudry. Specifically, the District Court found that Beaudry's conditions of probation included prohibitions against entering bars, using alcohol and using or possessing illegal drugs. The court also found that:

On June 22, 1994, a sample of Mr. Beaudry's urine tested positive for cannabinoids. On June 9, 1995 a sample of Mr. Beaudry's urine tested positive for cannabinoids. On June 9, 1995, Mr. Beaudry was charged with shoplifting. He subsequently plead guilty. On October 24, 1995, Mr. Beaudry was charged with the theft of a .44 caliber revolver. He subsequently plead guilty. Prior to October 24, 1995, Mr. Beaudry had told [Hodge] on more than one occasion that if he were drinking or using [drugs] that he would shoplift or steal. His history appears to support that statement. Although as of the time of the search [Hodge] knew the .44 caliber revolver Mr. Beaudry had stolen from the Gun Runner Gunshop, had been pawned by Mr. Beaudry, Mr. Hodge also knew that law enforcement also had a report of a second stolen .44 caliber revolver in Baker....

The record also reflected that Hodge knew that Beaudry had consumed beer and been in bars on several occasions. Accordingly, the District Court determined that this underlying factual foundation

gave this probation officer sufficient grounds to believe that Mr. Beaudry was back to drinking and doing drugs and stealing to support those activities. It is not too big of [a] stretch to conclude that evidence of such activities would be found at Mr. Beaudry's residence. The demonstrated, dynamic correlation of Mr. Beaudry's thefts with his drug and alcohol use gave this officer reasonable cause to search his residence for evidence.

It is well-established in Montana that a probation officer may search a probationer's residence without a warrant so long as the officer has reasonable cause for the search. Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 (citations omitted). This "reasonable cause" standard, while substantially less than the probable cause standard required by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, results from the probationer's diminished expectation of privacy and the probation officer's superior position in determining what level of supervision is necessary to provide both rehabilitation of the probationer and safety for society. Burchett, 921 P.2d at 856 (citations omitted). "The probation officer must be able to supervise the probationer, and upon his judgment and expertise, search the probationer's residence...." State v. Burke (1988), 235 Mont. 165, 171, 766 P.2d 254, 257.

As noted above, Beaudry does not challenge the bulk of the District Court's findings. Indeed, he concedes that Hodge had reasonable cause to believe he had violated the conditions of his probation at various times during the twenty-month period immediately preceding the search. His sole contention is that there was an insufficient relationship between his activities and his residence to provide reasonable cause for Hodge's warrantless search of the residence. We disagree.

For purposes relevant to the issue before us, the facts of the present case are similar to those we recently addressed in State v. Boston (1995), 269 Mont. 300, 889 P.2d 814, involving the warrantless search of a parolee's residence and storage garage based on the lesser "reasonable grounds" standard required for such searches. There, parolee Monte Chalmers Boston was subject to a "reasonable cause" warrantless parole search identical to Beaudry's condition of probation. See Boston, 889 P.2d at 815. Boston's parole officer, John Kelly, became aware of evidence linking Boston to an arson fire at the National Center for Appropriate Technology and indicating Boston's first-hand knowledge of an earlier arson fire at the Mormon Church. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815.

Kelly authorized a warrantless search of Boston's residence. After learning that Boston rented a storage garage separate from his residence, Kelly authorized a search of the garage as well. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815.

Boston subsequently was charged with burglary, theft and arson. Boston, 889 P.2d at 815. He moved to suppress all evidence taken during the warrantless searches of his residence and storage garage. Relying on Kelly's testimony about the circumstances surrounding his decision to authorize the searches, the district court determined that Kelly had reasonable cause to authorize the searches. Boston, 889 P.2d at 816.

On appeal, we reiterated the considerations underlying the "reasonable grounds" standard for warrantless searches by probation and parole officers, observing that probationers and parolees have conditional liberty and a reduced privacy interest. See Boston, 889 P.2d at 816-17 (citations omitted). Moreover, a probation or parole officer must be allowed to determine the supervision required and, " 'upon his judgment and expertise, search the probationer's [or parolee's] residence....' " See Boston, ...