State v. Beaumier

Decision Date01 August 1984
Docket NumberNo. 83-507-C,83-507-C
Citation480 A.2d 1367
PartiesSTATE v. Raymond BEAUMIER. A.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court judgment of conviction in which the defendant, Raymond Beaumier (Beaumier or defendant), was found guilty by a jury of (1) committing an assault with intent to kill and (2) assault with an intent to rob. Beaumier raises four issues in this appeal. In answering them, we shall, among other factors, consider a defendant's constitutional confrontation right and the exceptions-to-the-warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

The incident that is the subject of Beaumier's conviction occurred on August 6, 1980, on Main Street in East Greenwich. On that day Robert Bennett, the owner of Bob's Coins and Collectibles, was waiting on a customer who was seeking to add to her stamp collection.

A masked man entered Bennett's store and, brandishing a firearm, demanded that Bennett turn over his money. Bennett, exercising what he considered his own Second Amendment right, quickly aimed a weapon at the intruder. In a shoot-out that followed, Bennett was wounded in the arm. Of the three shots Bennett fired, one he was positive struck the intruder.

As the masked man hurriedly left the shop, the proprietor of the establishment adjacent to Bob's Coins noticed that the getaway car was a large, tan, two-tone automobile. The license plate had been folded in half, its identification numbers obscured.

Later that evening, Sergeant Ronald Lewis of the Providence police department returned home from his patrol shift at approximately 9 p.m. His wife had left him a message instructing him to "call Ray." A phone number accompanied this request.

Initially, Lewis did not know who "Ray" was. However, he dialed the number and soon recognized the voice of Beaumier on the phone. 1 Beaumier apparently told Lewis that he had "held up a place," that he had been shot, and that he had shot the clerk in the store. Lewis further testified that Beaumier told him the store was "an antique or gold store" and that it was located in East Greenwich.

Beamuier's reasons for making the call are not at all clear. Apparently, he wanted Lewis's advice about what course of action he should take. Lewis, true to his badge, told Beaumier to give himself up and immediately seek medical attention. This was not the counsel Beaumier desired; he told Lewis that a person was coming to Beaumier's home "to take the bullets out."

This phone call terminated, Lewis immediately took steps to verify Beamuier's story. The East Greenwich police told Lewis of the incident at Bob's Coins and of their information that the attacker was wounded. Lewis then called Beamuier again. This conversation was much shorter than the first. Beamuier merely stated that he was "not feeling too well" and that he had to end the conversation since the arrival of the would-be surgeon was imminent.

Lewis then organized an official police response to the situation. The response consisted of representatives from three police departments: Providence, of which Lewis was a member; Cranston, the location of the Beaumier residence; and East Greenwich, the location of the shoot-out.

It was approximately midnight when the group finally prepared to gain entrance to Beamuier's home. Lewis, who was familiar to both defendant and his wife, approached the back door and knocked. Mrs. Beaumier opened the door for his admission. As soon as she did so, other police officers soon followed Lewis into the house. Mrs. Beaumier protested their entrance, yelling, "You can't come in here," but her protests went unheeded.

Almost as soon as Lewis entered the kitchen (the room adjacent to the back door), he testified that he heard "noises coming from downstairs in the basement." He went to the basement stairway, saw Beaumier, and directed him to the kitchen. Beaumier, whom Lewis described as wounded in the neck and shoulder, was then taken into custody. 2

At this point, the remaining contingent of officers burst in. Several of them descended into the basement, where a group of the Beaumiers' friends were seated. They were frisked and also escorted from the house. One of the officers testified that he observed a "steaming pan of water," medical supplies, and a bloody towel.

Soon thereafter, at approximately 1 a.m., Mrs. Beaumier signed a consent-to-search form allowing the officers to search the basement area. She also permitted a search of the Beaumiers' car, which matched the description of the getaway car. The search of the automobile revealed no incriminating evidence, and the fruit of the basement search was a box of .32-caliber bullets.

Before addressing the significant constitutional questions raised at trial, we must first consider the propriety of the trial justice's denial of Beaumier's Super.R.Crim.P. 48(b) motion to dismiss. This court has recently stated that this question is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Dionne, R.I., 474 A.2d 445, 449 (1984).

The defendant bears the initial burden of showing that none of the delay was attributable to him. Id. 474 A.2d at 447. If the trial justice is not satisfied that the defendant was not responsible for the delay, this court will not disturb the trial justice's decision. State v. Austin, R.I., 462 A.2d 359, 364 (1983).

In this case, the trial justice concluded that at all times the state was ready for trial. However, as Beaumier's counsel was engaged in another matter from May 1981 until July of 1981, he asked that the court remove the case from the trial calendar. Furthermore, Beaumier twice failed to appear when the case was called for trial--in July and September of 1981. Since defendant failed to carry the initial burden, we will not overturn the trial justice's decision. State v. Austin, 462 A.2d at 364.

The next issue raised by Beaumier relates to the details of the shoot-out. At trial Bennett testified that five shots were fired in the store. At the time the trial started, Beaumier was under the impression that all but one had been found. This information was given to defense counsel pursuant to Rule 16. During the trial, defense counsel learned that the fifth bullet had been discovered. This bullet was imbedded in the door frame of Bob's Coins; only a picture of it existed. Beaumier moved for a mistrial, claiming that this photograph should have been provided him.

On appeal Beaumier admits that the photograph of the bullet (which was lodged in the wall and could not be removed) would not have been covered by a discovery request. Rather, Beaumier argues here that the "surprise at trial" from the disclosure should result in a new trial.

The state never sought to introduce, and did not introduce, the photograph of the doorframe with the bullet. Furthermore, as Beaumier concedes, the state provided all materials requested. Nevertheless, Beaumier claims that a "sleeping volcano" exists, and the sudden discovery of the bullet altered his trial tactics since he was proceeding under a faulty assumption.

However, this problem can in no way be charged to the state. The state did provide the Bob's Coins address in its discovery materials. If defendant had gone to Bob's Coins and Collectibles, the bullet in the wall would have been revealed to him. This failure by defendant to use the provided discovery for investigatory purposes should not lead to a dismissal of the case. 3

The question of the shoot-out is also the subject of another facet of defendant's appeal. In his statement given to the police on the day of the robbery, Bennett said, "I turned towards him and pointed my gun right at him and hesitated as I still thought he was kidding. At that point I heard a shot. It didn't hit me. I had my gun still pointed at him and I proceeded to crank two rounds at him. I know he returned fire at me. I think it was two more shots. At this point I was retreating for the back room and I felt a sting to my right arm. I got into the back room and I heard I think two more shots."

At trial Bennett testified that five shots were fired. The defendant desired to introduce this statement, alleging that it indicates that Bennett originally stated that there had been seven shots. The court did not allow the statement to be admitted for impeachment purposes. Pursuant to State v. Earley, 118 R.I. 205, 373 A.2d 162 (1977), the trial justice concluded that the statement was not inconsistent with the testimony. In reaching this conclusion, the trial justice clearly felt that the second mention of two shots was merely a recapitulation of the two initially mentioned.

This court has held that in order for a statement to be admitted for impeachment purposes, it must be truly inconsistent. State v. Wallace, R.I., 428 A.2d 1070, 1073 (1981). "[T]he inclusion and exclusion of proposed questions on the ground of relevance or materiality is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial justice and may be reviewed only for an abuse thereof." Id. In reviewing the trial justice's decision, we find that there has been no abuse of discretion in finding the statement not materially inconsistent for impeachment purposes.

We now turn to the final two issues. They present significant and difficult questions of law. In answering them, we are now testing the very limits of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination and the exceptions-to-the-warrant requirement.

Sergeant Lewis clearly was the state's most important witness. He established the link between the attempted robbery and defendant by testifying to the allegedly incriminating phone call from Beaumier. Beaumier sought to introduce evidence that at the time of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
40 cases
  • State v. Gonzalez
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • March 29, 2016
    ...been lawful, one of the few "narrowly defined and jealously guarded" exceptions to the warrant requirement must apply. State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I. 1984).[10] The state argues that this case falls within two exceptions to the warrant requirement; it contends: (1) that the en......
  • State v. Oliveira
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • July 6, 2001
    ...who testify against him or her at trial." State v. Olsen, 610 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I.1992) (emphasis added); see also State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1372 (R.I.1984) ("the right of cross-examination is a primary interest secured by the confrontation clause, it being the principal means by w......
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island
    • March 13, 1998
    ...413 (1984)) ("Nor is the prosecution responsible for delivery of information outside [its] custody and control"); State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1371 (R.I.1984), abrogated on unrelated grounds, State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889 (R.I.1997) (no Brady violation emanating from "surprise at trial" ......
  • State v. Picerno, C.A. No. P1-02-3047B (R.I. Super 1/30/2004)
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • January 30, 2004
    ...omitted)). There is no doubt that a search conducted pursuant to valid consent is a constitutionally permissible exception. State v. Beaumier, 480 A.2d 1367, 1374, overruled on other grounds by State v. Rios, 702 A.2d 889, 889-90 (R.I. 1997). The State must prove, by a preponderance of the ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT