State v. Beaver

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRIDGE, J.
• Citation: State v. Beaver, 60 P.3d 586, 148 Wash.2d 338 (Wash. 2002)
• Decision Date: 19 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 72441-5.
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Jermaine T. BEAVER, Respondent.

60 P.3d 586

148 Wash.2d 338

STATE of Washington, Petitioner, v. Jermaine T. BEAVER, Respondent.

No. 72441-5.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued October 24, 2002.

Decided December 19, 2002.

Gerald Horne, Pierce County Prosecutor, Kathleen Proctor, Deputy, Barbara Corey-Boulet, Deputy, Tacoma, for Petitioner.

Pattie Mhoon, Tacoma, for Respondent.

Christine Gregoire, Attorney General, Linda Sullivan-Colglazier, Asst., Oympia, Amicus Curiae on behalf of Department of Social & Health Services.

BRIDGE, J.

Jermaine T. Beaver pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit second degree murder in juvenile court and was given a manifest injustice disposition of confinement until the age of 21 without the possibility of early release. Beaver appealed his disposition to the Court of Appeals, asserting that by statute only the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) has the authority to set a juvenile offender's minimum term. The Court of Appeals agreed, vacated Beaver's minimum sentence, and remanded the case for DSHS to set Beaver's minimum term. We reverse.

I

On August 19, 2000, Beaver and seven other young people decided to find and beat someone up. As the group was discussing who should receive the beating, Erik Toews came into sight and became the ultimate victim. One of the members of the group approached Toews and asked him for a cigarette. While Toews was distracted, another member of the group "`socked [him] in the jaw.'"¹ The group then proceeded to attack, rob, and beat Toews with their fists, feet, and a stick, causing him to fall into a deep coma. Six days later, Toews died from his injuries.²

Beaver, three months shy of his 16th birthday, was charged with murder in the first degree and robbery in the first degree in Pierce County Juvenile Court. In compliance with his plea agreement, Beaver pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit murder in the second degree. The standard sentencing range for this charge is 15 to 36 weeks of confinement in a juvenile institution.³ Pursuant to the plea agreement, Beaver, with the advice of counsel, agreed to the imposition of a manifest injustice disposition. The State and Beaver jointly recommended to the juvenile court judge a manifest injustice disposition of 208 weeks (the equivalent of four years).⁴ Beaver's probation officer, Christal Davis, was initially in support of this joint recommendation. However, after interviewing Beaver the morning of his disposition hearing, Davis changed her recommendation to a manifest injustice disposition until age 21 because of the serious nature of the crime and because in her view, Beaver continued to deny responsibility for and to minimize the consequences of his actions. At the disposition hearing, the judge agreed with Davis and sentenced Beaver to the "Department of JRA [Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration] until he's 21."⁵ Beaver did not appeal his manifest injustice disposition.

A month later, at the request of DSHS,⁶ Beaver's sentencing matter was returned to juvenile court. DSHS presented problems interpreting the disposition language, which required by its terms that Beaver was to be confined "until age 21."⁷ DSHS was uncertain whether the disposition language was also setting a minimum term or whether the juvenile court wanted DSHS to set the minimum term. The juvenile court judge stated that his intention was for Beaver not to be released prior to his 21st birthday. Therefore, the disposition language set both the minimum and maximum term. The juvenile court judge determined that the original disposition was unambiguous; however, he entered an amended order restating his intention.

Beaver challenged the disposition in an appeal to Division Two of the Court of Appeals. Beaver maintained that DSHS has the sole authority to set a juvenile offender's release date or minimum term. In its published opinion,⁸ Division Two of the Court of Appeals agreed with Beaver and remanded the case for DSHS to set the minimum term.⁹ The State sought discretionary review of the Court of Appeals' decision.

II Minimum Term & Release Date: Two Distinct Terms

The court of Appeals concluded that, since under RCW 13.40.210(1) it is the function of DSHS to set a juvenile's release date, DSHS has the authority to set a juvenile's minimum term. The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in this conclusion by using "minimum term" and "release date" interchangeably. We agree.

A legislative body is presumed not to use nonessential words. State v. Lundquist, 60 Wash.2d 397, 403, 374 P.2d 246 (1962). In reviewing an ordinance or statute, we are bound to give meaning, if possible, to every word contained in it. Id. When the Legislature uses different words within the same statute, we recognize that a different meaning is intended. Haley v. Highland, 142 Wash.2d 135, 147, 12 P.3d 119 (2000).

The words "minimum term" and "release date" are found throughout the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, chapter 13.40 RCW,¹⁰ and have also been used within the same paragraph in a statute. Former RCW 13.40.210 (1994), which governs the setting of the release date, states in relevant part:

(1) The [DSHS] secretary shall ... set a release or discharge date for each juvenile committed to its custody.... Such dates shall be determined prior to the expiration of sixty percent of a juvenile's minimum term of confinement included within the prescribed range to which the juvenile has been committed.

LAWS OF 1994, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 7, § 527¹¹ (emphasis added). This example alone makes clear that "release date" and "minimum term" have two separate meanings and that the only synonymous terms are "release" and "discharge." From the plain reading of the statute, it is apparent that it is the function of DSHS to set the release or discharge date.¹² It is equally apparent that a minimum term must first be in existence before a release or discharge date is set. Although it is conceivable that the minimum term may be the same date as the release date, it is not always the case nor should it be presumed to be. See In re Pers. Restraint of Tapley, 72 Wash.App. 440, 448, 865 P.2d 12 (1994) ("[A] juvenile's release date may be set at the minimum, maximum, or anywhere in between.").

Treating the terms synonymously, the Court of Appeals framed the issue in this case as whether DSHS has the exclusive authority to set a juvenile's minimum term under RCW 13.40.210(1). Beaver, 110 Wash.App. at 522-23, 41 P.3d 1222. Yet, RCW 13.40.210 deals specifically with the setting of the juvenile's release date. The Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute blurs the distinction between the two terms. The function of setting a minimum term should not be confused with the statutory authority of DSHS to set the release date of juveniles in confinement.

Setting the Minimum Term for a Manifest Injustice Disposition

Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Therefore, our review is de novo. State v. Watson, 146 Wash.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002). In interpreting the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, we "must examine the statute as a whole and avoid narrow, overly strict interpretations that defeat the intent of the Legislature." State v. Riles, 135 Wash.2d 326, 341-42, 957 P.2d 655 (1998). If the statute is clear on its face, its meaning will be procured from the plain language of the statute. Watson, 146 Wash.2d at 954,51 P.3d 66. The statute is unclear if it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way. Id. at 955, 51 P.3d 66. It is not, however, ambiguous simply because different interpretations are plausible. Id.

When sentencing a juvenile offender, the juvenile court must impose a standard range disposition unless the court finds that the imposition of a standard range sentence would effectuate a manifest injustice. See RCW 13.40.0357 (Option C) and RCW 13.40.160(2). A juvenile committed under a standard range disposition order is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence range as set by statute, whereby the low end of the range represents the minimum term and the high end represents the maximum term of confinement. RCW 13.40.0357 (Option A). A finding that a disposition within a standard range would effectuate a manifest injustice, however, vests the juvenile court "`with broad discretion' in determining the appropriate sentence to impose." State v. B.E.W., 65 Wash.App. 370, 375, 828 P.2d 87 (1992) (quoting State v. Tauala, 54 Wash.App. 81, 86, 771 P.2d 1188, review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1007, 779 P.2d 727 (1989)). In rendering a manifest injustice sentence, the court sentences the juvenile to a maximum term while the minimum term is set using RCW 13.40.030(2). RCW 13.40.160(2). The issue at hand is to decide who sets the minimum term. Beaver contends that this is a function of DSHS, whereas the State believes it is a judicial duty.

By its plain language, RCW 13.40.210 does not apply to manifest injustice dispositions.¹³ To correctly determine the authority for setting the minimum term, the appropriate statutes to examine are RCW 13.40.160 and RCW 13.40.030. RCW 13.40.160 states in relevant part:

(2) If the court concludes, and enters reasons for its conclusion, that disposition within the standard range would effectuate a manifest injustice the court shall impose a disposition outside the standard range, as indicated in option C of RCW 13.40.0357. The court's finding of manifest injustice shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A disposition outside the standard range shall be determinate and shall be comprised of confinement or community supervision, or a combination thereof. When a judge finds a manifest injustice and imposes a sentence of confinement exceeding thirty days, the court shall sentence the juvenile to a maximum term, and the provisions of RCW 13.40.030(2) shall be used to determine the range. A disposition outside the standard range is appealable under RCW 13.40.230 by the state or the respondent.

(Emphasis added.) In...