State v. Beck

• Decision Date: 27 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 20848,20848
• Citation: 913 P.2d 1186,128 Idaho 416
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kevin D. BECK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1186

913 P.2d 1186

128 Idaho 416

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kevin D. BECK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20848.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Feb. 27, 1996.

Petition Review Denied April 18, 1996.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Shoshone County; Hon. Craig C. Kosonen, District Judge.

Order denying motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial right and unified eight-year sentence with three-year minimum term of confinement for sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, affirmed.

Benjamin Simpson, Shoshone County Public Defender, Wallace, for appellant.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General, argued, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge.

Kevin D. Beck entered a conditional plea of guilty to the crime of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, I.C. § 18-1506. Beck appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the charge for violation of the speedy trial guarantee provided by I.C. § 19-3501. Beck also challenges as excessive his unified eight-year sentence with a three-year minimum period of incarceration. We affirm.

I.

FACTS

On November 25, 1992, an information was filed charging Beck with sexual abuse of a nine-year-old girl. A trial was set for May 17, 1993. On that date, however, the trial was vacated in order that another criminal trial, scheduled for the same date before the same judge, could go forward. A new trial date of July 6, 1993, was set for Beck's case. On June 17, 1993, however, Beck entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to I.C.R. 11(a)(2). He reserved the right to appeal from the district court's disposition of a prospective motion to dismiss the charge due to the State's failure to bring Beck to trial within six months as required by I.C. § 19-3501(2). ¹ The motion to dismiss was filed on June 25, 1993, and following a hearing, it was denied. Beck was sentenced to a unified term of eight years, with a three-year determinate term. This appeal followed.

A. Right to a Speedy Trial Under I.C. § 19-3501

Idaho Code § 19-3501 requires that a person accused of a felony be brought to trial within six months from the filing of the indictment or information. ² If this time limit is violated, the charges must be dismissed "unless good cause to the contrary is shown."

To establish a violation of his right under this statute, Beck must make a prima facie showing that he was not brought to trial within six months of the filing of the information and that the trial was not postponed at his request. State v. Cotant, 123 Idaho 787, 788, 852 P.2d 1384, 1385 (1993); State v. Hobson, 99 Idaho 200, 202, 579 P.2d 697, 699 (1978); State v. Lund, 124 Idaho 290, 292 858 P.2d 829, 831 (Ct.App.1993). Here it is uncontroverted that the trial did not occur within the six-month period and that Beck neither requested nor consented to the delay.

With this prima facie showing having been made, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to demonstrate "good cause to the contrary." Cotant, 123 Idaho at 788, 852 P.2d at 1385; Hobson, 99 Idaho at 202, 579 P.2d at 699; Lund, 124 Idaho at 292, 858 P.2d at 831. To ascertain whether good cause exists under I.C. § 19-3501, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-92, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Cotant, 123 Idaho at 788, 852 P.2d at 1385; State v. Sindak, 116 Idaho 185, 187, 774 P.2d 895, 897 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076, 110 S.Ct. 1125, 107 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1990); State v. Russell, 108 Idaho 58, 62, 696 P.2d 909, 913 (1985). The factors that are weighed in this balancing process are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason or reasons for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her speedy trial right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant occasioned by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92; Cotant, 123 Idaho at 788, 852 P.2d at 1385; Sindak, 116 Idaho 185, 774 P.2d 895.

Because there is no bright-line test for determining good cause, the question of whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter for judicial determination based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 496, 745 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Ct.App.1987). On appeal we independently review the lower court's decision. State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803 P.2d 557, 559 (Ct.App.1990); Stuart, supra.

1. Length of Delay

The first of the Barker factors is the length of the delay. In this case, the six-month period for commencement of Beck's trial expired on May 25, 1993. The time that elapsed between that date and Beck's guilty plea was twenty-three days; the delay until the second scheduled trial date of July 6, 1993, was forty-two days. A delay of this duration, though significant, does not weigh heavily in favor of dismissal.

2. Reason for the Delay

The district court found that the court's congested trial calendar was the principal factor causing the delay in bringing Beck to trial. Because of the court's full schedule, Beck was given an initial trial date of May 17, 1993, near the end of the statutory period. The crowded court docket also had led the court to schedule Beck's trial on the same date as the trial for another defendant. Because the defendant in the other case had been incarcerated longer than Beck and because his trial had been previously rescheduled, the district court gave priority to the other defendant and vacated Beck's trial.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a delay caused solely by the overly burdened calendar of the trial court is a neutral factor not attributable to either party. Sindak, 116 Idaho at 187, 774 P.2d at 897; Russell, 108 Idaho at 61, 696 P.2d at 912. Thus, the primary cause of the delay in bringing Beck to trial was a neutral factor in the "good cause" evaluation.

The district court also found, however, that conduct of Beck's defense counsel contributed to the delay. On several occasions prior to the initial trial date, the attorney who was then representing Beck told the trial court that Beck would sign a waiver of his speedy trial right and would thereby consent to postponement of his trial. Defense counsel's representations encouraged the trial court to delay Beck's trial rather than to seek some other solution to the dilemma presented by the court's calendar, such as assigning the case to another judge. On Beck's motion to dismiss, however, the court accepted Beck's assertion that he had never agreed to waive the right to a speedy trial and had never authorized his attorney to make such a representation.

The unauthorized representations of defense counsel do not constitute a waiver of Beck's rights that would preclude Beck from later asserting a violation of his right to a speedy trial. See Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496-97, 745 P.2d at 1117-118. The question of waiver of a right differs, however, from evaluation of the reason for the delay under the Barker balancing test; the court need not ignore defense counsel's role as a contributing cause. Accordingly, the cause of the delay is assignable primarily to the court's heavy trial schedule, but secondarily to defense counsel's representations that Beck would acquiesce in a postponement of his trial.

Beck argues, however, that the State had a duty, which it did not discharge, to forewarn the court of the potential speedy trial problem so the court could take steps to avoid violating I.C. § 19-3501. According to Beck, unless it is shown that the prosecutor notified the court of an impending speedy trial deadline and gave the court an opportunity to avoid a violation, the State has not demonstrated good cause for the delay. In such a circumstance, Beck avers, the defendant is relieved of any need to show either a timely assertion of his right to a speedy trial or prejudice resulting from the delay.

For these arguments, Beck relies upon State v. Cotant, supra. In that case, three magistrates in succession disqualified themselves. Because of delays occasioned by these recusals, the matter was not assigned to the magistrate who ultimately presided until some four and one-half months after Cotant's arraignment. The magistrate scheduled a pretrial conference one day before the expiration of the statutory six-month period. At the pretrial conference, Cotant asserted his right to a speedy trial under Section 19-3501. The magistrate then agreed to clear his calendar so the trial could be conducted on the next day, but both parties were unable to have witnesses available on such short notice. The court then scheduled a trial date that was about two months beyond the statutory deadline. Prior to the trial date, however, the magistrate granted Cotant's motion to dismiss for violation of Section 19-3501. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, stating:

The State cannot simply [sit] back and attribute delay to the court without at least notifying the court of an impending speedy trial problem and giving the court an opportunity to respond by assigning the case to an out of county magistrate or otherwise expediting the trial process.... [T]here is an affirmative duty on the State to see to it that the case is brought to trial within the statutory time period.

Cotant, 123 Idaho at 789, 852 P.2d at 1386. Based upon this language from Cotant, Beck argues that unless the State shows that it forewarned the court of the statutory deadline, it cannot demonstrate good cause for the delay of Beck's trial.

We do not perceive the Cotant decision to have the sweeping effect urged by Beck. In Cotant, the presiding magistrate was unaware that most of the six-month statutory period for bringing the defendant to trial had already expired before the magistrate's assignment, and the magistrate therefore had no knowledge of the impending speedy trial deadline. The Supreme Court made clear that in that circumstance the State has an affirmative duty to notify the...