State v. Beck

• Citation: 1996 SD 30,545 N.W.2d 811
• Decision Date: 13 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 19246,19246
• Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. David Gordon BECK, Defendant and Appellee. . Considered on Briefs
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

Page 811

545 N.W.2d 811

1996 SD 30

STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. David Gordon BECK, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 19246.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs Feb. 13, 1996.

Decided March 27, 1996.

Mark W. Barnett, Atty. Gen., John M. Strohman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for plaintiff and appellant.

Kevin L. Reiner, James and Reiner, Yankton, for defendant and appellee.

MILLER, Chief Justice.

¶1 David Gordon Beck, a prisoner at the Springfield Correctional Facility, alleged that his prosecution for possession of marijuana by an inmate, following the imposition of prison discipline for the same conduct, violated the double jeopardy protections of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court agreed and dismissed the information. State appeals. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

¶2 Beck is a prisoner at the Springfield Correctional Facility, serving time for a conviction of aggravated assault. Based on a tip by a confidential informant, prison and law enforcement officials searched his person and prison cell and found three cigarettes on Beck's person. Chemical analysis indicated the cigarettes contained marijuana.

¶3 As part of the prison disciplinary process, Beck received a form entitled "Notice of Violation of Prohibited Act." The form indicated he had been reported for use or possession of marijuana, a violation of prison rules and also stated that a hearing regarding the alleged violation had been scheduled. Beck marked the following response on the notice form: "I desire to plead: guilty. I waive my right to an adverse hearing and accept the penalty of: 90 days punitive segregation and 90 days loss of good time which I understand will be imposed upon me as soon as possible after I have returned this portion of the Notice to the Disciplinary Office." Beck signed and dated the form on the same day as the search of his cell. He spent 93 days in punitive segregation and lost 90 days of good time as a result of the violation of prison rules. Beck was also transferred to a higher security facility and became ineligible for trustee status.

¶4 Some weeks later, the State charged Beck with a violation of SDCL 24-2-14(1), possession of marijuana by an inmate. State also alleged he was an habitual offender. Beck filed a motion to dismiss the charges claiming the prosecution for possession of marijuana by an inmate, in addition to the prison disciplinary action, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. The trial court agreed, reasoning punitive segregation and loss of good time credits constituted punishment for Beck's marijuana violation; a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct would be a second punishment for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy guarantees.

ISSUE

¶5 Did the trial court err in holding that prison discipline, including punitive segregation and loss of good time, constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy so that a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 This case calls for an analysis of the double jeopardy protections contained in the state and federal constitutions. Constitutional interpretation is a question of law which is reviewable de novo. Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 241 (S.D.1994). Accordingly, we give no deference to the conclusions of the trial court. Id.

DECISION

¶7 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" U.S.Const.Amend. V. This provision is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664 (1969) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969)), overruled on other grounds, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Our state constitution also prohibits double jeopardy: "No person shall ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." S.D.Const. Art. VI, § 9.

¶8 The Double Jeopardy Clause guards against three governmental abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989) (Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717, 89 S.Ct. at 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)).

¶9 This case concerns the prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. In State v. Weekley, 90 S.D. 192, 195, 240 N.W.2d 80, 84 (1976), we held the Double Jeopardy Clause was not violated when a defendant was subjected to prison discipline for escaping from the institution and then criminally prosecuted for the same conduct. We wrote:

[T]he purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to require that a person be subject only once to a criminal proceeding that may result in criminal punishment designed to vindicate public justice. We do not consider administrative discipline imposed by penitentiary officials as constituting that type of proceeding. The administrative discipline imposed by penitentiary officials is designed to serve purposes essential to the orderly administration of the penitentiary. A formal criminal prosecution by the state on a charge of escape, together with the attendant publicity and potentially severe punishment, is designed to vindicate the vital interest that the citizens of this state have in enforcing the law which imposes a sanction for escaping from the penitentiary. True, some of the purposes of the two types of proceedings may overlap, e.g., the deterrent effect the administrative and penal sanctions imposed may have upon others who are contemplating escape; however, other purposes served by the action taken by penitentiary officials, e.g., the necessity of promptly confining a returned escapee in order to maintain security within the institution, may be different from the purposes served by the prosecution on the charge of escape brought in the name of the state. Although appellant argues that the deprivation of liberty resulting from his being confined in isolation did not secure the objectives of preserving order, preventing escape, or rehabilitating an escapee, that is a question committed to the considered judgment of those officials charged with the responsibility of operating the penitentiary. It is for those officials, possessing expertise with respect to the maintenance of order, morale and discipline within a penal institution, to decide whether or not the imposition of administrative sanctions upon a returned escapee is necessary or desirable to further the objectives of maintaining an orderly institution.

90 S.D. at 195-96, 240 N.W.2d at 82-3 (emphasis supplied).

¶10 Weekley would appear to resolve the issue presented here. However, the trial court concluded that a subsequent decision by the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), mandates a different result. In Halper, Irwin Halper had submitted sixty-five separate false claims for Medicare reimbursement, resulting in an overpayment of $585 by the federal government. The United States indicted Halper on sixty-five counts of violating the criminal false-claims statute and he was convicted on all counts. He was also convicted of mail fraud. He received a two-year prison sentence and a fine of $5,000. The United States then brought an action against Halper under the civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31, under which a single false claim could result in a civil penalty of $2,000 payable to the government. Because Halper had violated the Act sixty-five times, he could be subjected to a statutory penalty of $130,000. The district court declined to award this figure, concluding the $2000-per-count penalty, coupled with the previous conviction and sentence, would violate the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments. Instead, the district court limited the government's recovery to double damages of $1170 and the costs of the civil action.

¶11 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the statutory penalty authorized by the civil False Claims Act, under which Halper is subject to liability of $130,000 for false claims amounting to $585, constitutes a second 'punishment' for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis." 490 U.S. at 441, 109 S.Ct. at 1898, 104 L.Ed.2d at 497. The Court set forth a test for determining the punitive character of civil proceedings:

[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment[.] ... We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.

490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502.

¶12 The Court reasoned that a civil penalty, which is "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the damages caused by the defendant, loses its remedial character and constitutes punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502. The Court wrote:

Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant is entitled...