State v. Becker

Decision Date14 December 1976
Docket NumberNo. 75--723--CR,75--723--CR
Citation74 Wis.2d 675,247 N.W.2d 495
PartiesSTATE of Wisconsin, Respondent, v. Darrell BECKER, Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

Jack E. Schairer, Asst. State Public Defender, with whom on the briefs was Howard B. Eisenberg, State Public Defender, for appellant.

Marguerite M. Moeller, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief was Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

HEFFERNAN, Justice.

The facts are not disputed. There was sufficient evidence to convict Darrell Becker of the unlawful delivery of amphetamines, contrary to sec. 161.41(1)(b), Stats., and the unlawful delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, contrary to sec. 161.41(2m).

The only question is whether the circuit court had jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, to try Becker when the delivery of the substances was made by Becker when he was seventeen years of age but the charge was brought after he attained the age of eighteen.

State ex rel. Koopman v. Waukesha County Court Judges, 38 Wis.2d 492, 157 N.W.2d 623 (1968), held that, under sec. 48.12, Stats., and sec. 48.02(3), a juvenile court has jurisdiction only when the defendant is under the age of eighteen when charged. That such is the accepted rule in Wisconsin is acknowledged by Becker's counsel, the State Public Defender.

The State Public Defender argues, however, that Miller v. Quatsoe, 348 F.Supp. 764 (E.D.Wis.1972), is persuasive authority for the proposition that a child who has committed an offense while under the age of eighteen can only be charged in an adult criminal court when it is determined after a hearing that prosecution was initiated with due dispatch.

The following language of the United States District Court is relied upon:

'In conclusion, it is important to note that I do not today pass upon that aspect of Wisconsin law which holds that juvenile court jurisdiction is determined by the offender's age at the time the criminal complaint is brought, nor do I suggest that anytime the bringing of a complaint is delayed, and this delay causes juvenile court jurisdiction to lapse, that the constitution is infringed. Rather, I hold only that when the filing of the complaint determines juvenile court jurisdiction, then this filing cannot be delayed in order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction unless the juvenile is granted a hearing with the necessary constitutional safeguards.' (at 766)

We have no quarrel with this language and agree that, where the filing is 'delayed in order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction,' the circuit court can maintain jurisdiction only after a due-process hearing.

We conclude that the hearing referred to in Miller is the hearing to determine whether the delay in charging was in fact occasioned by a deliberate effort to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction. The hearing referred to is not the 'waiver' hearing which is required when the juvenile court has jurisdiction and it is desired to try the defendant as an adult. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

In Miller, supra, the district court stated:

'Administrators of a state juvenile system may not manipulate administrative procedures so as to avoid state and constitutional procedural rights and meant to protect juveniles.' (at 766)

It is this manipulation of the system for the purpose of avoiding the juvenile court that is proscribed. Miller does not address itself to situations where the juvenile system is not manipulatively avoided.

A review of the facts of Miller puts this in perspective. Miller, while in custody in the county jail and while within three weeks of his eighteenth birthday, stabbed a guard with a ballpoint pen. The record is clear that the charging authorities deliberately, and with only the avowed purpose of avoiding juvenile jurisdiction, deferred charging until the day after Miller attained the age of eighteen. This clearly evinced a manipulative intent to avoid the procedural and statutory safeguards afforded by the system of juvenile justice.

The facts in the instant case do not reveal a manipulation of the system which Miller proscribes.

In the instant case, there was an ongoing drug investigation. The deliveries were made by Becker in February of 1975 at a time when he was seventeen years old. He, having become eighteen on July 13, 1975, was charged as an adult on September 9, 1975. On that same date, eight other persons were charged with drug violations that occurred between November of 1974 and July 25, 1975. The investigation was completed in August of 1975.

There was no apparent manipulation of the juvenile system to avoid charging Becker while he was within the age-limit jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Prima facie, it is apparent that he was charged at the same time that all other drug offenders revealed in the same investigation were charged.

Nevertheless, we hold that, when the...

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30 cases
  • State v. Annala, 90-2162-CR
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • November 26, 1991
    .......         In State v. Becker, 74 Wis.2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976), this court held that before an adult defendant could be tried for an offense committed before he was eighteen ......
  • State v. Manns, 16358
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • April 18, 1985
    ......Guerry, 210 Va. 268, 170 S.E.2d 1 (1969); State v. Calderon, 102 Wash.2d 348, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984) (En Banc); State v. Becker, 74 Wis.2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976); State ex rel. Koopman v. County Court, 38 Wis.2d 492, 157 N.W.2d 623 (1968); S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles ......
  • State v. Sanders, 2015AP2328-CR
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
    • May 18, 2018
    ...right to due process when it delays charging as part of "a deliberate effort to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction." 74 Wis. 2d 675, 677, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976). If a defendant alleges, with particularity, that the State intentionally delayed filing charges to avoid a juvenile delinquency pro......
  • State v. Schroeder, 98-1420
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
    • February 4, 1999
    ...he turned eighteen. He pleaded guilty to both counts. Schroeder contends that he was entitled to a hearing under State v. Becker, 74 Wis.2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976), at which the State had to establish that it did not intentionally delay filing the criminal complaint until after his eight......
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