State v. Beckstrom

• Court: Utah Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CHRISTIANSEN
• Citation: State v. Beckstrom, 307 P.3d 677, 739 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah App. 2013)
• Decision Date: 26 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20111081–CA.,20111081–CA.
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Tanga BECKSTROM, Defendant and Appellant.

307 P.3d 677

739 Utah Adv. Rep. 4

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Tanga BECKSTROM, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 20111081–CA.

Court of Appeals of Utah.

July 26, 2013.

Aaron P. Dodd and Dustin Parmley, for Appellant.

John E. Swallow and Ryan D. Tenney, for Appellee.

Opinion

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

¶ 1 Defendant Tanga Beckstrom appeals from an order of restitution entered after her felony conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) that resulted in serious bodily injury to another.¹ We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On an evening in January 2010, a vehicle operated by Defendant abruptly turned onto State Street in Lehi and proceeded in the direction of oncoming traffic. Defendant's vehicle collided with a car driven by a married couple (Husband and Wife). Defendant was heavily intoxicated at the time of the accident. Although Defendant was not seriously hurt, Husband and Wife were both seriously injured—indeed, Husband sustained permanent brain damage. Police officers responded to the scene shortly after the accident.

¶ 3 Because of heavy snowfall and poor road conditions, the officers asked Defendant to accompany them to the police station so that field sobriety tests could be conducted in a lighted, heated, and secured parking garage. The officers arrested Defendant at the station after she failed the field sobriety tests, admitted to consuming numerous shots of vodka prior to the accident, and registered a blood alcohol content of .228—nearly three times the legal limit. ² The State charged Defendant with one count of DUI, seeUtah Code Ann. § 41–6a–502 (LexisNexis 2010), a third degree felony based on the serious bodily injury suffered by Husband, see id. § 41–6a–503(2)(a), and one count of failing to yield, see id. § 41–6a–903, a class C misdemeanor, see id. § 41–6a–202(2).

¶ 4 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence the officers gathered at the station, which the trial court denied. Defendant subsequently pleaded no contest to a third degree felony DUI, conditioned on her right to appeal the denial of her suppression motion.³ Specifically, Defendant agreed to the following factual basis in her plea agreement:

On or about 22 January 2010, in Lehi, Utah County [Defendant] operated a motor vehicle at a time when [she] was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that [she] could not safely operate the vehicle; as a result of entering a lane of travel, [she] collided with another vehicle; a passenger of the other vehicle suffered loss of consciousness and traumatic brain injury resulting in protracted impairment of his brain function.

On March 3, 2011, Defendant was sentenced to probation for thirty-six months, a jail term of 180 days, and a fine of $2,883. The issue of restitution was to be “held open.”

¶ 5 The trial court scheduled a hearing for May 12, 2011, to determine restitution. However, that hearing was continued until June 16 so Defendant's trial counsel (Trial Counsel) could review Husband's and Wife's restitution information with the civil attorney that was handling those issues. Trial Counsel advised the court that he wanted to investigate Husband's and Wife's claimed expenses further before deciding whether to contest those amounts in the criminal case. At the June 16 restitution hearing, Defendant, acting on the advice of Trial Counsel, stipulated to complete restitution in the amount of $5,442.24 for Wife and $92,036.03 for Husband. The court then scheduled a review hearing to determine the amount of court-ordered restitution and instructed Defendant to complete a financial affidavit in preparation for that hearing.

¶ 6 Prior to the review hearing, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the order of complete restitution. Defendant argued that despite her stipulation, the complete restitution order violated her due process rights because it was an unconstitutional taking and because it became a civil judgment against her even though a determination of comparative fault was never made. On November 17, 2011, the day of the restitution review hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's motion to vacate, thereby binding her to the stipulated amount. In addition, the court ruled that based on the evidence presented at the hearing, Defendant was capable of paying $300 per month in court-ordered restitution over the course of her probation. The court also extended Defendant's probationary period to ninety-six months. Thus, the court's amended order of restitution required Defendant to pay court-ordered restitution in the amount of $28,800, with $1,607 to be paid to Wife and $27,193 to be paid to Husband. Defendant appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 7 On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court's determination of both complete restitution and court-ordered restitution. “[I]n the case of restitution, a reviewing court will not disturb a district court's determination unless the court exceeds the authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.” State v. Laycock, 2009 UT 53, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 104. With regard to the complete restitution amount, we must first determine if Defendant's stipulation to an amount of complete restitution precludes her claims on appeal. Defendant argues that even if she is estopped from challenging complete restitution, Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising her to stipulate to the amount of complete restitution. “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal presents a question of law.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.

ANALYSIS

I. Defendant's Stipulation Estops Her from Challenging the Complete Restitution Determination on Appeal.

¶ 8 Defendant argues that the trial court's acceptance of the stipulated amount of complete restitution was erroneous because the court unconstitutionally deprived her of her right to due process and abused its discretion in entering the complete restitution order without providing an opportunity to discover and present evidence of comparative negligence. “When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of [the defendant's] crime....” Utah Code Ann. § 77–38a–302(1) (LexisNexis 2012). When making a restitution determination, the court “shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.” Id. § 77–38a–302(2). “ ‘Complete restitution’ means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant,” whereas “ ‘[c]ourt-ordered restitution’ means the restitution the court ... orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of sentencing or within one year after sentencing.” Id. § 77–38a–302(2)(a)–(b).

¶ 9 Defendant is estopped from raising her complete restitution claims on appeal because she stipulated to the amount of complete restitution and did not properly challenge the trial court's denial of her motion to vacate that stipulation. In Prinsburg State Bank v. Abundo, 2012 UT 94, 296 P.3d 709, the supreme court observed that because “stipulations are binding on the parties and the court,” “a stipulation entered into by the parties and accepted by the court ‘acts as an estoppel upon the parties thereto and is conclusive of all matters necessarily included in the stipulation.’ ” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 11, ¶ 20, 20 P.3d 287). Also, the moment “a court adopts a stipulation of the parties, the issues to which the parties have stipulated become ‘settled’ and [are] ‘not reserved for future consideration.’ ” Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Amoss v. Bennion, 30 Utah 2d 312, 517 P.2d 1008, 1009–10 (1973)); see also Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2000 UT 36, ¶ 11, 1 P.3d 539 (“[T]here is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice of counsel.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “[a] party who stipulates to a court's actions ‘may not ... complain about them on appeal.’ ” Prinsburg State Bank, 2012 UT 94, ¶ 13, 296 P.3d 709 (omission in original) (quoting DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah Ct.App.1995)).

¶ 10 Accompanied by Trial Counsel, Defendant stipulated to the amount of complete restitution in open court. Prior to entering into the stipulation, Defendant received the advice of Trial Counsel and had more than three months after the sentencing hearing to consider whether to enter into the stipulation. Trial Counsel even requested and received a continuance of the original restitution hearing so he could review Husband's and Wife's restitution information with Husband and Wife's civil attorney. Trial Counsel expressed his desire to investigate the validity of the claimed expenses before having Defendant stipulate to such an amount. Thus, it is clear that Defendant, with the advice of Trial Counsel, willingly entered into a binding stipulation with full opportunity to investigate the attendant circumstances and consequences of doing so. Accordingly, we hold that Defendant is estopped from contesting the trial court's determination of complete restitution. ⁴

¶ 11 There are instances where a trial court “may exercise its discretion to set aside a stipulation,” assuming certain conditions are met. Prinsburg State Bank, 2012 UT 94, ¶ 14, 296 P.3d 709. “ ‘First, the party seeking relief from the stipulation must request it by motion from the trial court. Second, the motion ... must be timely filed. Third, [the motion] must show that the stipulation was entered into inadvertently’ or that it should be set aside ‘for justifiable cause.’ ” Id. (omission in original) (quoting Yeargin, 2001 UT 11, ¶ 21, 20 P.3d 287). A finding of inadvertence or justifiable cause is available only “ ‘if the mistake is not due to failure to exercise due diligence and it...