State v. Beckwith

• Decision Date: 06 February 1951
• Docket Number: No. 47669,47669
• Citation: 242 Iowa 228,46 N.W.2d 20
• Parties: STATE v. BECKWITH.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 20

46 N.W.2d 20

242 Iowa 228

STATE v. BECKWITH.

No. 47669.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 6, 1951.

W. L. Beecher, of Waterloo, and E. W. Ruppelt, of Grundy Center, for appellant.

Robert L. Larson, Atty. Gen., Don Hise, Asst. Atty. Gen., B. K. Willoughby, County Atty. for Grundy County, Grundy Center, and Robert R. Buckmaster, of Waterloo, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The defendant was charged, by county attorney's information, with the murder of Irma Jean Stahlhut, committed on or about June 22, 1949, in Grundy county, Iowa. A change of venue was granted, and the cause was tried in the district court of Black Hawk county.

Irma Jean Stahlhut and her husband, Harvey Stahlhut, operated a tavern in the small town of Morrison in Grundy county. They were married in 1947 and were the parents of one son who was seventeen months old at the time of the trial. Harvey Stahlhut had other employment, which took him away from the tavern a part of the time, so that its operation fell considerably upon his wife, with some intermittent outside help. The defendant lived at Morrison, and apparently upon occasion had rendered some aid in the operation of the Stahlhut Tavern. He was married, but his wife had left him and refused to return, or to live with him. He was 28 years of age on June 22, 1949.

Irma Jean Stahlhut was in charge of the tavern on the evening of June 22, 1949. There were customers as late as 11:45, and the defendant had spent much of the evening there. Harvey Stahlhut returned to the tavern, in the rear of which the couple and their baby son lived, about 12:25 on the morning of June 23rd. He did not see his wife, went to bed about 12:40, and upon awakening about 3:45, and finding her still missing, made a search of the tavern and found her horribly mutilated body in the 'walk-in' cooler.

The crime was a particularly brutal and revolting one, but there can be no real doubt that a jury question is involved, and no good purpose would be served by further details. Defendant, as a witness in his own behalf, admitted his presence in the tavern, that he followed Irma Jean Stahlhut into the cooler, and that he stabbed her there. He denies the mutilation of her body, and defends upon the grounds of insanity and intoxication. Upon this appeal various legal questions are presented which are discussed in the opinion.

I. Defendant's first assignment of error is based upon the court's denial of challenges for cause to four jurors on voir dire. Section 779.5, Codes 1946 and 1950, I.C.A. contains the applicable ground for challenges for cause involved here: '11. Having formed or expressed such an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the prisoner as would prevent him from rendering a true verdict upon the evidence submitted on the trial.'

Some well-established principles are applicable to the situation existing here. The trial court has a large, but not unlimited, discretion in allowing or disallowing challenges for cause in criminal cases. State v. Rhodes, 227 Iowa 332, 340, 228 N.W. 98; State v. Reed, 205 Iowa 858, 859, 216 N.W. 759. Likewise, it is settled law that if a disqualified juror is left upon the jury in the face of a proper challenge for cause, so that defendant must either use one of his peremptory challenges or permit the juror to sit, and if defendant does use all of his peremptory challenges, prejudice will be presumed. State v. Reed, 201 Iowa 1352, 1354, 208 N.W. 308. Defendant should not be compelled to use his peremptory challenges upon prospective jurors who should have been excused for cause.

The jurors as to whom defendant's challenges for cause were denied by the court where Robert Pierce, Harry Moon, Clyde L. Border, and Thelma Stimson. Pierce was the subject of the state's first peremptory challenge. Clearly, no prejudice resulted to the defendant, even if error were present in the trial court's ruling on the challenge to this juror for cause. The juror Thelma Stimson was in our opinion sufficiently, if not abundantly, qualified upon her voir dire. It remains to consider the record with reference to Harry Moon and Clyde L. Border.

The juror Moon at first said that he had an opinion at the time. 'I would decide the case solely on the facts but believe I am prejudiced now. I don't exactly know whether he is guilty or innocent. I could decide the case solely on the evidence and put the opinion I now have out of my mind and I would do that.' Later, this occurred:

'If the evidence warranted it I believe I would be just and fair on it. I do have an opinion now and I now am prejudiced. I think I would be fair if the facts were presented.

'Q. Do you think you could set aside that opinion and prejudice?

'A. Probably not entirely.

'I think I would start out with the idea that the defendant was guilty and maintain that idea until evidence was introduced to show otherwise. I don't know as it would have anything to do with the kind of verdict I would render if the facts were there. I think I would act on the facts fairly and squarely. It might have an unconscious influence.'

The court then took over the examination of the juror, eliciting the following:

'The Court: And you understand that if you are chosen as a member of the jury in this case you will have to determine the matter solely upon the evidence you hear from the witness stand and under the instructions of the court? A. I understand that, sir.

'The Court: Notwithstanding any opinion or prejudices that you have? A. Yes.

'The Court: Can you do that? A. I can.

'The Court: And you will? A. Yes.

'The Court: The challenge is overruled.'

But after this, the record shows that the examination of the juror closed with the following statement: 'I think it would be difficult for me to acquit, yes. The attitude I now have might have some influence upon my verdict. I still say I would be fair about it and go by what the evidence warranted. With the opinion I now have it would be difficult for me to acquit even though the evidence warranted it.' (Italics supplied.)

The challenge for cause was renewed and again denid. Defendant removed the juror by the exercise of one of his peremptory challenges.

The record upon the voir dire examination of the prospective juror Clyde L. Border shows:

'I have some actual knowledge of the facts in this case. I have my opinion on it anyhow. I do not have any actual knowledge. I read the newspapers and heard quite a lot on the radio and quite a lot else. The people the lived at Morrison and owned the tavern there are very good friends of my next door neighor and we have talked about if different times after it happened. I have seen the Stahlhuts different times. I am not acquainted with them, only by seeing them is all. By talking with my neighbors I have formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. I don't know the defendant. I have heard of him. I don't know that the defendant committed this crime, but I have an opinion as to whether he did or not. I think I have an opinion as to whether he was sane or insane. I couldn't be positive, I have no actual knowledge. It would be hard for me to put the opinion I now have aside and decide this case solely on the vidence. I could do it. I'll say there would have to be a lot of evidence. If I took the oath I could decide this case on the evidence. I would have to.

'I have the opinion now. It would be hard for me to discard that opinion entirely if I were selected as a juror in this case. Of all the evidence that I have heard, and everything, I don't think I could be a juror in this case. I think that what I have heard might influence me in my verdict even though I tried not to let it do so.'

The court then examined:

'Well, you understand that if you were selected as--to sit as a juror in this case you take an oath and you are to arrive at your verdict solely upon the evidence that you hear in the court room or the exhibits that are introduced? A. Yes, sir.

'The Court: And accordingly apply those facts according to the law as the court gives it to you in the instructions? A. Yes.

'The Court: You understand that? A. Yes.

'The Court: Notwithstanding any prejudice or opinion that you might now have. Can you do that? A. Yes, I can do it.

'The Court: Will you do it? A. Yes.

'The Court: Challenge is overruled.'

Upon further examination the juror said: 'I think I would unconsciously be influenced by the opinion I have now.' The challenge was renewed and the trial court examined further.

'You just told this court a few minutes ago that notwithstanding any opinion or prejudice which you now have that you could and would, if eslected as a juror, determine or arrive at a verdict solely on the evidence introduced in this case, evidence and exhibits, and in accordance with the instructions of the court. New do you wish to change your answers? Your prior answers? Well, I don't believe I could give a fair verdict.

'The Court: You understand that all the time you have been on the witness stand there you have been under oath? A. Yes.

'The Court: And you want to tell the court now that you didn't correctly inform him when he previously asked you about what you could do? A. No.

'The Court: Well then notwithstanding your prejudice or opinion that you might have now, can you and will you, if selected as a juror, determine it solely upon the evidence introduced and the instructions of the court? A. Yes, I will.

'The Court: Challenge is overruled.'

Court having adjourned at this time, the juror was further examined the next morning, when he said: 'I read the newspapers in regard to this transaction and discussed it with friends and had formed an opinion at that time. I don't have an opinion now as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant.'

The defendant removed the juror by the exercise of a peremptory challenge.

We reviewed the law and the authorities exhaustively in State v. Rhodes, supra, and it is not required that we again analyze...