State v. Bedard
| Citation | 26 A. 719,65 Vt. 278 |
| Parties | STATE v. PHILIP BEDARD |
| Decision Date | 17 May 1893 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Vermont |
GENERAL TERM, 1892
Indictment for rape. Trial by jury at the April term, 1891 Chittenden county, THOMPSON, J., presiding. Verdict of guilty. Exceptions by the respondent. The case appears in the opinion.
Judgment of guilty rendered upon the verdict, and sentence passed, and execution thereof ordered.
J A. Brown and Henry Ballard for the respondent.
The respondent is charged with having committed the crime of rape upon the person of one Mary Pratt. The State claimed that just before the commission of this offence Miss Pratt and one Gonyeau, who was accompanying her, were attacked by the respondent and two persons named Blow and Wilkins. Gonyeau, being called as a witness for the State, identified the respondent as one of the persons who made this assault, and also testified that on the morning following the assault he saw the respondent and Blow at Winooski, and then recognized them as two of his assailants. It further appeared from his testimony that on this occasion some one asked him if he recognized any of the assaulting party among the persons present, and that he replied in the negative. At some stage of the evidence the respondent claimed that what Gonyeau said on this occasion tended to impeach his testimony that he then recognized the respondent as one of his assailants, and also tended to discredit his identification of the respondent in court. The State was thereupon permitted to obtain from the witness the explanation that he answered as he did on the occasion referred to because he was afraid if he said anything in particular at that time the respondent would get away.
It does not directly appear in what stages of Gonyeau's examination the different portions of this testimony were given. As the exceptions stand it may, perhaps, fairly be claimed that they were all parts of the direct examination. But it does distinctly appear that the explanation was permitted in view of a claim made by the respondent that the statement of the witness at Winooski tended to discredit his subsequent testimony and identification. Unexplained, it certainly had this tendency; and we think that, even if the evidence of the statement came in upon direct examination, it was proper to permit the State to meet the respondent's claim by showing how the statement came to be made. The respondent was not entitled to insist that this denial, which may have been necessary to prevent his escape from arrest, should be suffered to discredit the prosecution for the want of an explanation. And if the respondent's claim had not been advanced as it was, the right of the State to offer the explanation would perhaps have been the same, because of the probability that if the statement remained unexplained an injurious inference would be suggested in argument, or arise in the minds of the jury without suggestion.
It appeared from the testimony of one Flanagan that about the time, and not far from the place of the alleged assault, he saw three young men whom he did not then know. It appeared from other evidence that on the day following, the respondent and Blow were taken from the police office to the jail in a wagon; and Flanagan was permitted to testify that he saw the two men in this wagon, and that he then identified them as two of the persons whom he had seen the evening before. It can hardly be questioned that it was proper for the State to establish by this witness that the persons who were shown by other testimony to have been Blow and the respondent were two of three persons who were together near the place of the alleged assault about the time it was claimed to have occurred. But the respondent insists that evidence that the witness "identified" these persons was evidence that he then pointed them out, or otherwise designated them, to some one as having been so observed. Whether this would have been error, it is not necessary to consider; for we think the force of the testimony, as shown by the exceptions, was simply that the witness then recognized the two persons in the wagon as two of those whom he had previously seen.
The State was permitted to show that while going home after the alleged assault the prosecutrix cried continuously. We think the ruling was correct. Courts are not entirely agreed as to the precise ground upon which such evidence is received, but its admission has been sustained in several well considered cases. It may perhaps properly be said that indications of distress are in the nature of a complaint. They ordinarily precede and lead up to the making of a definite complaint. Evidence of them need not be rejected on the ground that they are easily simulated, and are in the nature of evidence made by a party in his own favor, for the same is true of the complaint itself. Proof of the complaint is received in disregard of the general rules of evidence, because of the peculiar nature of the charge, and of the suspicion with which the law regards the testimony of the prosecutrix. The law considers that the prosecutrix stands in need of corroboration irrespective of the defence, and so permits this corroborative fact to be shown in the opening. It is clearly within the reason of this exception for the State to show that from the time of the alleged outrage until the making of the complaint the appearance and conduct of the prosecutrix were consistent with her claim. Evidence tending to show physical prostration or mental distress would thus be admissible. And the physical and mental condition of the prosecutrix may often tend to explain what might otherwise be deemed a suspicious delay in making complaint. The weight to be given to the fact of...
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