State v. Beddia, Cr. A. No. 0811006506 (Del.Gen.Sess. 8/27/2009)
| Decision Date | 27 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | Cr. A. No: 0811006506. |
| Parties | STATE OF DELAWARE Petitioner v. VINCENT S. BEDDIA, Respondent |
| Court | Court of General Sessions of Delaware |
Michael Hendee, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for State
Louis B. Ferrara, Esquire, Ferrara & Haley, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Defendant
Final Order and Decision on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
On August 5, 2009, a hearing was held in this Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The limited legal issue to be basis heard at this bifurcated hearing as set forth in paragraph (2)(a) of the Motion was that the Investigating Police Officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the Defendant or require defendant to perform field coordination tests on the date, time, and place set forth in the Information. After receipt of testimony and legal argument by the parties, the Court reserved decision. This is the Court's Final Order and Decision on Defendant's Motion.
The Facts.
On November 10, 2008, at approximately 1:30 p.m., Sgt. Spagnolo of Delaware State Police Troop 2 had stopped to order lunch at Chick-Fil-A fast food restaurant in the Governor's Square Shopping Center on Route 40 in Bear, Delaware.1 Sgt. Sapgnolo had been working at headquarters at an administrative function. After ordering his lunch at the drive-up window, a Chick-Fil-A employee informed him that his lunch order was not yet ready, and requested him to park his vehicle into the restaurant's parking lot so that an employee could deliver his food order once it was prepared.
While Sgt. Spagnolo was waiting for his order in a parking lot, an unidentified Chick-Fil-A employee (hereinafter "the informant") approached Sgt. Spagnolo's vehicle and informed him that there was a vehicle being operated by a subject who may have been under the influence of alcohol in the drive-up lane of the restaurant. The car was identified as a red Ford Explorer. Sgt. Spagnolo asked the informant how he knew that that the individual may have been under the influence of alcohol. The informant replied that the individual had "very slurred speech" and that there was an open container of alcohol inside the vehicle. The informant further provided a description of the vehicle as a red Ford Explorer (hereinafter "the suspect vehicle"), and stated that there were two white males inside the vehicle.
Sgt. Spagnolo then observed the suspect vehicle drive to the pickup window and proceed past Sgt. Spagnolo's car and around a corner into the adjacent parking lot. As the suspect vehicle turned the corner, Sgt. Spagnolo observed a container of beer in the passenger's hand. At this point, Sgt. Spagnolo made a decision to stop the defendant's motor vehicle. While driving his unmarked vehicle, he followed the vehicle as it travelled approximately 100 feet and stopped in a parking space. Sgt. Spagnolo did not activate his emergency lights or siren, and parked his vehicle in front and partially to the side of the suspect vehicle. Sgt. Spagnolo then approached the vehicle, identified himself as a Police Officer to the driver; later identified as Defendant Vincent J. Beddia (hereinafter "Beddia" or "defendant"). He informed defendant that he had received a report from a Chick-Fil-A employee that the driver had been driver had been drinking and driving.2 Beddia responded that he had taken the day off from work on bereavement because his sister had passed away and he attend her funeral.
At that point, Sgt. Spagnolo noticed that defendant had a moderate odor of alcohol on his breath and that his eyes were "somewhat bloodshot." He also noticed that an individual in the front passenger seat had a can of beer in his hand, as well as two additional beer cans at his feet. Sgt. Spagnolo asked defendant for his driver's license, registration, and insurance, which Beddia provided immediately. Sgt. Spagnolo described Beddia's demeanor during the exchange as "very polite" and "very cooperative." Defendant informed Sgt. Spagnolo that he was on a bereavement day to attend his sister's funeral.
Sgt. Spagnolo then returned to his police vehicle and called for a road unit to respond to the scene. He then approached the Beddia's vehicle and requested him to exit his motor vehicle in order to perform a series of field sobriety tests.
Upon cross examination during the suppression hearing, Sgt. Spagnolo admitted that he did not see the suspect vehicle commit any motor vehicle or Title 21 violations, and that he would not have stopped the vehicle without the tip from the Chick-Fil-A employee. In addition, Sgt. Spagnolo testified that he did not know whether the informant personally observed any of the reported details or whether a third party reported these details about the defendant to the Chick-Fil-A employee he spoke with. He also testified that during his conversation with Beddia, he did not notice any slurred speech on Beddia's part.
On cross-examination Sgt. Spagnolo testified he did not personally observe the defendant "do anything wrong". Sgt. Spagnolo admitted the defendant did not have an open container of beer and the two beers observed were on the floor in the motor vehicle in front of the passenger. Sgt. Spagnolo observed defendant drive 100 feet without any motor vehicle violations and the defendant parked properly in a parking spot. The defendant `promptly responded" to his questions and responded in an "appropriate fashion". The defendant had "no difficulty" understanding Sgt. Spagnolo's questions. The defendant's eyes were "not glassy" and there was no slurred speech. There were also no manual dexterity issues in retrieving the motor vehicles legal documents. The defendant produced the vehicle documents without difficulty and Sgt. Spganolo observed "no evidence of verbal impairment".
The Law.
"On a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search, state bears the burden of proving that the challenged search and seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Daniel Hunter v. State of Delaware, 783 A.2d 558, Del. Super., No.: 279, 2000, Steele, J. (August 22, 2001); State v. Bien-Aime, 1993 Del. Super,. LEXIS 132, Cr.A. No.: IK92-08-326, Toliver, J. (March 17, 1993) (Mem.Op.)(citations omitted).
In State v. Robert S. Edwards, 2002 Del. C.P. LEXIS 28, Clark, Judge (May 31, 2002) this Court applied the following standard to similar facts as follows:
A police officer may detain an individual for investigatory purposes for a limited scope, but only if the detention is supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856 (Del. 1999), (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, (1968)). A determination of reasonable and articulable suspicion must be evaluated by the totality of the circumstances as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer under the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with the officer's subjective interpretation of them. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court defines reasonable and articulable suspicion as an officer's ability to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Id. In the absence of reasonable and articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, detention is not authorized.
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In State of Delaware v. John C. Dinan, 1998 Del. CP. LEXIS 31, (Welch, J. Oct. 15, 1998), this Court applied a "similar standard" for a motor vehicle stop by a police officer:
As stated in State v. Arterbridge, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 587, 1995 W.L. 790965 (December 7, 1995), the law with regard to "reasonable articulable suspicion" provides as follows:
The Fourth Amendment in Article 1, Sec. 6 of the Delaware Constitution protecting individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const. Art. I §6. Accordingly, a police officer must justify any "seizure" of a citizen. The level of justification required varies with the magnitude of the intrusion to the citizen. See, U.S. v. Hernandez, 854 F.2d 295, 297 (8th Cir. 1988). Not every contact between a citizen and a police officer, however, involves a "seizure" of a personal under the Fourth Amendment. See, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S Ct. 1868, n16 (1968); see also, Thompson v. State, Ark. Supr., 303 Ark. 407, 797 S.W.2d 450, 451 (1990). . . .
There are three categories of police-citizen encounters. See, Hernandez, 854 F.2d 295 at 297. First, the least intrusive encounter occurs when a police officer simply approaches an individual and asks him or her to answer questions. This type of police-citizen confrontation does not constitute a seizure. Robertson v. State, Del. Supr., 596 A.2d 1345, 1351 (1991) (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); Hernandez, 854 F.2d 295 at 297. Second, a limited intrusion occurs [like the facts of this case] when a police officer restrains an individual for a short period of time. This Terry stop encounter constitutes a seizure and requires that the officer have an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Hernandez, 854 F.2d at 297. Third, the most intrusive encounter occurs when a police officer actually arrests a person for a commission of a crime. Only "probable cause" justifies a full scale arrest. Id. n2. (emphasis supplied)
As stated in Arterbridge, "stopping an automobile falls under the second category and therefore requires that the officer have a reasonable articulable suspicion to do so." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979). Initially in this matter the Court, as it did in Arterbridge, must determine whether the police officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle on March 24,...
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