State v. Bedell
| Decision Date | 27 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–0662,2014–0662 |
| Citation | 169 N.H. 62,142 A.3d 701 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Paul BEDELL. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Colleen Laffin, attorney, and Stephen D. Fuller, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Mr. Fuller orally), for the State.
Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Paul Bedell, appeals his convictions on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. See RSA 632–A:2, I(l) (2007).
The defendant argues that the Superior Court (Bornstein, J.) erred when, on the second day of trial, it dismissed a juror after it erroneously concluded that the juror could no longer be impartial. We affirm because we conclude that, although error, the juror's dismissal was not prejudicial because an impartial jury ultimately rendered the verdict in the defendant's case.
The record supports the following facts. During jury selection for the defendant's trial, the trial court asked prospective jurors the following question: "Have you or a close family member ever been accused of [sexual assault]?" The following exchange occurred between one of the prospective jurors and the trial court:
The State then further questioned the juror:
Having used all of its peremptory challenges, the State asked the trial court to dismiss the juror for cause, arguing that her ability to "fairly and accurately judge this case" was "too close for comfort." The trial court asked the juror if she "would still be able to evaluate the credibility of the alleged victim and every witness based on the factors" in the present case; the juror responded, "Yes." The trial court found the juror qualified to sit on the jury, and declined to dismiss her for cause.
During a subsequent pre-trial evidentiary hearing, the State again asked that the juror be struck for cause because the State had learned that the attorney representing the juror's relative worked in the same public defender's office as the defendant's attorney. The trial court denied the State's request, noting that the juror "was quite firm in her expressions that she could be fair and impartial and indifferent," and observing that, because the juror "wasn't aware ... and ha[d] no reason to be aware of" the professional relationship between the attorneys, the juror's connection to the defendant's counsel was "attenuated."
On the second day of trial, the State again asked to dismiss the juror for cause, arguing that, during her opening statement, defense counsel made a "direct appeal to [the juror's] prior experience with her [relative]." Defense counsel had stated:
Defense counsel explained that she had merely provided a "general layout of the case," denying that her remarks were directed specifically to the juror.
The trial court granted the State's request to remove the juror for cause, observing that although it had found the juror impartial at the time of jury selection, defense counsel's opening statement was an appeal to the juror's personal experiences with her relative. The trial court explained:
[I]n the circumstances presented, I am now finding that [the juror] can no longer be fair, impartial, and unbiased; that is, that she can no longer be indifferent as it relates to this particular case where certainly, according to the Defense's opening, and the evidence introduced thus far at trial on cross-examination of the State's witnesses, one of the, perhaps, an important part of the Defendant's defense is that [the victim], for whatever reason, is making this stuff up.
After a three-day trial, the jury convicted the defendant on two counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. This appeal followed.
The defendant argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed the juror for cause after the jury had been sworn and the trial had begun. He asserts that because the trial court found the juror's affirmations that she could remain impartial credible, and because there is no evidence that the juror's impartiality was impacted by subsequent events, the juror remained qualified to serve and should not have been removed. The State counters that the trial court's dismissal of the juror was proper given the "cumulative effect ... of all of the potential factors that weighed against [the juror's] impartiality," including defense counsel's opening statement and the professional connection between the attorney for the juror's relative and the defendant's attorney. Moreover, the State argues that, even if the dismissal was error, it does not warrant reversal because an impartial jury rendered the verdict, and, therefore, the defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced.
"It is a fundamental precept of our system of justice that a defendant has the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury." State v. Addison, 161 N.H. 300, 303, 13 A.3d 214 (2010) (quotation omitted). Generally, a juror is presumed to be impartial. Id. To be found impartial, a juror State v. Weir, 138 N.H. 671, 676, 645 A.2d 56 (1994) (quotation and brackets omitted). When a juror's impartiality is questioned, the trial court has a duty to determine whether the juror is indifferent. Addison, 161 N.H. at 303, 13 A.3d 214. "It is well settled that whether a prospective juror is free from prejudice is a determination to be made in the first instance by the trial court on voir dire ." Id. "The manner in which voir dire is conducted is wholly within the sound discretion of the trial court." Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). "If it appears that any juror is not indifferent, the juror shall be set aside on that trial." Id. (quotation and brackets omitted).
"The trial court's determination of the impartiality of the jurors selected is essentially a question of demeanor and credibility and, thus, is entitled to special deference." State v. Tabaldi, 165 N.H. 306, 312–13, 77 A.3d 1124 (2013). "We will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion or a finding that the trial judge's decision was against the weight of the evidence." Id. at 313, 77 A.3d 1124 (quotation omitted). When we determine whether a ruling made by a judge is a proper exercise of judicial discretion, we are deciding whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.
State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296, 787 A.2d 175 (2001). "To show an unsustainable exercise of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate that the court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case." State v. Perri, 164 N.H. 400, 408, 58 A.3d 627 (2012).
We first address whether the trial court erred when it dismissed the juror for cause mid-trial. We conclude that the record does not establish an objective basis sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding. First, during jury selection, the juror repeatedly stated that she could remain impartial, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court doubted the veracity of her repeated affirmations. See Tabaldi, 165 N.H. at 313, 77 A.3d 1124 (). Moreover, the record does not show that the professional connection between the attorney for the juror's relative and the defendant's attorney affected the juror's ability to be impartial. Cf. State v. White, 105 N.H. 159, 161, 196 A.2d 33 (1963) (...
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State v. Soulia
...or the court — especially when the juror uses ambiguous phrases such as "I would try" or "I would do my best." Cf. State v. Bedell, 169 N.H. 62, 66-67, 142 A.3d 701 (2016) (holding that trial court erred in dismissing juror as biased during trial in part because the court failed to question......