State v. Bedwell

• Decision Date: 21 June 2018
• Docket Number: NUMBER 2018 KA 0135
• Parties: STATE OF LOUISIANA v. OTIS L. BEDWELL
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana (US)

STATE OF LOUISIANA
v.
OTIS L. BEDWELL

NUMBER 2018 KA 0135

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT

June 21, 2018

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appealed from the Twenty-First Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Livingston State of Louisiana
Docket Number 32686

Honorable Charlotte Hughes Foster, Judge Presiding

Scott M. Perrilloux
District Attorney
Patricia P. Amos
Assistant District Attorney
Amite, Louisiana

Counsel for Appellee
State of Louisiana

Gwendolyn K. Brown
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
Otis L. Bedwell

Otis L. Bedwell
Jackson, Louisiana

Pro Se

BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ.

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GUIDRY, J.

The defendant, Otis L. Bedwell, was charged by bill of information with three counts of indecent behavior with juveniles, violations of La. R.S. 14:81. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged on all counts. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. For each count, the defendant was sentenced to seven years imprisonment at hard labor. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The defendant now appeals, designating two counseled assignments of error and fifteen pro se assignments of error. We affirm the convictions and sentences.

FACTS

In 2015, fifteen-year-old A.D.¹ lived with his family in a rented mobile home in Satsuma in Livingston Parish. The mobile home was on the property of the defendant, who was their landlord. In the summer of 2015, the defendant offered to pay A.D. ten dollars an hour for A.D.'s help with various chores and projects on the defendant's property.

A.D. testified at trial that on three separate occasions while A.D. was working with the defendant, the defendant had inappropriate physical contact with him. On July 20, 2015, according to A.D., he and the defendant were in the defendant's shed (an old trailer) to get some tools. The defendant approached A.D. from behind, grabbed his penis, and asked him for sex. A.D. walked away, but continued to work that day. The defendant gave A.D. twenty dollars and told A.D. not to tell anyone. Then on July 24, 2015, A.D. and the defendant were, again, in the shed, getting tools. According to A.D., the defendant put his hand down A.D.'s shorts, touched his penis, and asked A.D. to have sex with him. A.D. walked away, but continued to work. The defendant gave A.D. twenty dollars and, again, told him not to tell anyone. Then on July 28, 2015, A.D. was again in the shed with the

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defendant, getting tools. According to A.D., the defendant pulled down A.D.'s shorts and placed A.D.'s penis in his mouth. A.D. pushed the defendant off and walked out of the shed. The defendant again gave A.D. twenty dollars to keep quiet. A.D. pretended that he was sick and went home shortly thereafter. A few days later, the victim informed his stepmother (in writing) about what had occurred when he was with the defendant. His stepmother told A.D.'s father, and they took A.D. to the police to report the incidents.

The defendant did not testify at trial.

COUNSELED ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 and 2

In these related counseled assignments of error, the defendant argues, respectively, the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the State's improper rebuttal closing argument, and the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial.

The defendant argues in brief that the prosecutor made improper statements on two occasions during his rebuttal closing argument. During his rebuttal, the prosecutor noted that, after the accusations about the defendant came to light, the defendant evicted A.D. and his family from the mobile home they were renting from the defendant. Specifically, the prosecutor stated: "They wanted to get out but they didn't have a choice because they were evicted by him. And not only that, but he took them to court and sued them over the money." Defense counsel objected to this, arguing he did not mention anything about the eviction in his closing argument. The trial court overruled the objection, finding no issue with the prosecutor's statements because defense counsel, in his closing argument, had "called out" the credibility of A.D. and, as such, it was proper rebuttal to defense counsel's "motive argument."

The other allegedly improper argument by the prosecutor was his mention of Nathan James:

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But out of all the people that you've heard about over the last couple of days, two, three days, out of all the people that were over there playing, [A.D.]'s friends, people that came by to work, various people. Is it curious at all that the one person that Otis Bedwell would decide to call up here as a character witness would be Nathan James?

Defense counsel objected, arguing that, in his closing argument, he had not mentioned anything Nathan James had testified about. The trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor continued his discussion of Nathan James by pointing out that, while James had been called as a character witness for the defendant, James had known the defendant for only two months, at most.

Prior to sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial and, at the hearing, argued that some of the statements made by the prosecutor in his rebuttal closing argument were prejudicial. Defense counsel averred they "were beyond the course of the closing made and basically made by the final statements; that those were prejudicial to the defendant and made an influence on the verdict." The trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Closing arguments in criminal cases should be restricted to the evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that may be drawn therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. Further, the State's rebuttal shall be confined to answering the argument of the defendant. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 774. Prosecutors are allowed wide latitude in choosing closing argument tactics. See State v. Draughn, 05-1825, p. 44 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So. 2d 583, 614, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S. Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007). The trial judge has broad discretion in controlling the scope of closing arguments, and this court will not reverse a conviction on the basis of improper closing argument unless thoroughly convinced that the remarks influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. State v. Vansant, 14-1705, p. 6 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/24/15), 170 So. 3d 1059, 1063. See also State v. Prestridge, 399 So. 2d 564, 580 (La. 1981).

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We see no reason to disturb the trial court's denial of the motion for new trial. In his closing argument, defense counsel sought to impugn A.D.'s credibility by pointing out that A.D. had lied in the past. Defense counsel challenged the plausibility of A.D.'s allegations against the defendant by questioning both the "mechanics" of how the defendant could have sexually assaulted A.D. and of A.D.'s description of the shed as the place where the alleged sexual assaults occurred. Accordingly, defense counsel sought to establish that the defendant was innocent because A.D. had fabricated, for motives not clearly known, the allegations he had made against the defendant.

By pointing out in his rebuttal closing argument that the defendant had evicted A.D. and his family from their rented mobile home, the prosecutor was seeking to establish that no one had any motive to lie about what the defendant had done to A.D. That is, both A.D.'s stepmother and father testified that the defendant was good to them and had helped them out in the past when they were having money problems. The prosecutor, thus, was suggesting that rather than having any ulterior motive, A.D. made these allegations against the defendant because they were true. Similarly, in response to defense counsel suggesting in closing argument that the defendant was innocent, the prosecutor pointed out that for a witness called to testify on the defendant's behalf, Eric Nathan James, Jr. was an odd choice for a character witness, because he was only eighteen years old and had known the defendant for only a couple of months.

The trial court in the instant matter instructed the jury following closing arguments that the defendant was presumed innocent, and he was not required to prove his innocence. The trial court further instructed that opening statements and closing arguments were not to be considered as evidence. Much credit should be accorded to the good sense and fairmindedness of jurors who have seen the evidence and heard the argument, and have been instructed by the trial judge that

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arguments of counsel are not evidence. Vansant, 14-1705 at p. 8, 170 So. 3d at 1065. See also State v. Mitchell, 94-2078, p. 11 (La. 5/21/96), 674 So. 2d 250, 258, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117 S. Ct. 614, 136 L.Ed.2d 538 (1996).

We find nothing improper in these comments by the prosecutor that were in response to defense counsel's tactic in closing argument to suggest that the defendant was innocent and that A.D. was lying. Moreover, even if improper, the prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal clearly did not contribute to the verdict nor make it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial. See La. C. Cr. P. art. 775; Vansant, 14-1705 at p. 8, 170 So. 3d at 1064. See also State v. Jones, 15-0123 pp. 45-46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 12/2/15), 182 So. 3d 251, 280-81, writ denied, 16-0027 (La. 12/5/16), 210 So. 3d 810. We find, therefore, that the trial court properly overruled defense counsel's objections and did not err in denying the defendant's motion for new trial on that basis. See State v. Greenup, 12-881, pp. 12-13 (La. App. 5th Cir. 8/27/13), 123 So. 3d 768, 775-76, writ denied, 13-2300 (La. 3/21/14), 135 So. 3d 617.

These counseled assignments of error are without merit.

PRO SE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

In his first pro se assignment of error, the defendant argues that the presence of a motorcycle gang in the courtroom created an unacceptable risk of prejudice, in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments to the...