State v. Beebe

• Decision Date: 18 December 1901
• Citation: State v. Beebe, 115 Iowa 128, 88 N.W. 358 (Iowa 1901)
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA v. JANE STINSON BEEBE, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

88 N.W. 358

115 Iowa 128

STATE OF IOWA v. JANE STINSON BEEBE, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

December 18, 1901

Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. W. G. THOMPSON, Judge.

INDICTMENT for keeping a house of ill fame. From a verdict and judgment of guilty, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Tom H Milner for appellant.

Chas W. Mullan, Attorney-General, and Chas. A. Van Vleck Assistant Attorney-General for the State.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

The indictment charges that the defendant kept a house of ill fame, "resorted to by divers ill-disposed persons for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness." It was found under section 4939 of the Code, which reads: "If any person keep a house of ill fame resorted to for the purpose of prostitution or lewdness such person shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than six months nor more than five years." Defendant contends that the indictment is void for duplicity, in that it charged that the place was resorted to both for prostitution and for lewdness. There is no merit in this contention. The language of the statute is disjunctive, and it is permissible to use conjunctive words in the indictment. State v. Feuerhaken, 96 Iowa 299, 65 N.W. 299. It is also said to be bad because the names of the persons resorting to the houses are not given. This is unnecessary. State v. Feuerhaken, supra. The names of the persons resorting to the houses are not an essential element of the offense. State v. Alderman, 40 Iowa 375; State v. Maurer, 7 Iowa 406; State v. Patterson, 29 N.C. 70 (45 Am. Dec. 506); State v. Prescott, 33 N.H. 212; Com. v. Ashley, 2 Gray 356. The indictment is in the language of the statute, and this so far individuates the offense that nothing further is required. State v. Bauguess, 106 Iowa 107, 76 N.W. 508; State v. Porter, 105 Iowa 677, 75 N.W. 519. It was unnecessary to allege that the act was done feloniously.

II. Section 4944 of the Code reads as follows: "The state upon the trial of any person indicted for keeping a house of ill fame may for the purpose of establishing the character of the house kept by defendant introduce evidence of the general reputation of the house as so kept." The state introduced evidence to show the reputation of the house, but the county attorney did not, by his questions, confine the time to a period antedating the finding of the indictment. Defendant's objections to the questions were incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. These objections were overruled. When specific objection was made because no time limit was fixed, the county attorney corrected his question, and propounded one which is admitted to be within the statute. Moreover, evidence as to general reputation of the house down to the time of trial was received without objection. In view of this record, there was no error of which defendant may justly complain. Reputation is not made in a day, and the defendant should have pointed out in her objection the exact point relied upon. Each question propounded called for the reputation of the house at a time prior, and also subsequent, to the finding of the indictment. In view of this fact, defendant should have specifically pointed out her objection. Again, as much evidence on this point was admitted before objection was made, the ruling, even if erroneous, was without prejudice.

III. Complaint is made of evidence said to have been offered by the state, over defendants objections to the effect that defendant's reputation for chastity prior to the finding of the indictment was bad. We do not find that any such evidence was admitted. An attempt was made to offer it, but the court either excluded it, or such as was received went in without proper objection being lodged against it. Whether or not evidence as to the character of the keeper is admissible is a question upon which the authorities are not agreed. See cases cited in 9 Ency. Pl. & Prac. pp. 534, 535, and cases cited. In State v. Hand, 7 Iowa 411, we held that such evidence is not admissible for the purpose of showing defendant was guilty of the crime. Without at this time committing ourselves, it is sufficient to say that the weight of authority seems to favor the admission of such evidence as tending to show the character of the house. See State v. Brunell, 29 Wis. 435; People v. Saunders, 29 Mich. 269; Betts v. State, 93 Ind. 375; Sparks v. State, 59 Ala. 82. Contra, State v. Hull, 18 R.I. 207 (26 A. 191, 20 L. R. A. 609); U. S. v. Nailor, 4 Cranch C.C. 372, 27 F. Cas. 69 (Fed. Cas. No. 15,853). The objection that the state was not limited as to time does not properly arise on the record.

IV. One Hilliard was offered as a witness by the defendant, who gave evidence to the effect that defendant was reputed to be a charitably disposed person, who was kind to those who were sick and in distress, and that he had never seen anything out of the way at her house. He was asked on cross-examination about the reputation of the house,--as to its being a house of ill...