State v. Beeler

Decision Date13 February 2015
Docket NumberCase No. 14CA3454
Citation2015 Ohio 668
PartiesSTATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REBECCA K. BEELER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

APPEARANCES:

Timothy Young, Ohio State Public Defender, and Ben A. Rainsberger, Assistant State Public Defender, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellant.

Sherri K. Rutherford, Director of Law, City of Chillicothe, and Carrie L. Rowland, Assistant Law Director, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.

McFarland, A.J.

{¶1} Rebecca K. Beeler (Appellant) appeals from the sentence and judgment of the Chillicothe Municipal Court filed May 29, 2014. On appeal, Appellant contends the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over Appellant contrary to R.C. 2951.022. Upon review, we find no merit to Appellant's assignment of error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

{¶2} Appellant was convicted of a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(d), operating a vehicle under the influence (OVI), in the Chillicothe Municipal Court (Ross County, Ohio) on January 28, 2011. Her sentence included being placed on community control. Appellant was ordered to participate and complete alcohol counseling and to "stay out of trouble."

{¶3} The State filed a complaint for violation of community control sanctions on March 28, 2011. Through the probation department, the State alleged Appellant violated community control by failing to complete court-ordered counseling and by failing to make payments toward fines and costs.1 On January 14, 2013, Appellant was convicted of another OVI offense, a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), in the Portsmouth Municipal Court (Scioto County, Ohio). Appellant was sentenced to community control by the Portsmouth Municipal Court on January 14, 2013.2

{¶4} The record indicates another complaint was filed for violation of community control sanctions (dated February 15, 2014) due to allegations that Appellant was convicted of OVI in the Portsmouth Municipal Court and on May 29, 2014, a hearing was held. Appellant stipulated to the "factual underpinnings" of the violation and indicated the intent to appeal on theissue of the trial court's concurrent jurisdiction. The court found Appellant had violated community control. The court also stated :

" * * * With respect to the motion that this Court has, doesn't have authority to supervise her since she is on probation in Portsmouth, a couple of things. The statute is difficult for me to understand, at least. It gives several scenarios, but one of the scenarios it doesn't talk about is when a person is under a community control sanction in two municipal courts in different counties, which is what we have here. And the other thing is, she was supervised by this Court, um, and then she gets another case in another county. It's really hard for me to think that this legislature really intended that at that point, I lose jurisdiction because she's been convicted in another county, to supervise her on my community control sanction. It may be what the legislature intended, just seems odd to me that that would be the case. So because of those reasons, the Court overrules the objection, Mr. Rainsberger, and we'll proceed with the sentencing."

{¶5} Appellant was sentenced to 30 days in the Ross County Jail. This timely appeal followed.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶6} The decision whether to revoke probation is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Johnson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 09-MA-94, 2010-Ohio-2533, ¶ 10; State v. Ritenour, 5th Dist. No. 2006AP-0002, 2006-Ohio-4744, at ¶ 37. Thus, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court'sdecision absent an abuse of discretion. Johnson, supra; State v. Dinger, 7th Dist. No. 04CA814, 2005-Ohio-6942, at ¶ 13. Abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. Johnson, supra; State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 253, 473 N.E.2d 768 (1984). In determining whether there was a probation violation, the trial court need not find the probation violation established beyond a reasonable doubt. Johnson, supra, at ¶ 11; State v. Wallace, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 05-MA-172, 2007-Ohio-3184, at ¶ 16.

{¶7} As this Court has noted, a "manifest weight" standard of review is used to assess the evidence adduced at a probation revocation hearing. State v. Baker, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3331, 2010-Ohio-5564, ¶ 11. See State v. Belcher, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 06CA32, 2007-Ohio-4256, at ¶ 12; State v. Wolfson, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 03CA25, 2004-Ohio-2750, at ¶ 7. In other words, a judgment will not be reversed if some competent, credible evidence supports the trial court's findings. Baker, supra. See Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 115 Ohio St.3d 291, 2008-Ohio-4918, 874 N.E.2d 1198, at ¶ 3; State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, at ¶ 21; C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978), at the syllabus. We further point out that thisstandard of review is highly deferential and even "some" evidence is sufficient to support a trial court's judgment and prevent a reversal. Baker, supra. See Barkley v. Barkley, 119 Ohio App.3d 155, 159, 694 N.E.2d 989 (1997); Drydek v. Drydek, 4th Dist. Washington No. 09CA29, 2010-Ohio-2329, at ¶ 16.

{¶8} Ordinarily, we would utilize the above standards in considering an appeal of a trial court's ruling on a probation revocation. However, Appellant's sole assignment of error raises a jurisdictional question. Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo. Cleveland v. Kutash, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99509, 2013-Ohio-5124, ¶ 8; Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 4-5.

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

{¶9} " * * * Jurisdiction * * * is the 'right and power to * * * apply the law.' " State v. Rode, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2010-P-0015, 2011-Ohio-2455, ¶ 15, quoting The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982), 694. "Subject-matter jurisdiction" is used when referring to a court's authority to act. Cleveland v. Persaud, 6 N.E.3d 701, (Feb. 10, 2014), ¶ 16. "Subject-matter jurisdiction" of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits, and defines the competency of a courtto render a valid judgment in a particular action. Id. A judgment rendered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is void. Kutash, supra; Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶10} The judicial power of the state is vested in "such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to time be established by law." Section 1, Article IV, Ohio Constitution. Rode, supra, at ¶ 16. The constitution gives the General Assembly the power to provide for municipal courts and their jurisdiction. Rode, supra; Behrle v. Beam, 6 Ohio St.3d 41, 42, 451 N.E.2d 237 (1983). Unlike courts of common pleas, which are created by the Ohio Constitution and have statewide subject-matter jurisdiction, municipal courts are statutorily created, and their subject matter jurisdiction is set by statute. Kutash, supra, at ¶ 10. Municipal courts, as they exist today in Ohio, were established in 1951 with the enactment of R.C. Chapter 1901. Id. Rode, supra.

{¶11} The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently discussed the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction within the context of community control violations, in State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226, 943 N.E.2d 1014. See State v. Meyer, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26999, 18 N.E.3d 805, 2014-Ohio-3705, ¶ 12. In Hemsley, supra, the highcourt recognized that a judge may conduct a community control violation hearing where the court does not "patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction." Id. at ¶ 14. See also, State ex rel. Carroll, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79305, 2001 WL 273619, *1.

{¶12} Appellant argues, pursuant to R.C. 2951.022, the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over her to conduct the revocation hearing. Appellant points out she was first convicted in Chillicothe Municipal Court in Ross County and then subsequently convicted in Portsmouth Municipal Court in Scioto County. She also indicates she is a resident of Scioto County.3 R.C. 2951.022(A), supervision of concurrent supervision offender, provides:

"(1) '[C]oncurrent supervision offender' means any offender who has been sentenced to community control for one or more misdemeanor violations or has been placed under a community control sanction pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, 2929.18, or 2929.20 of the Revised Code and who is simultaneously subject to supervision by any of the following:
(a) Two or more municipal courts or county courts in this state...."

{¶13} The statute further provides:

"(B)(1) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (B)(2)(3), and (4) of this section, a concurrent supervision offender shall be supervised by the court of conviction that imposed the longest possible sentence of incarceration and shall not be supervised by any other court.
(2) In the case of a concurrent supervision offender subject to supervision by two or more municipal or county courts in the same county, the municipal or county court in the territorial jurisdiction in which the offender resides shall supervise the offender. In the case of a concurrent supervision offender subject to supervision by a municipal court or county court and a court of common pleas for two or more equal possible sentences, the municipal or county court shall supervise the offender. In the case of a concurrent supervision offender subject to supervision by two or more courts of common pleas in separate counties in this state, the court that lies within the same territorial jurisdiction in which the offender resides shall supervise the
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