State v. Beer, 2004 VT 99 (VT 10/1/2004)

• Decision Date: 01 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2003-456.,No. 2002-536,2002-536,2003-456.
• Citation: 2004 VT 99
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: State of Vermont v. Tashia Lee Beer

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2004 VT 99

State of Vermont v. Tashia Lee Beer

No. 2002-536

No. 2003-456.

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 1, 2004

On Appeal from District Court of Vermont, Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit, Dennis R. Pearson, J.

Robert Butterfield, Caledonia County State's Attorney, St. Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-Appellant (02-536) and Plaintiff-Appellee (03-456).

William A. Nelson, Middlebury, and Pamela A. Marsh of Marsh & Wagner, Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellee (02-536) and Defendant-Appellant (03-456).

PRESENT: Amestoy, C.J.¹, Dooley, Johnson and Reiber, JJ., and Allen, C.J. (Ret.), Specially Assigned

REIBER, J.

¶ 1. Defendant Tashia Beer has been charged with first degree murder in the February 2000 slaying of her stepmother. In these consolidated interlocutory appeals, we consider whether the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress statements that she made to police on the morning of the murder, and denying her motion to dismiss on speedy trial and due process grounds. The State challenges the ruling on the motion to suppress, arguing that the court erred in finding that defendant was subject to an illegal "de facto arrest" on the morning of the murder, and that she was subjected to "custodial interrogation" by police officers. Defendant challenges the court's denial of her motion to dismiss, arguing that her speedy trial and due process rights were violated by the twenty-six month delay between her "de facto arrest" in February 2000 and her indictment for first degree murder in April 2002. We affirm both orders.

¶ 2. The trial court made the following findings. On February 16, 2000, at approximately 8:30 a.m., defendant's father, Randy Beer, called police to report that Scott Favreau, his foster son, had shot his wife. Beer stated that Favreau had fled with defendant, who was fourteen at the time, in a red Isuzu. Detective Dante Annicelli, the principal investigating officer, received word that the shooter had taken "a child." Shortly thereafter, Detective Annicelli spotted the vehicle, and observed two passengers in the car. He followed the car, and called for backup.

¶ 3. After a high speed chase, the vehicle was stopped at a roadblock. There were approximately twenty police officers at the roadblock, and at least fifteen police vehicles with their lights flashing and sirens running. Officers drew their guns and pointed them at the vehicle's occupants. Both Favreau and defendant were ordered out of the car and down on the ground. Defendant got out of the car, but she did not comply with the second command. Instead, she said, "Me? Why me?" Police again ordered her to get down. When she complied, she was immediately handcuffed with her hands behind her back. She was lying face-down for less than two minutes while she was patted down for weapons.

¶ 4. Favreau was formally arrested at the roadblock, and driven to the police barracks. At the roadblock, he stated to police, "It was all me. She had nothing to do with it." Police transported defendant to the police barracks to obtain information about the homicide. Defendant appeared calm and collected. She was not questioned during the ride, but she volunteered the statement, "Who called? I bet it was my Dad." After arriving at the police barracks, defendant initially remained in handcuffs, and she was placed in a room with a uniformed officer stationed just outside. Sergeant Leo Bachand, the police officer in charge of the scene, and State's Attorney Dale Gray, believed that defendant had possibly been a hostage. They did not discuss whether defendant should be given Miranda warnings, nor did they arrange for an independent interested adult to be present to advise her.

¶ 5. Detective Annicelli and Detective Sergeant Martin Hatch were assigned to interview defendant. They intended the interview to be informal and conversational; they sought to obtain information, rather than conduct a formal interrogation designed to obtain incriminating statements. Both Detective Annicelli and Detective Sergeant Hatch believed that it was unnecessary to advise defendant of her Miranda rights or secure the presence of an independent interested adult because defendant was considered a material witness, not a suspect.

¶ 6. At approximately 10:00 a.m., Detective Annicelli and Detective Sergeant Hatch conducted a "pre-interview" discussion with defendant. This interview was not tape-recorded, although the officers took notes. The officers removed defendant's handcuffs, and offered her food, drink, and an opportunity to go to the bathroom. The officers were not in uniform during the interview, although both wore their sidearms. The room in which defendant was interviewed was approximately ten by fifteen feet with a window. Detective Annicelli sat at a desk facing defendant; defendant sat approximately four to five feet away on the other side of the desk. Detective Sergeant Hatch sat next to defendant, about three feet away. The door to the office was closed.

¶ 7. During the interview, defendant appeared calm and collected. Neither officer noticed any signs that she was impaired or unable to understand what was happening. The officers knew that she was fourteen years old. Detective Annicelli was the lead interviewer. He informed defendant that they thought she was a witness to her stepmother's murder, and they needed her to "provide information" and "clarify" the morning's events. Defendant appeared willing to talk. The officers informed defendant that their purpose was to get information "to piece together what had happened."

¶ 8. During the interview, defendant engaged in an essentially uninterrupted narrative. The officers then asked some specific follow-up questions, including whether defendant had spoken to Favreau and her classmates about killing her stepmother. They also asked her about the presence of her fingerprints on the murder weapon. The same process was then repeated on tape. The recorded interview concluded at approximately 11:00 a.m. At that time, the officers again offered defendant food, drink, and an opportunity to use the restroom. Defendant remained calm, almost "upbeat."

¶ 9. Later that afternoon, at approximately 4:00 p.m., defendant's father arrived at the police barracks. He informed police that he did not want defendant to return home. An emergency detention order was obtained based on an allegation that defendant was a child in need of care and supervision (CHINS) pursuant to 33 V.S.A. § 5502(a)(12)(A). Defendant was transferred to the custody of the Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) sometime after 6:45 p.m. that evening.

¶ 10. The next day, the State moved to have defendant held as a material witness pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 6605 in the criminal case pending against Favreau. That same day, the family court held a detention hearing, and it continued temporary custody and guardianship with SRS pending a merits hearing. The family court issued a flexible order for placement at Woodside Juvenile Rehabilitation Center, which was scheduled for review on February 22, 2000. Woodside is a juvenile rehabilitation center that is operated by SRS as a secure detention and treatment facility for juvenile offenders. See 33 V.S.A. § 5801(a).

¶ 11. On February 22, 2000, the district court held a hearing on the State's motion to detain defendant as a material witness. Pursuant to a stipulated agreement between the parties, the district court granted the State's motion. Defendant stipulated that she was a material witness, and the parties agreed to certain conditions of recognizance, including the posting of a $10,000 appearance bond. Defendant did not post this bond.

¶ 12. That same day, at a status conference in the CHINS proceeding, the family court continued guardianship and custody of defendant in SRS. Defendant's attorney indicated that defendant was aware that, given the terms of her stipulation in the material witness proceeding, she would likely be placed at Woodside. By agreement between the Department of Corrections and SRS, defendant was placed at Woodside.

¶ 13. The family court held a merits hearing in March 2000. Defendant, through her attorney, admitted that she was CHINS pursuant to 33 V.S.A. § 5502(a)(12)(C). The family court accepted defendant's admission, and it made findings based on the parties' stipulation that defendant was CHINS. SRS filed a disposition report and case plan in May 2000. Defendant objected to the case plan, asking that she be placed with her aunt and uncle rather than at Woodside. She did not object to being placed in SRS custody. After a disposition hearing in July 2000, the family court accepted the SRS case plan, and continued SRS custody and guardianship. The court concluded that SRS had established by clear and convincing evidence that it should have custody of defendant, and its plan served defendant's best interests. At a permanency planning hearing in January 2001, defendant did not object to SRS's case plan, and the court adopted it and continued custody in SRS.

¶ 14. In August 2001, defendant moved to vacate the court's February 2000 order detaining her as a material witness. The district court granted defendant's request on October 5, 2001, but stayed its order until October 30. On October 30, the family court held a juvenile disposition hearing. The court continued defendant in SRS custody and guardianship, and all parties agreed that defendant would be placed at The Pines, a residential treatment center in Virginia. A permanency planning hearing was held in January 2002. At the hearing, defendant's counsel stated that the case plan was appropriate. Defendant remained at The Pines until she was indicted for first degree murder on April 17, 2002.

¶ 15. Shortly after she was indicted, defendant moved to suppress the statements that she had made to police on the day of the murder, and to dismiss the case against her on speedy trial and due process grounds. After...