State v. Bell
| Decision Date | 16 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-75 September Term 2020,084657 |
| Citation | 250 N.J. 519,274 A.3d 594 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rashaun BELL, a/k/a BG Rashaun Rah, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Erin M. Campbell, on the brief).
Susan L. Romeo, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Susan L. Romeo, on the brief).
Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Steven A. Yomtov, Trenton, of counsel and on the brief).
Zachary A. Levy, Hackensack, argued the cause for amicus curiae Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Zachary A. Levy and CJ Griffin, on the brief).
In this case, a car driven by defendant Rashaun Bell crashed into two teenaged boys riding a bicycle on a roadway in Jersey City. Both boys died as a result of the accident. Defendant and his three passengers fled the scene. Defendant was eventually apprehended and indicted on two counts of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. Defendant moved to dismiss one of the counts, arguing that, as applied here, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 violated the rule against multiplicity.
The trial court denied defendant's motion and concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 holds a driver who knowingly flees the scene of an accident criminally responsible for each person who dies in the accident. Defendant thereafter pled guilty, pursuant to an agreement negotiated with the State, to both counts of the indictment. Consistent with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive five-year terms of imprisonment. In response to defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court's ruling, dismissed one of the convictions, vacated the five-year term of imprisonment for that conviction, and remanded the matter to the trial court to amend the judgment of conviction accordingly.
In response to the State's appeal, we now hold the plain text of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 reveals the Legislature intended to criminalize the act of leaving the scene of an accident resulting "in the death of another person," in violation of the tenets of order and civility codified under N.J.S.A. 39:4-129, independent of the number of fatalities. Stated differently, the number of fatalities caused by the accident is not an element of the second-degree offense codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1.
This outcome is consistent with this Court's well-settled principle of statutory construction that looks to a statute's plain language as the "best indicator" of legislative intent. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005). Beyond that analytical threshold, we construe N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 consistent with the rule against multiplicity derived from the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits "multiple punishments for the same offense." See State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 489-90, 724 A.2d 241 (1999). Finally, this interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 is in harmony with the doctrine of lenity.
We thus affirm the part of the Appellate Division's judgment that construed N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 consistent with this Court's holding. We reverse, however, the Appellate Division's judgment to amend sua sponte the sentence imposed by the trial court in a manner not contemplated by the terms of the plea agreement negotiated by the parties in good faith and approved by the trial court under Rule 3:9-2. Under these circumstances, the appellate court should have remanded the case to the trial court to permit the parties to negotiate a new plea agreement that the trial court finds acceptable or otherwise schedule the case for trial.1 See State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 411, 555 A.2d 559 (1989).
The salient facts of this case are undisputed. At approximately 2:25 p.m. on October 18, 2017, twenty-year-old Rashaun Bell was driving a 2010 four-door Nissan Maxima northbound on the Secaucus off-ramp for Routes 1 and 9 in Jersey City. At the same time, fifteen-year-old Elionel Jimenez and sixteen-year-old Alexander Antonio Rosas Flores were riding a bicycle down a steep hill, heading westbound on Leonard Street on a path that intersected with the road on which defendant was traveling. This mode of bicycling required Elionel to pedal standing up while Alexander remained seated.
Tragically, defendant's car crashed into the boys' bicycle at a perpendicular angle. The speed limit in the area where the accident occurred is twenty-five miles per hour. A Jersey City Police Sergeant, who testified before the grand jury, estimated defendant was traveling approximately double the speed limit when the car struck the boys' bicycle.
Elionel was found "face down on the ground with a large laceration to his head." He was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:41 p.m. by a physician from the Jersey City Medical Center. Police officers found Alexander on Tonnelle Avenue; the force of the impact propelled him over a nine-foot fence where he landed twenty-seven feet below. Medical staff transported him to the Jersey City Medical Center, where he succumbed to his injuries the following day.
A detective from the Homicide Unit of the Hudson County Prosecutor's Office, who responded to the accident scene, testified before the grand jury that the car was "abandoned" approximately 600 feet from the point of impact. The four occupants of the vehicle fled the scene on foot.2 Law enforcement investigators searched the Nissan Maxima, pursuant to a warrant, and retrieved a court document addressed to defendant as well as an identification bracelet with defendant's name, photograph, and date of birth. The State also presented a video showing defendant fleeing through a backyard, about two blocks from the scene. Defendant did not have a driver's license.
The Assistant Prosecutor instructed the grand jury that, under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, defendant was "charged with two counts: one count for Elionel Jimenez and one count for Alexander Antonio Rosas Flores." Consistent with those legal instructions, the grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with two counts of second-degree leaving the scene of an accident in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, and two counts of third-degree causing the death of Elionel and Alexander while operating a vehicle without a driver's license, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-22(a).
Defendant moved to dismiss the second count of leaving the scene of a fatal accident under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. Defense counsel argued the statute reflects the Legislature's intent to punish drivers for leaving the scene of a fatal accident or failing to report they were involved in such an accident, regardless of the number of fatalities caused by the accident. Relying on United States v. Kennedy, 682 F.3d 244, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2012), defense counsel urged the motion judge to dismiss the multiplicitous count because it would violate the "Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against cumulative punishment."
In opposition, the State focused on the part of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 that refers to the driver "knowingly" leaving the scene of the accident "under circumstances that violate the provisions of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-129." The prosecutor argued the specific reference to the obligations imposed on drivers under Title 39 indicated the Legislature's intent to hold a defendant criminally responsible under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 for each death caused by the accident.
The trial judge denied defendant's motion in an oral opinion delivered from the bench. Because the statute "imposes culpability" when a driver leaves the scene of an accident that results in the death of "another person," the judge inferred the Legislature intended "the death of each victim [to stand] as a separate and distinct element of two separate offenses that may be charged separately on the indictment." Thus, the judge found the death of each victim constituted an element of separate offenses and defendant could be charged accordingly. The motion judge also found support for his analysis in the part of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 that prohibits a conviction of this offense to merge with other homicide offenses -- i.e., aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4, reckless vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5, or strict liability vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.3 -- and expressly requires a court to impose a sentence for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 to run consecutively to multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense.
Defendant thereafter pled guilty to two counts of second-degree leaving the scene of a fatal accident, and expressly reserved the right to appeal the trial court's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the indictment and seek a five-year term of imprisonment for each count under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1, to run consecutively. The trial court accepted the terms of the plea agreement and sentenced defendant to a cumulative ten-year term of imprisonment.
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss one of the counts in the indictment for the single act of leaving the scene of an accident. Defendant urged the Appellate Division to vacate his conviction because the multiple charges violated double jeopardy protections espoused in the rule against multiplicity. The State argued the trial court correctly concluded N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5.1 requires ...
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