State v. Bell

• Decision Date: 03 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. 23163,23163
• Citation: 393 S.E.2d 364,302 S.C. 18
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of South Carolina, Respondent, v. Larry Gene BELL, Appellant. . Heard

Page 364

393 S.E.2d 364

302 S.C. 18

STATE of South Carolina, Respondent, v. Larry Gene BELL, Appellant.

No. 23163.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard May 3, 1988.

Decided Feb. 26, 1990.

Jack B. Swerling, S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, John H. Blume and David I. Bruck, both of Bruck & Blume, Columbia, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr. and Norman Mark Rapoport, Columbia, and Sol. Donald V. Myers, Lexington, for respondent.

TOAL, Justice:

A jury convicted appellant, Larry Gene Bell, of the murder and kidnapping of Debra Mae Helmick. For these crimes, Bell was sentenced to death. We consolidate Bell's direct appeal with our mandatory review of his death sentence pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1985). We affirm his conviction and sentence.

The facts of the instant case must be considered together with the facts surrounding the abduction and murder of Shari Faye Smith (hereinafter Shari). On the afternoon of Friday, May 31, 1985, Bell abducted seventeen year old Shari from beside the mailbox in front of her home in Lexington County. On June 3, 1985, the Smith family began to receive a series of phone calls from Bell concerning Shari. After Bell related the precise whereabouts of Shari's body in one telephone call to the Smiths, he called again to describe how Shari died. Bell explained to Dawn Smith, Shari's sister, that he "took duct tape and wrapped it all the way around [Shari's] head." Bell also insisted that Dawn report the information concerning the duct tape and the suffocation to the coroner so he could accurately determine the cause of death.

Two weeks after Shari's abduction, at a time after Shari's body had been found but while Bell was still at large, Bell abducted and murdered another young girl. This victim was nine and a half year old Debra Mae Helmick. Debra Mae, her three year old brother, and her parents lived in a rented trailer in the Shiloh Trailer Park in Richland County. On June 14, 1985, at 4:00 p.m., Debra Mae and her brother were playing in the front yard beneath their trailer's front window. A neighbor, looking out of the window of his trailer, observed what he described as a "silver" car drive rapidly into the trailer park, past the Helmick trailer and his trailer. The car turned around and stopped near the children. The neighbor saw a man he later identified as defendant Bell get out of the car with what appeared to be a white bag in his hand. Bell walked toward the children, grabbed Debra Mae around her waist and ran back to his car. Debra Mae was screaming and kicking. Bell threw her into his car. She continued to struggle and scream, kicking the inside roof of the car. The neighbor ran out of his trailer and attempted to stop the car. Bell accelerated the car and exited the trailer park. The neighbor got within 40 feet of the Bell automobile. He observed that the license was a South Carolina tag, first letter "D". The neighbor then ran to the Helmick trailer to alert Mr. Helmick.

Eight days after the abduction of Debra, Bell again called the Smith family to give them precise directions to find Debra's body. Following the directions given by Bell, the police located Debra's severely decomposed body in Lexington County on June 22, 1985. Debra's body was clothed in a tank top, shorts, her cotton panties, and over her panties, a pair of silk adult bikini briefs. Adhesive material, not inconsistent with duct tape, was found in Debra's hair, suggesting that she, like Shari, had been suffocated. Bell was apprehended by the police on June 27, 1985, while driving a grayish 1978 Riviera. Although the car's affixed license plate read "OCH 241," a search of the car's trunk revealed the existence of a second license plate. This plate read "DCE 604." Also found in the trunk was the registration card for the car, which indicated that "DCE 604" was the Riviera's license plate number.

In June of 1986, Bell was tried for the murder and kidnapping of Shari Smith found guilty of these crimes and sentenced to death. ¹ In March of 1987, Bell was tried, convicted and sentenced to death for the murder and kidnapping of Debra Mae Helmick. Bell now appeals from the 1987 conviction and sentence.

I. GUILT PHASE

A. JURY QUALIFICATION

Bell alleges that the judge erred in the jury qualification. ² First, Bell maintains that the trial judge erred in qualifying nine jurors who knew the appellant had previously been sentenced to death for the murder and kidnapping of Shari Faye Smith. Such knowledge, Bell submits, rendered his conviction and sentence of death constitutionally unreliable. Second, Bell contends that the judge abused his discretion in not striking three jurors who purportedly equivocated concerning their views on the death penalty.

The determination of whether a juror is qualified to serve on a death penalty case is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and is not reviewable on appeal unless wholly unsupported by the evidence. State v. Spann, 279 S.C. 399, 308 S.E.2d 518 (1983), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 466 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2146, 80 L.Ed.2d 533 (1984). A voir dire examination must be reviewed in its entirety to determine whether the trial judge erred in his qualification or disqualification of prospective jurors. State v. Drayton, 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079, 108 S.Ct. 1060, 98 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1988).

The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). In Irvin, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of pretrial knowledge of facts by jurors where the appellant had been sentenced to death. The Court found that it was not required that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case. The Court opined that "it [was] sufficient if the juror [could] lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in Court." Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. at 1643. Here, each of the jurors at issue stated that they could set aside any opinions garnered from their prior knowledge of the appellant's conviction and/or sentence of death for the murder of Shari Smith and would be able to give the appellant a fair and impartial trial.

In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975), the defendant, "Murph the Surf", notorious for his involvement in the 1964 theft of the Star of India sapphire, claimed that the jurors were biased because they knew about his previous convictions. The Court held that juror exposure to information about a defendant's prior convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged does not alone presumptively deprive the defendant of due process. The Court declined to find that the setting of the trial was inherently prejudicial, and declined to find prejudice in the jury selection process. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 803, 95 S.Ct. at 2038.

Our Court considered whether the trial court erred in not excusing four jurors who had heard of the case and some of its details in DeLee v. Knight, 266 S.C. 103, 112, 221 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1975) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 939, 96 S.Ct. 2658, 49 L.Ed.2d 392 (1976). Even though the jurors had some knowledge of the case, we found that each juror had not formed a conclusive opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, and could render a just verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial.

Consistent with the holdings in DeLee and Murphy, we conclude here that each juror who had knowledge of Bell's prior conviction and death sentence stated that he could set aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on evidence presented in the courtroom. In response to the questions by the attorneys and the Court, each juror expressed his belief that he could set aside any prejudice, passion or bias that he/she might harbor. Hence, we hold that the judge did not abuse his discretion in qualifying the challenged jurors.

In so holding, we also reject Bell's argument that the jurors' knowledge of the previous death sentence diminished their sense of responsibility in deciding what sentence to impose. Bell relies, by analogy, on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). In Caldwell, the prosecutor urged the jury not to view itself as the final determiners of whether the petitioner would die, since a death sentence would be reviewed for correctness by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Court concluded that this invitation to rely on the Mississippi Court's review would generate a bias toward returning a death sentence. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 333, 105 S.Ct. at 2642.

We find that the reasoning of Caldwell does not control the case at bar. The jurors here disavowed themselves prior to their qualification of any bias or prejudice against the appellant, specifically with respect to his previous sentence of death.

Likewise, we find that the judge did not abuse his discretion in qualifying three jurors because of their views concerning the death penalty. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that if a venireman's views regarding capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror, then he should be excluded for cause. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 420, 105 S.Ct. at 850.

The decision as to whether a venireman's views would substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror rests with the sound discretion of the judge, and no reversal shall occur unless the record establishes an abuse of discretion. DeLee v. Knight, 266 S.C. at 112, 221 S.E.2d at 847. Here, all three jurors indicated that they would be able to give a sentence of life or death depending...