State v. Bell
Citation | 583 N.E.2d 414,66 Ohio App.3d 52 |
Decision Date | 05 February 1990 |
Docket Number | No. CA-7852,CA-7852 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BELL, Appellant. * |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Robert D. Horowitz, Pros. Atty., and Ronald Mark Caldwell, Asst. Pros. Atty., Canton, for appellee.
Kathleen M. Tatarsky, Canton, for appellant.
On June 29, 1988, defendant-appellant, Candace Kay Bell, pled guilty to a violation of R.C. 2911.02, robbery. The trial court accepted appellant's plea and sentenced appellant to the Ohio State Reformatory for Women in Marysville Ohio, or the "appropriate institution for defendant's physical and mental condition" for an indeterminate term of three to fifteen years.
On November 30, 1988, appellant filed a motion for shock probation. The trial court granted said motion, suspended the above sentence, and placed appellant on probation for four years upon certain terms and conditions.
On January 24, 1989, appellant's probation officer filed a motion seeking to revoke appellant's probation. Said motion alleged that appellant assaulted Priscilla Weir on December 31, 1988, and that this conduct violated Condition One of appellant's probation, to wit: appellant was not to violate any federal, state, or local laws.
Prior to the scheduled revocation hearing, appellant filed a motion requesting a competency evaluation and an evaluation regarding her sanity at the time of the alleged probation violation. On March 1, 1989, the trial court, through judgment entry, granted the competency motion but overruled the sanity evaluation. Dr. Kathleen P. Stafford, Director of the Summit County Psycho-Diagnostic Clinic and a clinical psychologist, evaluated appellant's competency and opined that appellant was incompetent to stand trial. 1 Nevertheless, the trial court, by way of an April 4, 1989 judgment entry, found that the competency-to-stand-trial provisions of R.C. 2945.37 et seq. were inapplicable to post-conviction proceedings.
On April 26, 1989, an evidentiary hearing was held and appellant proffered the competency and sanity reports. On May 2, 1989, the trial court revoked appellant's probation.
Appellant now seeks our review and raises the following assignments of error:
In her first assignment, appellant claims that the trial court erred when it revoked appellant's probation for an assault committed by appellant while she was insane. Therefore, the issue confronting us is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires a court to consider the defense of insanity in a probation revocation hearing. For the reasons that follow, we believe due process does not require such consideration.
The two leading United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the due process requirements for revocation of parole and probation are Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656; Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. In Morrissey, the court recognized that "[t]he essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." Id. 408 U.S. at 477, 92 S.Ct. at 2598, 33 L.Ed.2d at 492.
Here, there is sufficient evidence contained in the record to support the finding that appellant violated Condition One of her probation. The question is whether appellant under due process requirements is afforded the defense of insanity for such violation.
In both Gagnon and Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that probation/parole revocation proceedings are not considered stages of criminal prosecution. Gagnon, supra, 411 U.S. at 783, 93 S.Ct. at 1760, 36 L.Ed.2d at 662, Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d at 494. Revoking an individual's probation does not deprive that individual of an absolute right of liberty, but deprives that person of a conditional right of liberty dependent upon observing special probation restrictions. Morrissey, supra, at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d at 494. Therefore, the due process requirements in revocation proceedings are more limited than the requirements for criminal prosecution proceedings. Id.
In Bearden v. Georgia (1983), 461 U.S. 660, 668, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2070, 76 L.Ed.2d 221, 230, fn. 9, the Supreme Court stated:
"We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probationer's lack of fault in violating a term of probation would necessarily prevent a court from revoking probation. * * * "
In Knight v. Estelle (C.A.5, 1974), 501 F.2d 963, 964, the court stated:
The Tenth District Court of Appeals relied on the above cases when it decided State v. Qualls (1988), 50 Ohio App.3d 56, 552 N.E.2d 957. In that case, the court of appeals found that a trial court may revoke probation even when the violation of a probation condition was beyond the control of the defendant (such as insanity) because there remains a threat to the safety and welfare of society. The Qualls court went on to hold that:
"[I]nsanity is not a complete defense in a probation revocation hearing but is a mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised." Id. at 60, 552 N.E.2d at 962.
It is noteworthy that the above holding does not require a trial court to consider the defense of insanity even when timely raised.
From the foregoing, we believe due process does not require a court to consider the defense of insanity in revocation proceedings. Had appellant here violated a condition that she would not leave the state of Ohio, we do not find it fundamentally unfair to revoke her probation even though appellant claims ignorance of the state border. The privilege of probation rests upon the probationer's compliance with the probation conditions and any violation of those conditions may properly be used to revoke the privilege. It is not fundamentally unfair to require an individual who has been convicted of a crime and granted conditional probation to adhere strictly to those conditions. An insanity defense focuses on the probationer's state of mind. However, the true focus of the probation revocation proceeding is whether a condition of probation has been violated, and if so, what should be done. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Fears
...privilege." State v. Ohly , 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006-Ohio-2353, 853 N.E.2d 675 (6th Dist.), ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bell , 66 Ohio App.3d 52, 57, 583 N.E.2d 414 (5th Dist. 1990). "Because a community control revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, the state does not have to establish a ......
-
State v. Brock
...the privilege." State v. Ohly, 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006-Ohio-2353, 853 N.E.2d 675 (6th Dist.), ¶ 19, quoting State v. Bell, 66 Ohio App.3d 52, 57, 583 N.E.2d 414 (5th Dist. 1990). "Because a community control revocation hearing is not a criminal trial, the state does not have to establish ......
-
State v. Griffeth
...with the probation conditions and any violation of those conditions may properly be used to revoke the privilege." State v. Bell (1990), 66 Ohio App.3d 52, 57, 583 N.E.2d 414. Determination of the credibility of the witnesses is for the trier of fact. State v. Swiger (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 15......
-
State v. Wolfe, 2009 Ohio 830 (Ohio App. 2/23/2009), 2008-CA-00064.
...silent record raises the presumption that a trial court considered the factors contained in R.C. 2929.12"). State v. Bell (1990), 66 Ohio App. 3d 52, 58, 583 N.E.2d 414, 417-418. {¶62} "When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption that he did......