State v. Bell, No. 68080
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
| Writing for the Court | BILLINGS; HIGGINS; WELLIVER; WELLIVER |
| Citation | 719 S.W.2d 763 |
| Decision Date | 18 November 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 68080 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Tessie L. BELL, Appellant. |
Page 763
v.
Tessie L. BELL, Appellant.
En Banc.
Page 764
Thomas J. Marshall, Public Defender, Moberly, for appellant.
William L. Webster, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Philip M. Koppe, Asst. Atty. Gen., Kansas City, for respondent.
BILLINGS, Judge.
Defendant Tessie Bell was convicted of possession of marijuana on the premises of
Page 765
a correctional institution in violation of § 217.360, RSMo Supp. 1984. He appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District but that court, noting his challenge to the constitutionality of § 217.360 transferred the case here. Affirmed.On October 21, 1984, David Andrews, a guard at the Missouri Training Center for Men at Moberly, a correctional institution, conducted a general search of inmates, including defendant. Andrews testified that he found a "marijuana joint" and a small packet containing marijuana in defendant's left rear pocket. Chemical analysis confirmed that the substance in the packet was marijuana. Defendant testified that another inmate had given him the packet to deliver to a third inmate and that he did not know what was in the packet until Andrews opened it. The jury found the defendant guilty of violating § 217.360, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of five years imprisonment, to run consecutively to a term that defendant was then serving.
Defendant first contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support the verdict against him because the state failed to prove that he "knowingly" possessed a controlled substance, as is required by § 217.360. There is no direct evidence regarding defendant's knowledge that he possessed marijuana other than his testimony that he was unaware of the contents of the packet taken from him. Knowledge, however, may also be shown by circumstantial evidence. State v. Scarlett, 486 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Mo.1972). A prima facie case of knowing possession of a controlled substance is made out by the prosecution showing the defendant's possession of the substance. State v. Virdure, 371 S.W.2d 196, 201 (Mo.1963). A defense that defendant was not aware of the controlled substance in his possession merely creates a conflict in the evidence, the resolution of which is for the jury. Id. Thus, the state's uncontradicted evidence showing defendant's possession of a packet containing marijuana constituted substantial evidence from which a jury could rationally have determined that defendant knowingly possessed the marijuana. In his second point on appeal, defendant challenges § 217.360 as being violative of the equal protection, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Missouri and United States Constitutions.
Defendant's first constitutional line of attack is the assertion that § 217.360 denies him equal protection of the laws because it permits inmates in correctional institutions to be punished more severely for possession of less than 35 grams of marijuana than non-inmates. A comparison of § 217.360 and § 195.200(1)(a), RSMo Supp. 1984, demonstrates the basis of this assertion. Section 217.360 provides that possession of any amount of any controlled substance in or about the premises of a correctional institution is a felony. Section 195.200.1(1)(a) provides that a first offense possession of less than 35 grams of marijuana is punishable as a misdemeanor.
Defendant is incorrect, however, in his conclusion that § 217.360 singles out inmates for more severe punishment than non-inmates. Section 217.360.1 expressly states that "[i]t shall be an offense for any person to knowingly ... have in his possession ... in or about the premises of any division correctional institution: (1) Any controlled substance...." (Emphasis added). Thus, the statute does not punish defendant more severely merely because he is an inmate. The actual classification made by § 217.360 is not between inmate and non-inmate, but between those people in possession of a controlled substance in or about a correctional institution and those in possession of a controlled substance elsewhere.
Unless a statute creates a classification that burdens a suspect group or trammels a fundamental interest, the classification will be upheld so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. State v. Bolder, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Williams
...a particular attorney as a matter of constitutional right." State v. Taylor, 778 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. App. 1989) (citing State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Mo. banc 1986)). Instead, a defendant's right to be represented by chosen counsel "is qualified by the public right to effective and e......
-
State v. Carlton, No. 14784
...(Wyo.1986). Also see United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3rd Cir.1986); Ex Parte Harbor, 465 So.2d 460 (Ala.1985); State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. banc 1986). The Solem decision has also received the following Appellant argues that the district judge was required under Helm to har......
-
State v. McCleod, No. WD 64945.
...possession of a controlled substance is made out by the prosecution showing the defendant's possession of the substance."4 State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Mo. banc 1986). "A defense that defendant was not aware of the controlled substance in his possession merely creates a conflict in t......
-
State v. Stoer, Nos. 17206
...a one hundred year sentence. Furthermore, Defendant's sentence did not subject him to cruel and unusual punishment. In State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. banc 1986), the Supreme Court said that "punishment within statutory limits is not cruel and unusual because of its duration unless it is......
-
State v. Williams
...attorney as a matter of constitutional right." State v. Taylor, 778 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. App. 1989) (citing State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Mo. banc 1986)). Instead, a defendant's right to be represented by chosen counsel "is qualified by the public right to effective and effi......
-
State v. Carlton, No. 14784
...(Wyo.1986). Also see United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3rd Cir.1986); Ex Parte Harbor, 465 So.2d 460 (Ala.1985); State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. banc 1986). The Solem decision has also received the following Appellant argues that the district judge was required under Helm to har......
-
State v. McCleod, No. WD 64945.
...of a controlled substance is made out by the prosecution showing the defendant's possession of the substance."4 State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Mo. banc 1986). "A defense that defendant was not aware of the controlled substance in his possession merely creates a conflict in th......
-
State v. Stoer, Nos. 17206
...a one hundred year sentence. Furthermore, Defendant's sentence did not subject him to cruel and unusual punishment. In State v. Bell, 719 S.W.2d 763 (Mo. banc 1986), the Supreme Court said that "punishment within statutory limits is not cruel and unusual because of its duration unless ......