State v. Bellamy, No. 22766
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Writing for the Court | HARWELL; NESS, C.J., GREGORY and FINNEY, JJ., and LITTLEJOHN |
Citation | 359 S.E.2d 63,293 S.C. 103 |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Lee Grant BELLAMY, Appellant. . Heard |
Decision Date | 10 June 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 22766 |
Page 63
v.
Lee Grant BELLAMY, Appellant.
Decided Aug. 10, 1987.
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[293 S.C. 104] Asst. Appellate Defender Daniel T. Stacey, Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and William Edgar Salter, III, Columbia, and Sol. James O. Dunn, Conway, for respondent.
HARWELL, Justice:
Appellant was convicted of murder and criminal conspiracy. He received the death penalty and five years, respectively. This case consolidates appellant's direct appeal and our mandatory review of the death sentence, pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1976, as amended). We reverse and remand.
On February 11, 1986, appellant bought a .38 caliber pistol at a pawn shop. On February 28, 1986, appellant killed the victim by shooting him five times in the head at close range. At trial, the state contended that this was a contract killing or murder for hire. The state attempted to prove that appellant's co-defendant, Von Ceil Lewis (Lewis), hired him to kill the victim, Roland Vereen (Vereen). Lewis' alleged motive was to prevent Vereen from continuing to steal items from her home as she believed he had been doing since she had refused to continue selling drugs for him. Appellant contended that while his co-defendant had repeatedly asked him to kill Vereen, he had refused to do so. He claims that he shot Vereen in self-defense after Vereen pulled a gun on him.
Appellant contends that the trial court's charge failed to comply with the self-defense charge suggested in State v. Davis, 282 S.C. 45, 317 S.E.2d 452 (1984) and made mandatory [293 S.C. 105] in State v. Glover, 284 S.C. 152, 326 S.E.2d 150 (1985). We agree.
In its charge, the trial court properly set forth the four elements of self-defense. The trial court erred, however, in the subsequent portion of its charge dealing with the burden of proof in self-defense cases. The jury was instructed that the accused is required to establish the plea of self-defense by the preponderance or the greater weight of the evidence. After explaining what is meant by "a preponderance of the evidence," the trial court stated, "and that's the standard, that's the burden that the defendant must carry in order to prove the defense of self-defense in this case."
This charge is in direct contravention of the model charge given in Davis, supra, and made mandatory in Glover, supra. The relevant portion of the self-defense charge as set forth in Davis states, "If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence including the evidence of self-defense, then you must find him not guilty. On the other hand, if you have no reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence including the evidence of self-defense then you must find him guilty." 282 S.C. at 46, 317 S.E.2d at 453. It is clear that the defendant need not establish self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence but must merely produce
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evidence which causes the jury to have a reasonable doubt regarding his guilt. 1Respondent...
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State v. Hughey, No. 25096.
...evidence and not merely those requested by the defendant. State v. Caldwell, 300 S.C. 494, 388 S.E.2d 816 (1990) (citing State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987)). In deciding which statutory mitigating circumstances may be supported, the trial judge is concerned only with the e......
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Smart v. Leeke, Civ. A. No. 3:85-0225-15B.
...683 F.2d 820 n. 5 (4th Cir.1982). 5 Self-defense is no longer an affirmative defense under the law of South Carolina. State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987). Apparently, self-defense was no longer an affirmative defense under South Carolina law as a result of the ruling in Sta......
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State v. Torrence, No. 23403
...(1988); State v. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E.2d 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10 (1987); State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987); State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515, 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987); State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987); State v. Co......
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State v. Biegenwald
...such intoxication must be to a degree that it affects defendant's ability to understand and control his actions"); State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 105, 359 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1987) ("if there is evidence that the defendant could be under the influence of alcohol or drugs," court should charge o......
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State v. Hughey, No. 25096.
...evidence and not merely those requested by the defendant. State v. Caldwell, 300 S.C. 494, 388 S.E.2d 816 (1990) (citing State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987)). In deciding which statutory mitigating circumstances may be supported, the trial judge is concerned only with the e......
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Smart v. Leeke, Civ. A. No. 3:85-0225-15B.
...683 F.2d 820 n. 5 (4th Cir.1982). 5 Self-defense is no longer an affirmative defense under the law of South Carolina. State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987). Apparently, self-defense was no longer an affirmative defense under South Carolina law as a result of the ruling in Sta......
-
State v. Torrence, No. 23403
...(1988); State v. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E.2d 793 (1988); State v. Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E.2d 10 (1987); State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987); State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515, 362 S.E.2d 13 (1987); State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E.2d 138 (1987); State v. Co......
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Smart v. Leeke, No. 87-7737
...of that decision, so long as contemporaneous objection was made at trial." Id. at 154, 326 S.E.2d at 151. Finally, in State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E.2d 63 (1987), the court reversed a murder conviction for failure to comply with the Davis charge. The court refused to address the st......