State v. De Bellis

• Decision Date: 17 March 1927
• Docket Number: No. 97.,97.
• Citation: 136 A. 603
• Parties: STATE v. DE BELLIS.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

136 A. 603

STATE

v. DE BELLIS.

No. 97.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

March 17, 1927.

Error to Court of Quarter Sessions, Hudson County.

Dominick De Bellis was convicted of robbery, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Argued May term, 1926, before KALISCH, KATZENBACH, and LLOYD, JJ.

William A. Kavanagh, of Hoboken, for plaintiff in error.

John Milton, Prosecutor of the Pleas, of Jersey City, for the State.

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff in error was indicted together with John De Bellis and Joseph Rupprecht, alias Joseph Dunn, alias Charles Anders, alias Red Ruppert, for having perpetrated four robberies committed at the same time and place on each of the complaining victims. A severance was granted as to John De Bellis; and the plaintiff in error and Joseph Rupprecht were put on trial. After a jury was impaneled, counsel on behalf of Rupprecht stated to the court that Rupprecht desired to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, which request was granted. The trial then proceeded against the plaintiff in error alone. Rupprecht appeared as a witness on behalf of the state. The plaintiff in error was convicted on all four indictments, which, by consent of respective counsel, were tried together. Judgment having been given on the convictions had, the plaintiff in error comes before this court on strict writ of error and under the 136th section of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St. 1910, p. 1863).

The first ground relied on and argued in the brief of counsel of plaintiff in error for reversal is that the court erred in allowing Joseph Rupprecht to plead guilty in the presence and hearing of the jury. This objection is substanceless, and needs no comment, except to say that, at the time the offer was made to plead by Rupprecht, counsel of plaintiff in error sat quietly by and made no objection. But, even if he had, it could not have been of any avail, since the practice of taking pleas of guilty of codefendants in the presence of the jury is a common one, and its legal propriety has never been questioned. The second point argued and urged for a reversal is that the court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal at the conclusion of the state's case.

A fair reading of the testimony offered by the state makes it manifest that there was ample proof of the participation of the plaintiff in error, in the perpetration of the robberies. The insistence of counsel of plaintiff in error is that, according to the testimony, the...