State v. Belton, DOCKET NO. A–0971–16T1

Decision Date26 December 2017
Docket NumberDOCKET NO. A–0971–16T1
Parties STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Anwar H. BELTON, a/k/a Hason Belton, a/k/a Hason Lyon, a/k/a Anwar Belton, a/k/a Anwar Beltron, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Damon G. Tyner, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (John J. Santoliquido, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges Sabatino, Ostrer and Whipple.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

OSTRER, J.A.D.

Defendant Anwar H. Belton appeals from a September 14, 2016 order denying, without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant collaterally challenges his conviction, after a plea, of first-degree aggravated manslaughter.

We reverse. We conclude that defendant, in the course of his plea allocution, suggested a defense of others that was inconsistent with guilt; his waiver of that defense was not knowingly made; therefore, he did not present a sufficient factual basis of guilt. In reaching this conclusion, we apply the principles set forth in State v. Urbina, 221 N.J. 509, 115 A.3d 261 (2015), although that case involved a claim of self-defense, rather than the defense of others, suggested in the course of a guilty plea. In view of defendant's contemporaneous claim of innocence, the failure to elicit a sufficient factual basis was of constitutional dimension and warrants PCR. See State v. D.D.M., 140 N.J. 83, 95, 657 A.2d 837 (1995) ; State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 577–78, 601 A.2d 198 (1992).

I.

Defendant was indicted and charged, along with a woman named Erika Pugh, also known as "Sparkles," with murder, theft from the victim, and endangering an injured victim. Pugh was also charged with prostitution. Defendant was offered an agreement to plead to an amended charge of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, in return for a recommended twelve-year prison term subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2, and dismissal of the remaining charges.

In his allocution, defendant contended that he was roused from his sleep in an Atlantic City motel by frantic requests for help by Pugh and another woman. Both women were involved in an altercation with a man. When the man began biting down on Pugh's hand, refusing to let go, defendant said he put the man in a headlock to get him to release Pugh's hand. The man relented only after he began "snoring." The man died soon thereafter.

In the plea colloquy, defense counsel first established that Pugh woke defendant, who admitted he had only met Pugh that night. We quote the colloquy at length:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. So she [Pugh] came knocking on your door sometime in the middle of the night, correct?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And Miss Pugh was actually not dressed at the time that she came knocking on your door.
[DEFENDANT:] Yes, Your Honor. I mean—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] That's okay.... And she indicated to you something about somebody took my money, come help me, somebody took my money; is that correct?
[DEFENDANT:] No, she didn't say that yet. She just came screaming help.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Help, okay. So you went outside and tell the judge primarily in your own words what happened after you went outside, and if there's some questions that I'll have to ask you, I'll ask you.
[DEFENDANT:] When I came to the door and I seen Miss Pugh, she was in the nude and she was screaming help, help, help! And I came to the door, first I was looking at her, then I looked down the hallway because there was some more noise coming, well not the hallway but down the corridor of the top floor. And I seen the girl, the young lady that I did come down with, Candy, and the victim. And he was like, he was a little, he had his shirt off, he was a little hysterical.
So I just went over there and told him to calm down and be quiet, to go back in and find out what was going on. And when we got on the inside, she's saying he took her money. He's saying they robbed him. Then he got real agitated and I told him relax, I didn't come for that. Then Sparkle[s] is screaming, beat him up, get my money. And I says to her shut up, because I didn't even know her.
And in the process of that Candy says, is there some more money around here? And she wants to touch the guy, and when she touches the guy, he gets real belligerent and starts assaulting her. And I tried to stop it and me and him got into an altercation.1

Defendant then described his effort to defend Pugh, as the victim bit her hand:

[DEFENDANT:] [cont'd] And in between that altercation Sparkles got in, intervened, and he starts biting Sparkles, and when he's biting Sparkles, I'm trying to get him off of Sparkles, he's biting and she's screaming and doing whatever she can to get him off of her. And by the time I get ready to let go was when I heard like, I heard him snoring.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. Now prior to you, when you say let go, you actually had your arm, or your had his head in a headlock, correct?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. And during that time period when you had [the victim's] head in a headlock, you held him for a period of time until he let her go.
[DEFENDANT:] Let go of her hand.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay.
[DEFENDANT:] I let go of him when he let go of her hand.

Defense counsel then attempted to elicit defendant's admission that he acted with indifference to human life. Defendant insisted that he was "trying to stop [the victim] from hurting" Pugh.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] ... What I'm asking you is, when the gentleman was down on the ground and he wasn't responding, you, Sparkle[s] and Candy left the room.
[DEFENDANT:] Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. And would you agree that by leaving the room and not offering him any aid, that you actually, that action alone showed indifference to his life.
[DEFENDANT:] No, I don't believe in that, to be honest.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] You don't. Well then we're not going to have a plea.
[DEFENDANT:] Well I did everything I can do, but I'm not going to say I showed indifference, because I was trying to stop him from hurting her.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] I understand that. That's not the question. The question is after the fact when he was down on the ground you didn't offer him any medical aid.
[DEFENDANT:] No. I said I left him there.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. What I'm saying to you is the fact of you leaving him there and not assisting him is extreme indifference because you didn't assist him when you knew he needed assistance.
[DEFENDANT:] Yeah, but the ambulance was there.

The prosecutor elicited that defendant disregarded the risk that he might cause the victim's death:

[PROSECUTOR:] ... [Y]ou agree what you were doing was affecting his ability to breathe?
[DEFENDANT:] I might have contribute [sic].
[PROSECUTOR:] Okay. And you agree based on your actions and everything that occurred there was a conscious disregard of the probability of death of ... the victim?
[DEFENDANT:] No, I wouldn't say that because then I would thought that he would die at that moment.
THE COURT: Well the question was probability, not a certainty.
THE DEFENDANT: Oh, probability? Oh yes, well I can't, yeah, okay.
[PROSECUTOR:] And you disregarded that risk when you were doing what happened, what you described, right?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes.

As the judge began to say he was satisfied with the allocution, the prosecutor interrupted to express his concern that defendant may have expressed a defense of others:

[PROSECUTOR:] Judge, maybe the court—I mean from what he is saying there's the possibility that there's a defense of others. As long as he understands he's waiving that possible defense in order to take the benefits of this plea agreement. So I don't know if the court can maybe inquire about that.

The judge then asked defense counsel if she had talked to her client about that defense. She admitted she had not. The judge conducted an off-the-record conference at the bench. After a break of unknown duration, the court went back on the record, whereupon defendant purported to waive the defense.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Judge, I did discuss with Mr. Belton any defenses that could have been brought up as a result of what his colloquy is today and we are after discussing it giving up any rights to any defenses that may have been presented in exchange for the plea agreement.
THE COURT: All right. That's correct, Mr. Belton?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

The judge found that defendant's plea was freely and voluntarily entered and satisfied the elements of aggravated manslaughter. Notably, at the subsequent sentencing hearing, defendant stated he was reluctant to enter the plea agreement, and reiterated that he acted in Pugh's defense. The court sentenced defendant in accord with the plea agreement. On direct appeal, we affirmed the sentence on an Excessive Sentence Oral Argument calendar, but remanded for a correction of jail credits. State v. Belton, No. A–0389–14 (App. Div. May 6, 2015).

II.

Defendant thereafter filed a "motion for post-conviction relief" and a motion to withdraw his plea, pursuant to Rule 3:21–1. He contended:

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED DEFENDANT TO A TERM GREATER THAN THE CO–DEFENDANT WHEN THE CO–DEFENDANT CONTRIBUTED TO VICTIM[']S
DEATH FAR MORE THAN DEFENDANT
IN VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTIONS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS.
POINT II
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR WITHHOLDING THE DEFENSE OF OTHERS AND NOT DISCUSSING THIS DEFENSE IN DETAIL TO DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF NEW JERSEY CONST. ART. I PAR. X.
POINT III
THE DEFENDANT[']S PLEA OF GUILT DOES NOT SUPPORT A FIRST DEGREE AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER CONVICTION.

In a counseled brief, defendant contended:

POINT I
BECAUSE TRIAL AND [sic] PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, AND BECAUSE THE PETITIONER WAS PREJUDICED THEREBY, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR POST–CONVICTION
...

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