State v. Belton

Decision Date19 April 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2003–002.,2003–002.
Citation150 N.H. 741,846 A.2d 526
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court
Parties The STATE of New Hampshire v. Allen BELTON.

Peter W. Heed, attorney general (Susan P. McGinnis, assistant attorney general, and Michael A. Delaney, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Dawnangela Minton, assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.

Allen Belton, by brief, pro se.

DUGGAN, J.

The defendant, Allen Belton, appeals his conviction following a jury trial in the Superior Court (McHugh , J.) on one count of robbery. See RSA 636:1 (1996). We affirm.

The jury could have found the following facts. On the morning of November 14, 2000, a man robbed the First Essex Bank in Salem. The man told the bank employees that he had a gun and would shoot them. The man then fled the bank on foot with over $14,000 and headed toward Methuen, Massachusetts. As he fled, he was observed by several witnesses, including Christine Spignesi, Rocky Arsenault and George Coker.

After receiving information which led him to believe that the defendant might be a suspect, Methuen Police Officer Christopher McCarthy went to the defendant's Methuen home and questioned him about his recent activities. The defendant then consented to a search of his home and the police seized a pair of white sneakers that matched the description of the robber's footwear. The defendant was subsequently arrested and, the following morning, he confessed to robbing the bank.

A jury trial was held in October 2002. Arsenault and Coker both testified that they selected a picture of the defendant from a photo array. On the other hand, Spignesi described the man she saw on the morning of the robbery but told the jury that she was unable to identify the robber in the photo array.

The State also called Melissa Staples, an expert in DNA forensic analysis, to describe the results of a DNA analysis performed on a nylon mask believed to be worn by the defendant when he allegedly robbed the bank. Staples testified that the defendant could not be excluded as a source of DNA on the nylon mask. The defendant was convicted on one count of robbery.

On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the DNA evidence should have been excluded because there was insufficient statistical interpretation to assist the jury; (2) the State's failure to disclose evidence that a witness was unable to identify the defendant in a photo array should have resulted in exclusion of all evidence concerning photographic identifications; and (3) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce statements he made on the day after his arrest because they were fruits of an unlawful detention. We address each argument in turn.

The defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it found that the DNA analysis results were admissible. Specifically, the defendant contends that because "the State presented no interpretive evidence regarding the likelihood of a potential match if the analyzed sample was from more than one DNA source, the trial court erred when it allowed Staples to testify as an expert and offer her interpretation of the laboratory results." We disagree.

Generally, we accord considerable deference to a trial court's evidentiary rulings and will only intervene when they demonstrate an unsustainable exercise of discretion. State v. Pelletier, 149 N.H. 243, 249, 818 A.2d 292 (2003). Unless a party establishes that such a ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the party's case, it will not be disturbed. Id.

At trial, Staples testified that a DNA analysis revealed that the defendant could not be excluded as a source of DNA on the nylon mask. She further testified that the DNA analysis excluded 99.9 percent of the population as a source of DNA on the nylon mask. With regard to how frequently the DNA types found on the mask would occur in a random sample of the population, Staples said that these same DNA types would be found "in the Caucasian population [in] approximately one in 14,000; in the African American population, about one in 26,000; and in the Southwestern Hispanic population, about one in 28,000."

On direct examination, Staples was asked about "weak results" that were identified during the testing process. Staples stated that the "weak results" could be evidence of a mixed sample, meaning that DNA from another person was present. Staples further stated that "weak results" could be indicative of technical flaws in the testing process. Staples explained that she did not interpret the "weak results" because they were below the required threshold level of intensity and, thus, uninterpretable and unreliable.

On cross-examination, Staples said that because she could not determine whether the DNA the lab tested was from a mixed sample, she did not take this possibility into account when she conducted her statistical analysis. Rather, she said that because there was "no indication above the controls of a mixture in this particular case," the DNA sample was treated as a single source.

The defendant objected to the admissibility of the DNA evidence. He argued that because the nylon mask and other items that were later subjected to DNA testing were stored in the same place as items that were taken from his home, there was a possibility that the DNA analysis was conducted on a mixed sample and, therefore, the DNA evidence should be excluded. The trial court rejected the defendant's argument and pointed out that there was "no evidence" that the items taken from the defendant's home were "somehow commingled" with the nylon mask.

We agree with the defendant that if the DNA results presented to the jury were based on the analysis of a known mixed sample, the State would be required to explain how the presence of DNA from another individual would affect the statistical analysis. See , e.g., State v. Garcia, 197 Ariz. 79, 3 P.3d 999, 1003–04 (1999) (holding that Frye test for admissibility was satisfied because expert used likelihood ratios to explain results of DNA tests conducted on known mixed samples); State v. Ayers, 315 Mont. 395, 68 P.3d 768, 775 (2003) (affirming trial court's admission of expert testimony where expert used likelihood ratios to explain DNA results from a known mixed sample); People v. Coy, 243 Mich.App. 283, 620 N.W.2d 888, 895 (2000) (holding that admission of evidence that defendant's DNA profile was consistent with DNA profiles from mixed blood samples was plain error warranting reversal because no testimony was provided to explain the statistical significance of a potential match).

In this case, however, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the DNA sample was from a mixed source. Although Staples testified that "weak results" could indicate the presence of DNA from another person, she further testified that there was "no indication above the controls of a mixture in this particular case." Moreover, the trial court found that there was no evidence that the nylon mask was "somehow commingled" with items that were taken from the defendant's home. Because the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding that the DNA analysis at issue was conducted on a mixed sample, we find no unsustainable exercise of discretion in the trial court's ruling that the DNA tests were admissible without additional statistical analysis. See N.H. R. Ev. 104(a).

The defendant next argues that the State's failure to disclose that one witness could not identify the defendant in a photo array " should have resulted in the exclusion of all evidence concerning photographic identifications." The State, on the other hand, argues that the failure to disclose was inadvertent, the information was not exculpatory and the defendant was not prejudiced by the late disclosure. We agree with the State.

As we set forth above, we generally accord considerable deference to the trial court's evidentiary rulings and will only intervene when they demonstrate an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Pelletier, 149 N.H. at 249, 818 A.2d 292. The same standard applies to the review of a discovery sanction. State v. Cromlish, 146 N.H. 277, 280, 780 A.2d 486 (2001). To show an unsustainable exercise of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial court's decision was clearly unreasonable and that the decision prejudiced his case. See id. at 280–81, 780 A.2d 486.

In determining whether evidence should be excluded for a violation of discovery rules, the trial court may consider several factors, including: whether the violating party made a good faith effort to comply or provided a pre-trial warning to minimize surprise; the ability of the court to limit the scope of testimony or evidence to minimize surprise; and the availability of lesser sanctions or procedural curative measures.

Id. at 281, 780 A.2d 486.

In superior court, within thirty days after the entry of a not guilty plea, the State is required to provide the defendant with copies of all police reports and statements of witnesses. Super. Ct. R. 98(A)(2)(i). The State is also required to provide the defendant with "[a]ll exculpatory materials." Super. Ct. R. 98(A)(2)(iv).

Superior Court Rule 98(J) provides the trial court with a non-exclusive list of sanctions that it may impose for a violation of the discovery rules. Under the rule, the trial court may order the party to provide the discovery not previously provided, grant a continuance of the trial, prohibit the party from introducing the undisclosed evidence or assess costs and attorney's fees against the violating party. Super. Ct. R. 98(J).

Spignesi told the police that on the morning of the robbery, she saw a black man with very dark skin running towards the woods carrying a bag. She looked at a photo array and picked out "one or two" photographs that she thought were similar to the man she saw, but she was unable to identify any particular...

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