State v. Belton

• Citation: 153 S.W.3d 307
• Decision Date: 25 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC 85990.,SC 85990.
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Phillip BELTON, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

153 S.W.3d 307

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Phillip BELTON, Appellant.

No. SC 85990.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

January 25, 2005.

Kent Denzel, Office of the Public Defender, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Shaun J. Mackelprang, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.¹

Phillip Belton attended a gathering at Donald Adkins' home in December 1999. During the gathering, he waved a gun in the dining room, threatened to shoot Adkins in the head, and shot Adkins dead. Belton was charged with second-degree murder, section 565.021,² and armed criminal action, section 571.015.

Belton was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included crime of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, section 565.024, RSMo Supp.1999, and armed criminal action. Belton was sentenced to two consecutive five-year prison terms. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his involuntary manslaughter conviction and alleges instructional error on the armed criminal action charge. Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Belton contends the evidence is insufficient to convict him of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this Court must determine whether sufficient evidence permits a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict. State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 763-64 (Mo. banc 2002).

To convict Belton of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, the State had to prove that he recklessly caused Adkins' death. Section 565.024.1(1), RSMo Supp.1999.³ A person acts recklessly when he or she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. Section 562.016.4. Recklessness resembles knowing conduct in one respect in that it involves awareness, but it is an awareness of risk, that is, of a probability less than a substantial certainty. State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. banc 2000).

Three witnesses testified Belton was showing off a gun and waving it around in the dining room, where Adkins was sitting at a table. Two of the witnesses left the home after they heard Belton threaten to shoot Adkins in the head. A third witness went into a bedroom because she was afraid of the gun. Upon hearing a gunshot a few minutes later, she came back into the dining room and saw that Adkins had been shot in the head. Although none of the witnesses saw the actual shooting, the evidence was sufficient to establish a reasonable inference that Belton shot Adkins.

The State's theory focused on an intentional shooting, but the witness hearing the gunshot testified she thought it was an accident. Similarly, an inmate at a correctional facility with Belton testified that Belton admitted he "accidentally shot a guy in the head." An accidental shooting, where the irresponsible use of a gun is shown, can support a finding of recklessness. State v. Gaskins, 66 S.W.3d 110, 113 (Mo.App.2001). At a minimum, the evidence was sufficient to establish the shooting death occurred as result of Belton's conscious disregard for the substantial risks involved in waving a gun around and pointing it toward Adkins. The jury could reasonably conclude his conduct was reckless, in that it grossly deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would use under similar circumstances. See State v. Jennings, 887 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Mo.App.1994).

The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Belton was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of recklessly causing Adkins' death.

INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR

Belton also contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury to consider the armed criminal action charge in connection with a guilty verdict on involuntary manslaughter in the first degree. He argues armed criminal action requires a mental state of purposeful or knowing conduct, pursuant to section 571.015.1 and section 562.021.3, RSMo Supp.1999, and, therefore, cannot be submitted with the underlying felony of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree, which requires the lower mens rea of reckless conduct.

On a claim of instructional error, the Court will reverse due to instructional error if there is error in submitting an instruction and prejudice to the defendant. State v. Westfall, 75 S.W.3d 278, 280 (Mo. banc 2002). A defendant is prejudiced by an erroneous instruction when the jury may have been adversely influenced by it. State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 319 (Mo. banc 1996).

Section 571.015 defines armed criminal action:

1.... [A]ny person who commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action....

The trial court instructed the jury that Belton could be found guilty of armed criminal action if the jury determined:

First, that defendant is guilty of the offense of involuntary manslaughter, as...