State v. Beltran
| Decision Date | 14 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2004-695.,2004-695. |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Christopher BELTRAN. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Kelly A. Ayotte, attorney general (N. William Delker, senior assistant attorney general, and Karen E. Huntress, assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Mr. Delker orally), for the State.
David M. Rothstein, deputy chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Christopher Beltran, appeals his conviction of two counts of second-degree murder, see RSA 630:1-b (1996), following a jury trial in Superior Court (Barry, J.). He argues that the trial court erred: (1) in admitting detailed evidence that he physically abused his former girlfriend, Arica Siegel; (2) by refusing to allow him to introduce a police report as extrinsic evidence to impeach Siegel; and (3) by allowing the State to impeach its own witness with a prior inconsistent statement. We affirm.
The jury could have found the following relevant facts. On April 17, 2003, Christopher Squeglia and Amy Knott were shot and killed in a parking lot on Calef Road in Manchester. The defendant was a crack cocaine dealer. His former girlfriend, Siegel, first met the defendant in November 2002, when she was eighteen years old and addicted to crack cocaine. Richard Badeau was a heavy drug user to whom the defendant sold crack almost every day. Badeau ultimately pled guilty to acting as an accomplice to the murders and testified against the defendant at trial. Knott was also one of the defendant's customers. Squeglia was another drug dealer in Manchester.
Benoit Goupil was a customer of both the defendant and Squeglia. He testified that the defendant said that he did not like Squeglia and thought that he was "no good." In March 2003, Goupil fought with Squeglia; during the fight, several of Squeglia's friends attacked him and broke his jaw. After the fight, Goupil discussed what had happened with the defendant.
Between November 2002 and April 2003, the defendant made several trips to California. On his last trip in April 2003, he told Badeau that he was bringing back two kilograms of cocaine. After his return, the defendant and Siegel went to Manchester on April 16 to sell crack cocaine. They stopped at the home of Richard Case and Linda Segebarth, where the defendant told Case that he had a problem and asked if Case had a gun. Case responded in the negative, and the defendant and Siegel left.
They later stopped at Karen Reed's home. Siegel stayed in the car while the defendant went into the house. Upon his return, he told Siegel that he had run into "a bunch of people on [Reed's] front porch" including Squeglia. The defendant said that Squeglia told him that Goupil deserved to have his jaw broken.
Later in the evening, the defendant met Badeau in the parking lot where the murders took place. Following the meeting, the defendant and Siegel departed. The defendant then received a call from Goupil, and drove to Goupil's home to sell him drugs. Goupil testified the defendant was looking for a gun which he wanted "to put the fear of God into somebody."
The defendant and Siegel next went to Badeau's house, where the defendant had a confrontation with several people, including a woman whom Squeglia was dating. The defendant told her that she and Squeglia had "better watch themselves tonight."
After the house emptied, Badeau took out a pump action shot gun and threw it on the bed. The defendant picked up the gun and unloaded it. He instructed Siegel to wipe off the shells to remove any fingerprints. The defendant put socks on his hands and reloaded the shotgun.
Later, the defendant and Badeau discussed killing Squeglia. Siegel testified that she heard Badeau say, to which the defendant responded, "Let's do it."
The defendant and Badeau then made plans with Squeglia by phone to meet. The defendant, Badeau, and Siegel got into Badeau's truck. The shotgun was in the back seat. They met Squeglia at a convenience store, and told him to follow them. As they were leaving, the defendant and Badeau discussed where to shoot Squeglia and decided to return to the parking lot where they had met earlier in the evening.
On the way to the parking lot the defendant instructed Siegel to chamber a round in the gun. She did not respond and the defendant yelled at her. She testified that she told the defendant she did not know how and he responded, "You just press the button down by the trigger and you slide the thing up and down." The defendant wanted the gun loaded in advance so that there would be no warning to the victims. Siegel testified that she loaded the gun because she was afraid that she would be harmed by the defendant if she did not do as he instructed.
When they arrived at the parking lot, Squeglia and Knott were waiting. The defendant and Badeau got out of the truck and took the gun. Badeau testified that he saw the defendant carrying the gun toward the back of the truck. He and Siegel both heard two gunshots, a pause, and then two more gunshots. The defendant and Badeau got back into the truck and drove away.
After returning to Badeau's home, the defendant and Siegel left for her parents' home. During the trip the defendant called Goupil, and told him he would not have to worry about "Chris" anymore, and that Squeglia and the woman had been shot. He also instructed Siegel to lie if questioned about what happened.
The defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. At trial he conceded to being present in the parking lot at the time of the murders, but contended that Badeau, who pled guilty to being an accomplice to second-degree murder and testified against the defendant at trial, murdered the victims.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to admit evidence that the defendant had abused Siegel. Specifically, the State offered evidence that the defendant physically abused her by pulling her hair, punching and beating her, and on several occasions shooting her with a taser gun, to explain why Siegel loaded the gun for the defendant prior to the murders and why she initially withheld information from and repeatedly lied to the police. After a hearing at which Siegel testified about the abuse and its impact on her conduct on the night of the murders, the trial court found that the evidence was "highly relevant" to explain her conduct, that there was clear proof of the bad acts, and that the "probative value of the evidence [was] far greater than the prejudice, in particular in light of the defendant's claim that Richard Badeau committed the murders and not the defendant."
A jury found the defendant guilty of two counts of second-degree murder. See RSA 630:1-b. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it permitted the State to elicit testimony from Siegel that he subjected her to physical abuse, including the repetitive use of a taser stun gun. Siegel testified that on one occasion, the defendant shot her with a taser gun while she was naked in the shower. The defendant argues that "the issue of why [Siegel] loaded the gun [for the defendant] was not sufficiently important to justify admitting the details of [his]. . . treatment of his girlfriend." He contends that "[i]n light of its low probative value, the prejudicial impact of [the] testimony mandated that the evidence be excluded." Finally, the defendant argues that the evidence had an "unmistakable tendency to isolate [him], as opposed to Badeau, as the man who acted in conformity with his character when he committed these murders."
New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to ensure that the defendant is tried on the merits of the crime as charged and to prevent a conviction based upon evidence of other crimes or wrongs. State v. Bassett, 139 N.H. 493, 496, 659 A.2d 891 (1995). We have established a three-part test for the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant for a purpose other than proving the defendant's character or disposition; (2) there must be clear proof that the defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its prejudice to the defendant. State v. Smalley, 151 N.H. 193, 196, 855 A.2d 401 (2004). The State bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of prior bad acts. Id. We review the trial court's ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant's case. Id. The defendant claims that the State failed to meet its burden, challenging the trial court's decision with respect to the first and third prongs of the Rule 404(b) analysis.
In order to meet its burden under the first prong, the State is required to specify the purpose for which the evidence is offered and articulate the precise chain of reasoning by which it will tend to prove or disprove an issue actually in dispute, without relying upon forbidden inferences of predisposition, character, or propensity. Id. To be relevant, prior bad acts must be in some significant way connected to material events constituting the crime charged and not so remote in time as to eliminate the nexus. State v. McGlew, 139 N.H. 505, 507, 658 A.2d 1191 (1995).
The State contends that the trial court "properly exercised its discretion when it permitted the State to introduce details of the...
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