State v. Benedict
| Decision Date | 31 January 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-38523 |
| Citation | 511 P.3d 379 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Clayton Thomas BENEDICT, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Benjamin L. Lammons, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Mary Barket, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee
{1} Defendant Clayton Thomas Benedict was charged by the State with second-degree murder and the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant, an Uber driver, picked up two intoxicated passengers late afternoon on Saint Patrick's Day 2019. One of the passengers vomited in the backseat of Defendant's car. Minutes later, Defendant stopped along the shoulder of I-25 and told the passengers to get out of the car. An argument about paying a clean-up fee escalated into what Defendant saw as an attack sufficient to provoke him into fatally shooting James Porter (Victim), one of his passengers.
{2} The State appeals pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 39-3-3(B)(1) (1972), from the district court's decision that there was no probable cause to bind Defendant over for trial on second-degree murder. The district court found probable cause solely on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. We agree with the State that the district court erred in failing to find probable cause to bind Defendant over for trial on second-degree murder and remand for amendment of the criminal information to include that charge.
{3} The State filed a criminal information charging Defendant with second-degree murder, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-1(B) (1994), and voluntary manslaughter, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-2-3(A) (1994). The case proceeded to a preliminary hearing, as required by Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution when the State prosecutes a felony by criminal information, rather than by grand jury indictment. The procedures in the district court for a preliminary examination are set forth in Rule 5-302 NMRA.
{4} At the preliminary examination, the State introduced into evidence a video recording of an hour-long interview of Defendant by law enforcement on the night of the shooting. The entire record interview was played for the district court during the preliminary hearing. Defendant's interview was the only evidence of the events leading up to the shooting of Victim that night.
{5} Defendant testified that he picked up Victim and Victim's friend, Jonathan Reyes, from a local bar. Reyes was so drunk he was on the ground, and Victim was trying to get him on his feet. Once both passengers were in the vehicle, Defendant noticed Reyes looked "woozy," so he rolled down the window for him, and asked both Victim and Reyes to let him know if Reyes needed to vomit, so he could pull over. A minute or two later, as Defendant approached the entrance to I-25, Reyes vomited all over the back seat of Defendant's car.
{6} Defendant told his passengers that Uber would charge Victim (who had hailed the ride) a clean-up fee, which angered Victim. It was undisputed that it was Uber's policy to charge a clean-up fee when a passenger vomited in a driver's vehicle. When Reyes looked like he was about to vomit again, Defendant pulled over on the shoulder of the highway and asked both passengers to get out.
{7} Both passengers got out of the vehicle through the passenger's side back door, and Victim slammed the door behind him. Defendant opened the door, partially stepped out of the driver's seat, and told Victim not to slam his door. Victim began pulling off his hat, sunglasses, and necklaces throwing them on the ground, and started walking toward Defendant, moving from the passenger's side of the vehicle, around the tail end, toward the driver's door. Reyes told Victim it was "not worth it" and that they should just leave.
{8} Defendant told Victim to listen to his friend and advised both of them to go to the nearest stoplight, which was visible about a block away, sober up, and call another ride. Victim then pushed his friend aside and started moving toward Defendant again. Defendant pulled out a concealed handgun (which he was authorized to carry) stepped completely out of the driver's side of the vehicle, aimed the gun at Victim, and told Victim to "stop, back up, get away from me," and to "let me get in my car and leave." Victim stopped momentarily, but then began approaching Defendant again, yelling, "You want to fucking shoot me, then fucking shoot me, you fucking pussy." Defendant described backing up behind the driver's open door.
{9} Victim veered away, walking a couple of feet into the traffic lane, and waving his hands at passing vehicles. Defendant saw at least one truck swerve to avoid hitting Victim. Defendant indicated that while Victim was in the road, he thought that maybe he could get into his car, which was still running with the door open, and leave. Defendant reported feeling alarmed and confused by the fact that Victim had walked directly into traffic. Defendant was afraid that a car might veer to avoid hitting Victim and hit Defendant or his car, which remained on the shoulder, just out of the lane of traffic. Defendant stated that all these thoughts rushed through his mind and he could not be sure exactly what he was thinking, but, in any event, he did not get back into his car and drive away. Instead, Defendant stood in front of his car, on the other side of the open driver's side door, still holding his gun.
{10} Victim then turned back toward the car. Victim was close to the driver's side open door and continued his approach. Victim said something like, When Victim reached the open driver's door, he began to reach his head and hands into the vehicle. Without giving a verbal warning, Defendant fired his gun. Defendant told police he "focused in on the center of mass ... through the window." Defendant shot Victim repeatedly, continuing to shoot until Victim stopped moving. The medical examiner testified Victim had been shot five times, three times in the back, once in the side, and once in the shoulder. When asked by the police what he thought would happen if he did not shoot Victim, Defendant said that he believed that Victim would have either run him over or would have driven straight into traffic and injured others.
{11} The State called the medical examiner and a crime scene investigator who testified that the physical evidence was consistent with Defendant's story.
{12} At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the district court ruled that the State had failed to establish probable cause to believe that Defendant had committed second-degree murder. The district court found probable cause for the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, concluding that because there were both verbal threats and actions by Victim, there was sufficient provocation for the fatal shooting. The district court asked the State to prepare a revised criminal information charging only voluntary manslaughter and entered a written order binding Defendant over for trial on voluntary manslaughter alone. The State appeals.
{13} Defendant argues, as a preliminary matter, that we lack jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal because the district court did not dismiss the charge of second-degree murder, but merely "diminished" it to voluntary manslaughter. The State contends that (1) in determining whether probable cause exists to bind over a defendant for trial, the district court must view all evidence presented at the preliminary hearing in the light most favorable to the State and draw all inferences in the State's favor; (2) whether there is sufficient provocation to reduce a charge of second-degree murder to voluntary manslaughter is exclusively within the province of the jury, and should not be the basis for a finding of no probable cause; (3) this Court should review the district court's application of the law of probable cause to the facts applying a de novo standard of review. We agree with the State as to the last point it makes on appeal: that the district court's application of the law to the facts should be reviewed by this Court de novo. We reject the deferential abuse of discretion or reasonable basis standard advocated by Defendant and by the dissent. Finally, reviewing the application of the law to the undisputed facts de novo, we reverse the district court's determination that there was no probable cause to bind Defendant over for trial on second-degree murder.
{14} We address each of the issues raised on appeal in turn, beginning with Defendant's threshold question of whether this Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
{15} Defendant contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal under Section 39-3-3(B)(1), which allows the State to appeal to this Court "within thirty days from a decision, judgment or order dismissing a complaint, indictment or information as to any one or more counts[.]" Defendant argues that the district court did not "dismiss" the State's second-degree murder count, but rather merely "diminished" the count to the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. We are not persuaded.
{16} When a jurisdictional issue is raised, this issue must be decided before this Court reviews the other issues on appeal. Smith v. City of Santa Fe , 2007-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 142 N.M. 786, 171 P.3d 300. "We review jurisdictional issues de novo." State v. Lucero , 2017-NMCA-079, ¶ 10, 406 P.3d 530.
{17} Defendant's claim that there was no appealable dismissal of the State's second-degree murder charge is based on the failure of the district court to issue an order expressly stating that the second-degree murder charge is dismissed. Instead...
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