State v. Bennett, Docket No. 40770
| Decision Date | 01 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 748,Docket No. 40770 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BARCLAY D. BENNETT, Defendant-Appellant. |
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. Benjamin R. Simpson, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and persistent violator, affirmed.
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett, LLP; Jeffrey E. Brownson, Boise, for appellant. Jeffrey E. Brownson argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Nicole L. Schafer argued.
Barclay D. Bennett appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. He argues the district court erred in denying his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.
Police officers arrived at the home of a friend of Bennett's for the purpose of arresting Bennett on several outstanding felony warrants. Police entered the residence and went upstairs to the room Bennett was staying in, which was the bedroom of the eleven-year-old daughter of his friend. When they entered the room, both Bennett and another female occupant were standing with their backs to the officers; Bennett was facing an open dresser with his hands in front of him and the woman was on the other side of the bed. Bennett was placed in handcuffsand one of the officers looked inside the open dresser drawer to see if a weapon had been placed inside. He noticed on top of the dresser there were several men's toiletries and a small plastic container of methamphetamine. Bennett was subsequently charged with possession of methamphetamine, possession of paraphernalia, and a felony enhancement for being a persistent violator.
At the close of the jury trial, Bennett made a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The jury returned a guilty verdict for both possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Bennett subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a persistent violator. Bennett then filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal based on his claim of insufficiency of the evidence to prove he possessed the methamphetamine, and a motion for a new trial asserting the jury was not properly instructed regarding the law of constructive possession. Both motions were denied by the district court.
The court imposed a unified term of nine years with three years determinate for possession of methamphetamine, and thirty days for possession of paraphernalia. Bennett filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to reconsider his sentence and the court reduced the determinate portion to two years. Bennett timely appeals.
Bennett claims there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, and that the trial court erred when it declined to give at least one of his three requested jury instructions.
Bennett claims the State did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that he had constructive possession of the methamphetamine found on the dresser, and therefore erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of thewitnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.
Absent actual possession of the controlled substance, the State must establish constructive possession by showing the defendant knew of the substance and had the power and intention to control it. State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 242, 985 P.2d 117, 122 (1999); State v. Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 638, 262 P.3d 278, 281 (Ct. App. 2011). Constructive possession exists where there is a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the controlled substance to show the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise dominion or control over the substance. State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 778, 784, 735 P.2d 1089, 1095 (Ct. App. 1987). Constructive possession may be "joint or exclusive." Blake, 133 Idaho at 242, 985 P.2d at 122. A jury may infer knowledge of the substance where a defendant is in control of the premises, but additional circumstances showing knowledge are necessary when the control is not exclusive. Id.
Bennett argues this case is similar to State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 861 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1993), which involved an underage man being charged with possession of alcohol after beer was found next to him in the back seat of a car with two other individuals in the front seats. This Court held that proximity to the beer alone was not enough, and the State had not presented sufficient evidence that he had control over the beer so as to establish constructive possession. Id. at 542, 861 P.2d at 112. He also cites State v. Vinton, 110 Idaho 832, 718 P.2d 1270 (Ct. App. 1986), in which this Court vacated the convictions of manufacturing marijuana by a husband and wife because the State did not present sufficient evidence that either one had individually exercised control over the marijuana. Id. at 834, 718 P.2d at 1272.
The State presented evidence that Bennett was staying at his friend's residence, in the young daughter's bedroom where the methamphetamine was found, and that he had personal belongings in the room. While a believed methamphetamine user had stayed in the daughter's room two months prior, Bennett's friend and tenant of the residence testified that he had regular access to his daughter's room, that his daughter was not involved in drugs, and that he had never seen the plastic container found by the police. Additionally, several items were found by thepolice on top of the dresser that Bennett was facing when they entered the room. These included several men's toiletries, including deodorant, shaving cream, etc. Police testified these items were no more than one foot away from the plastic container of methamphetamine on top of the dresser in the bedroom. Further, when police entered the room, Bennett was standing twelve to eighteen inches away from the items on the dresser.
Bennett concedes there was a reasonable inference that he knew of the contraband since it was in plain view. However, Bennett argues the woman's presence in the bedroom removes the inference that the methamphetamine was his. He asserts the State was required to present sufficient evidence supporting the inference that he individually exercised control over the contraband. Though a woman was also in the room,1 Bennett was facing the dresser with his back to the officers and was twelve to eighteen inches away from the contraband, while the woman was on the opposite side of the bed. Further, the contraband was found among men's toiletry items, when the room was a young girl's bedroom. As noted in Blake, more than one individual can possess an item, and even if the woman had ownership, it would not preclude the jury from finding Bennett also had possession.
In the light most favorable to the State, the jury reasonably could conclude that Bennett both knew of the presence of methamphetamine and had the intent to exercise dominion...
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