State v. Bennett
| Decision Date | 05 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 406PA18,406PA18 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Cory Dion BENNETT |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Kristin J. Uicker and Brent D. Kiziah, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellee.
Franklin E. Wells, Jr., Asheboro, for defendant-appellant.
Donald H. Beskind, Raleigh, Robert S. Chang, and Taki V. Flevaris, for Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, amicus curiae.
David Weiss, James E. Coleman, Jr., and Elizabeth Hambourger, Durham, for Coalition of State and National Criminal Justice and Civil Rights Advocates, amici curiae.
This case requires us to determine whether the record developed before the trial court sufficed to permit appellate review of a Batson challenge lodged by defendant Cory Dion Bennett and, if so, whether defendant established the existence of the prima facie case of discrimination necessary to require the trial court to undertake a complete Batson analysis. After careful review of the record, transcript, and briefs in light of the applicable law, we conclude that defendant presented a sufficient record to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful review of his contention that he did, in fact, establish the necessary prima facie case of discrimination and that he made a sufficient showing to require the performance of a complete Batson analysis. As a result, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, Sampson County, for a hearing to be conducted in accordance with the final two steps of the analysis delineated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986).
On 25 April 2016, the Sampson County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging defendant with three counts of possessing a precursor chemical with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, one count of manufacturing methamphetamine, one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession, one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacture, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. On 6 June 2016, the Sampson County grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging defendant with two additional counts of possessing a precursor chemical with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
The charges against defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 13 March 2017 criminal session of the Superior Court, Sampson County. Among the first twelve persons seated in the jury box during the voir dire process was Roger Smith, who occupied Seat No. 10. Mr. Smith, an unmarried man, lived off H.B. Lewis Road and worked as a termite supervisor in Clinton. In response to the prosecutor's inquiry concerning whether any prospective juror had "ever been the victim of a crime," Mr. Smith responded that he had been the victim of a breaking or entering that had occurred approximately two years earlier; that, while law enforcement officers had investigated the incident, no one had ever been charged with the commission of the crime; and that Mr. Smith believed that the investigating officers had handled the incident in a satisfactory manner. In addition, Mr. Smith informed the prosecutor that, while he recognized one of the other prospective jurors, who worked at a local bank, his connection with this other prospective juror would not affect his ability to decide the case fairly and impartially in the event that he was selected to serve as a member of the jury.
Mr. Smith responded to prosecutorial inquiries concerning whether anything would make it difficult for him to be a fair and impartial juror and whether there was anything going on in his life that would make it difficult for him to serve on the jury in the negative. Similarly, Mr. Smith denied having any religious, moral, or ethical concerns that would prevent him from voting to return a guilty verdict. After questioning other prospective jurors, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Mr. Smith from the jury being selected to decide the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence.
After a ten-minute recess, Virginia Brunson was called to replace Mr. Smith in Seat No. 10. Ms. Brunson responded to the trial court's initial questions by stating that she was not aware of any reason that she would be unable to be fair to either the State or defendant. Ms. Brunson, who was not married, lived near Ingold and owned a beauty salon that was located across the street from the courthouse. After stating that she did not know anyone involved in the prosecution or defense of the case or any of the other prospective jurors, Ms. Brunson told the prosecutor that she had never been the victim of crime, a defendant or witness in a case, or a juror. In addition, Ms. Brunson stated that she did not have any strong feelings, either favorable or unfavorable, concerning the law enforcement profession; that she had not heard anything about the charges against defendant before arriving for jury selection; and that she would be able to be impartial to both sides. Similarly, Ms. Brunson expressed no reservations concerning the fact that possession of a firearm by a felon is unlawful and said that she was not confused by the distinction between the concepts of actual and constructive possession.
Ms. Brunson stated that she would be able to listen to and fairly consider the testimony of a witness who had entered into a plea agreement with the State, that she did not know any of the other prospective jurors who were seated in the jury box with her, and that she understood that legal dramas on television were not realistic. To Ms. Brunson's knowledge, neither she, a member of her family, nor a close friend had ever had a negative experience with a member of the law enforcement profession or a member of the District Attorney's staff or had ever been charged with committing an offense other than speeding.
In response to further prosecutorial questioning, Ms. Brunson stated that she understood that defendant was presumed to be innocent; that he possessed the rights to a trial by jury, to call witnesses to testify in his own behalf, and to refuse to testify; and that any refusal on his part to testify in his own behalf could not be held against him. Moreover, Ms. Brunson stated that she understood the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence, that she understood that the State was required to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that she would be required as a member of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses.
Ms. Brunson assured the prosecutor that she could listen to all of the evidence, keep an open mind, and follow the law in accordance with the trial court's instructions; agreed with the prosecutor's comment that "the law is not always what we think it is or what we would like it to be"; and acknowledged that, in the event that she was selected to serve as a juror in this case, she would be required to follow the law and apply the law set out in the trial court's instructions to the facts. At that point, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and Ms. Brunson:
After reiterating that nothing would make it difficult for her to be fair and impartial to either side and that nothing was going on in her life outside of the courtroom that would render jury service unduly burdensome, Ms. Brunson stated that she did not have any religious, moral, or ethical concerns about voting for a guilty verdict in the event that the State satisfied its burden of proof. At the conclusion of this line of questioning, the State peremptorily challenged Ms. Brunson.
At that point, Rita Corbett took Ms. Brunson's place in Seat No. 10. In responding to the trial court's initial questions, Ms. Corbett stated that there was no reason that she could not be fair to either the State or defendant. Ms. Corbett lived in Clinton, worked as a child nutrition supervisor for the Clinton City Schools, and was married to a person who had retired from his employment with Duke Energy. In response to prosecutorial questions, Ms. Corbett said that she did not know the prosecutor, defendant, or defendant's attorney. Ms. Corbett denied having ever been the victim of a crime, a defendant, or a witness in a case. However, Ms. Corbett had served as a member of a criminal jury in Sampson County about thirty years earlier. According to Ms. Corbett, the jury upon which she served had deliberated on the case, she had not served as the foreperson of the jury, and nothing about that experience would impact...
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