State v. Bennett
Decision Date | 30 August 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 78377-2.,78377-2. |
Citation | 165 P.3d 1241,161 Wn.2d 303 |
Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Bruce L. BENNETT, Jr., Petitioner. |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
¶ 1 This is a case of first impression for this court. Bennett was convicted of first degree escape. RCW 9A.76.110. He argues that the burden of proof instruction given, commonly referred to as the Castle instruction,1 violated his constitutional right to due process. We decline his invitation to hold that the Castle instruction violates minimum constitutional standards, and we affirm his conviction. We also exercise our inherent supervisory powers to maintain sound judicial practice and instruct the trial courts of this State to use the approved Washington Pattern Jury Instruction2 to instruct juries on the government's burden to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 2 Bennett was charged with and tried for attempted first degree escape. After both parties rested, the court and counsel debated a variety of instructions. Much of this debate revolved around the State's proposed instruction defining reasonable doubt. Bennett proposed the standard Washington Pattern Jury Instruction, 4.01. 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 4.01, at 79 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (WPIC). Over Bennett's objection, the State successfully proposed, and the jury was read, what has come to be known as the Castle instruction.
¶ 3 The jury found Bennett guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed and we accepted review. State v. Bennett, 131 Wash.App. 319, 126 P.3d 836 (2006); State v. Bennett, 158 Wash.2d 1010, 145 P.3d 1214. Without citing any particular constitutional provisions, Bennett argues that the trial court's instruction violated the constitution. He relies upon cases explaining how reasonable doubt instructions that diminish the State's burden of proof violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to our federal constitution. E.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5-6, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 39-40, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990); State v. McHenry, 88 Wash.2d 211, 214, 558 P.2d 188 (1977) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)).
¶ 4 Instructions must convey to the jury that the State bears the burden of proving every essential element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Victor, 511 U.S. at 5-6, 114 S.Ct. 1239. Although no specific wording is required, jury instructions must define reasonable doubt and clearly communicate that the State carries the burden of proof. State v. Coe, 101 Wash.2d 772, 787-88, 684 P.2d 668 (1984). Instructions must also properly inform the jury of the applicable law, not mislead the jury, and permit each party to argue its theory of the case. State v. LeFaber, 128 Wash.2d 896, 903, 913 P.2d 369 (1996). It is not error to refuse to give a specific instruction when a more general instruction adequately explains the law and allows each party to argue its theory of the case. State v. Schulze, 116 Wash.2d 154, 168, 804 P.2d 566 (1991). It is reversible error to instruct the jury in a manner relieving the State of its burden to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280-81, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). A challenged jury instruction is reviewed de novo, in the context of the instructions as a whole. State v. Brett, 126 Wash.2d 136, 171, 892 P.2d 29 (1995) (citing State v. Benn, 120 Wash.2d 631, 654-55, 845 P.2d 289 (1993)).
¶ 5 Washington has adopted pattern jury instructions to assist trial courts. Our pattern instructions are drafted and approved by a committee that includes judges, law professors, and practicing attorneys. Just because an instruction is approved by the Washington Pattern Jury Instruction Committee does not necessarily mean that it is approved by this court. E.g., State v. Studd, 137 Wash.2d 533, 546, 973 P.2d 1049 (1999).
¶ 6 However, pattern instructions generally have the advantage of thoughtful adoption and provide some uniformity in instructions throughout the state. The Washington Pattern Jury Instruction Committee drafted WPIC 4.01 as an abbreviated form of the instruction used in State v. Tanzymore, 54 Wash.2d 290, 340 P.2d 178 (1959).3 In Tanzymore, written almost half a century ago, we observed, "[t]his instruction has been accepted as a correct statement of the law for so many years, we find the assignment [of error criticizing the instruction] without merit." Id. at 291, 340 P.2d 178. WPIC 4.01 is sometimes referred to as the "abiding belief" instruction and reads as follows:
[The] [Each] defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. That plea puts in issue every element of [the] [each] crime charged. The [State] [City] [County] is the plaintiff and has the burden of proving each element of [the] [each] crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has no burden of proving that a reasonable doubt exists [as to these elements].
A defendant is presumed innocent. This presumption continues throughout the entire trial unless during your deliberations you find it has been overcome by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of evidence. It is such a doubt as would exist in the mind of a reasonable person after fully, fairly, and carefully considering all of the evidence or lack of evidence. [If, from such consideration, you have an abiding belief in the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.]
WPIC 4.01, at 79 (2d ed. Supp.2005).4 WPIC 4.01 has been approved by several courts. See State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 656-58, 904 P.2d 245 (1995); State v. Lane, 56 Wash.App. 286, 299-301, 786 P.2d 277 (1989); State v. Mabry, 51 Wash.App. 24, 25, 751 P.2d 882 (1988); State v. Price, 33 Wash. App. 472, 475-76, 655 P.2d 1191 (1982).
¶ 7 Bennett urged the court, at his trial, to use WPIC 4.01. The court did not and instead, over Bennett's objection, gave the following Castle instruction:
The Defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. That plea puts in issue every element of the crime charged. The State is the plaintiff and has the burden of proving each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant has no burden of proving that a reasonable doubt exists.
A Defendant is presumed innocent. This presumption continues throughout the entire trial unless during your deliberations you find it has been overcome by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is one for which a reason exists and may arise from the evidence or lack of evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the Defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the Defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.
Clerk's Papers at 27 (Jury Instruction 3) (emphasis added). The instruction given in Bennett's case may find its origin in a United States Supreme Court case, Victor, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583. In Victor, the Supreme Court examined jury instructions from two states, California and Nebraska,5 and approved both. The California instruction reviewed by the court read:
Victor, 511 U.S. at 7, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The Court examined the use of the phrase "moral certainty," concluding it was not "reasonably likely that the jury understood the words `moral certainty' either as suggesting a standard of proof lower than due process requires or as allowing conviction on factors other than the government's proof." Id. at 16, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The Court observed that any ambiguity in the phrase "moral certainty" was clarified because "the rest of the instruction given in Sandoval's case lends content to the phrase." Id. at 14, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The Court observed that the phrase "abiding conviction" informed jurors they must develop a belief beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting the defendant. Id. at 15-16, 114 S.Ct. 1239. Further, Id. at 13, 114 S.Ct. 1239.
¶ 8 Sandoval challenged this definition, arguing, as Bennett now argues, that the phrase "possible doubt" lowered the standard of proof below a reasonable doubt. The Court rejected this argument, noting that a ...
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