State v. Bennett

• Decision Date: 05 February 2013
• Docket Number: SC18606
• Citation: State v. Bennett, SC18606 (Conn. Feb 05, 2013)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. BENNETT

STATE v.BENNETT

SC18606

Supreme Court of Connecticut

Dated: February 5, 2013

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DISSENT

NORCOTT, J., dissenting in part, with whom Zarella, J., joins.I disagree with the conclusion of part I of the majority's opinion, namely, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction of the defendant, Calvin Bennett, of intentional murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 (a)¹and53a-54a (a).²In my view, the majority simply substitutes its view about whether the state had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's intent to cause the death of the victim, James Caffrey, for that of the panel of experienced trial judges, Cremins, Crawford and Schuman, Js.(trial court), who served as fact finders in this case.³Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from part I of the majority's opinion.⁴

I begin by noting my agreement with the historical facts, unanimously found by the trial court, and the general legal principles that the majority states; I will restate them only where necessary.My disagreement, then, lies with the majority's application of those principles to the facts in the present case.In my view, the majority's analysis contravenes the ''well established'' governing standard of review, namely, that: ''In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we apply a two-part test.First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

''We note that the jury must find every element proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other proven facts in determining whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .Moreover, [w]here a group of facts are relied upon for proof of an element of the crime it is their cumulative impact that is to be weighed in deciding whether the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been met and each individual fact need not be proved in accordance with that standard.It is only where a single fact is essential to proof of an element, however, such as identification by means of fingerprint evidence, that such evidence must support the inference of that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

''As we have often noted, however, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the trier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . .On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the jury's verdict of guilty. . . .Furthermore, [i]t is immaterial to the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of circumstantial rather than direct evidence.''(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51, 65-66, 43 A.3d 629(2012).

As noted by the majority, in order to convict the defendant of intentional murder as an accessory under §§ 53a-8 (a)and53a-54a (a), the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended the death of the victim to result from his actions in assisting Tamarius Maner, the principal offender who actually fired the fatal shot, with the home invasion of which he was convicted.See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 278 Conn. 598, 615-16, 900 A.2d 485(2006);State v. Robertson, 254 Conn. 739, 783-84, 760 A.2d 82(2000).Indeed, it is well settled that the ''specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of murder.To act intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim. . . .Because direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available . . . intent is often inferred from conduct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom. . . .Intent to cause death may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading to and immediately following the death. . . .Furthermore, it is a permissible, albeit not a necessary or mandatory, inference that a defendant intended the natural consequences of his voluntary conduct.''(Internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Otto, supra, 305 Conn. 66-67.Finally, and most significantly, ''[i]ntent is a question of fact, the determination of which should stand unless the conclusion drawn by the trier is an unreasonable one.''(Internal quotation marks omitted.)State v. Robertson, supra, 784.

I acknowledge the relative sparsity of the facts surrounding the actual killing of the victim prior to the completion of the home invasion and theft.This was, no doubt, by design of the defendant and Maner, who surprised the victim by ringing his doorbell and invading his home in the midnight hours when potential witnesses were likely to be absent or sleeping.Nevertheless, I conclude that there is sufficient circumstantialevidence of the defendant's intent, drawn from his conduct before and after the victim's death, to sustain the trial court's conclusion that he intended the victim's death to result during the home invasion and was not merely acting as a passive observer or tag-along.See, e.g., State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 531, 522 A.2d 277(1987)(''[m]ere presence as an inactive companion, passive acquiescence, or the doing of innocent acts which may in fact aid [the principal] must be distinguished from the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose shared by one who knowingly and wilfully assists the perpetrator of the offense in the acts which prepare for, facilitate or consummate it''[internal quotation marks omitted]).

First, the defendant accompanied Maner to the victim's door while he himself was armed with a loaded gun.In my view, the trial court reasonably could have deemed the fact that the defendant's gun was loaded to be probative of his intent to kill—at least conditionally to effect the planned theft—despite the fact that there is no evidence that he fired that gun during the home invasion.⁵SeeUnited States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471, 481(6th Cir.2008)(evidence that defendant's gun is loaded is highly probative evidence of ''conditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm'' required for conviction under federal carjacking statute);People v. Spiezio, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1074, 548 N.E.2d 561(1989)(''there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of intent to kill to support the jury's verdict [convicting defendant of attempted murder] where defendant pointed a loaded gun at the police officer from close range, while yelling, 'fuck you coppers' ''), appeal denied, 131 Ill. 2d 565, 553 N.E.2d 401(1990);Specht v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1081, 1095(Ind. App.2005)(defendant's plan to use weapon to rob convenience store and fact that he traveled with accomplice to store with two loaded guns was sufficient evidence of specific intent to kill to sustain attempted murder conviction as accessory);Commonwealth v. Lewis, 81 Mass. App. 119, 121-22, 960 N.E.2d 324(defendant's act of pointing loaded gun at police officer was evidence of his intent to kill for purpose of offense of assault with intent to murder, despite fact that gun was not yet ready to be fired), review granted, 461 Mass. 1110, 964 N.E.2d 985(2012).⁶

The defendant's intent to kill is further demonstrated by his actions after entering the victim's apartment.Specifically, the defendant did not flee immediately or obtain help for the victim once Maner had shot him, rather, he chose to enter the apartment, put his loaded gun to the head of Samantha Bright, the victim's pregnant girlfriend, and demand that he be led to the victim's money and drugs.⁷Based on these actions, the trial court reasonably could have found...