State v. Bent
| Decision Date | 16 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,227.,29,227. |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Wayne BENT, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gary K. King, Attorney General, Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.Law Works L.L.C., John A. McCall, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellant.
{1} Defendant stands convicted of various counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor as a result of which he was sentenced to prison. Of the many issues he raises on appeal, one defect in the grand jury proceedings deprives the district court of its jurisdiction and is, accordingly, dispositive of all other issues.
{2} Defendant was indicted by a grand jury, which was convened on October 3, 2007, and whose statutory term would have ended on January 4, 2008, but for an order extending the statutory term issued verbally by a district judge. Defendant's case was presented to the grand jury on May 20, 2008. Since NMSA 1978, Section 31–6–1 (1983) provides that a “grand jury shall serve for a period of no longer than three months[,]” we hold that this statutory term is a mandatory limitation on the grand jury's jurisdiction. An indictment returned after the grand jury's term expires is void ab initio. Therefore, Defendant's motion to quash the indictment should have been granted, as the grand jury was without legal authority to consider his case and return an indictment. As a result, the indictment issued by the grand jury was void, and the district court did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the trial in this case.
{3} Because our decision renders the proceedings in this matter a nullity ab initio for lack of jurisdiction, we need not address the issues related to motions brought by Defendant concerning the State's manner of conducting the grand jury proceedings, nor matters raised at trial. See State v. Chacon, 62 N.M. 291, 293–94, 309 P.2d 230, 231–32 (1957) (); People v. Williams, 73 N.Y.2d 84, 538 N.Y.S.2d 222, 535 N.E.2d 275, 279 (1989) (). We reverse the district court and remand this case for entry of an order quashing the grand jury indictment, dismissing this case without prejudice, and discharging Defendant.
{4} Defendant, the apparent leader of a religious community in northeastern New Mexico, was charged with various crimes centering around what he maintained were religious practices intended to be cleansing ceremonies. The State argued that such practices amounted to criminal sexual contact of minors and contributing to the minors' delinquency. The case was presented to the grand jury of Union County on May 20, 2008. Defendant was indicted and arraigned on the indictment.
{5} There is no dispute in this case as to the facts pertaining to this issue. The grand jury that heard Defendant's case had been convened on October 3, 2007. An almost indecipherable pleading bearing a file stamp from that date appears to have summoned grand jurors for service on November 12, 2007. At the hearing on Defendant's motion to quash the indictment, the prosecutor stated to the court that the grand jury's term had been verbally extended “[sua sponte]” by District Judge Sam Sanchez without the entry of any written order. There is no documentary evidence concerning such an extension, nor does the record contain any explanation as to why the extension was made. We are left to rely on assertions by counsel and the district court that it happened. The parties agree that the grand jury only sat twice, once in November, and again on May 20, 2008. The date in May was beyond three months past the date of any previous grand jury activity.
{6} Defendant's motion to quash the indictment was heard on August 12, 2008, alleging that, under NMSA 1978, Section 31–6–3(A) (2003), the grand jury was not selected and seated in accordance with the law. Specifically, Defendant alleged that the grand jury had been convened on October 3, 2007, and had convened again on May 20, 2008, in violation of Section 31–6–1, which mandates a maximum period of grand jury service of “no longer than three months.”
{7} The district court responded to the portion of the motion related to the grand jury term by stating that the statute “doesn't provide for any relief if there's a violation.” Defendant responded that the remedy for an illegal indictment is that it be “quashed[,] and a new [g]rand [j]ury seated properly.” The district court read the annotation to the statute and noted that the annotation indicated that Sections 31–6–1 and 31–6–2 were “merely directory, not mandatory” pursuant to State v. Garcia, 110 N.M. 419, 796 P.2d 1115 (Ct.App.1990), and State v. Apodaca, 105 N.M. 650, 735 P.2d 1156 (Ct.App.1987) (). The court further inquired as to whether a showing of prejudice to Defendant was required before an indictment may be quashed. Defendant responded that the indictment was deficient on its face and should be quashed because the grand jury exceeded its term, the State denied discovery, and the State did not present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury that had been requested by Defendant. The State responded that the district court had already noted that the statute was only advisory in nature. The State then asserted, without citation to the record, that Judge Sanchez had explained to the grand jury that he extended their tenure sua sponte for an additional three months without issuing a written order on the record. The prosecutor, without having them admitted, showed to the court certified pay records indicating the grand jury served on two days.
{8} The State was aware and informed the district court of case law indicating that an indictment handed down by a grand jury after the expiration of its statutory period would in some states render the indictment “void [ab initio].” The State mentioned that there are such things as “de facto” grand juries that are allowed to proceed past their terms. At the end of the argument, the district court ruled:
With respect to the first issue, that the [g]rand [j]ury was [empaneled] or served beyond the three [-]months time period as provided by Section 31–6–1, it appears that within that section, there is no remedy provided for a jury that serves longer than its term. And at this point in time, there's been no prejudice shown by ... Defendant with respect to that issue by itself. And so, the motion to quash with respect to that violation or apparent violation of the statute will be dismissed.
What's more is that even in the constitutional section, Section 14, dealing with the [g]rand [j]ury[,] the right to a [g]rand [j]ury and the convening of a [g]rand [j]ury, ... there is no time limitation for the service of a[g]rand [j]ury. And then ... Apodaca is a case that tells us that this section, as well as Section 31–6–2 is directory and not mandatory. I will state though that Apodaca dealt with not this precise issue, but the issue of the quashing of an indictment based on the discharge of an individual grand juror by the [d]istrict [a]ttorney and replacement of him by an alternate to serve on that case.... [E]ven in that situation, ... which is pretty clearly set out what the process is in the statute, ... the Court of Appeals has said that that's discretionary or directory and not mandatory. For those reasons, that issue is denied.
{9} We review the construction of statutes and the legal requirements for convening and maintaining a grand jury as a matter of law under a de novo standard. State v. Isaac M., 2001–NMCA–088, ¶ 4, 131 N.M. 235, 34 P.3d 624.
{10} The New Mexico Constitution provides that the composition of and process for convening a grand jury be as “prescribed by law.” N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 (). The statutory basis for the convening of grand juries has been recognized since at least 1892. Territory v. Baca, 6 N.M. 420, 440, 30 P. 864, 870 (N.M.Terr.1892) (). This is so because, while the existence of grand juries is constitutionally required, the nature of their composition, work, and term are matters enacted by statute. In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 268, 10 S.Ct. 762, 34 L.Ed. 107 (1890) ().
When an indictment is presented by a grand jury in open court, the presumption is that it is legally presented; that the jurors were properly summoned, legally qualified, and competent, and that the required number, at least concurred in the finding. These facts [are] essential to the lawful finding and presentment[.]
State v. Rogers, 31 N.M. 485, 498–99, 247 P. 828, 834 (1926) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the questions are (1) whether the term of the grand jury had expired; and (2) if the term expired, what was the expiration's effect on the validity of the grand jury's indictment of Defendant. Challenges to the validity of the grand jury are specifically limited by statute to three enumerated grounds: (1) the grand jury was not legally...
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State v. Bent
...that the indictment should have been quashed as a matter of law, and reversed all convictions. State v. Bent, 2011–NMCA–093, ¶ 24, 150 N.M. 561, 263 P.3d 903. The Court concluded that the grand jury's three-month statutory limit is mandatory and jurisdictional, and therefore, an indictment ......
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State v. Bent
...that the indictment should have been quashed as a matter of law, and reversed all convictions. State v. Bent, 2011-NMCA-093, ¶ 24, 150 N.M. 561, 263 P.3d 903. The Court concluded that the grand jury's three-month statutory limit is mandatory and jurisdictional, and therefore, an indictment ......