State v. Benton
| Decision Date | 25 June 1971 |
| Citation | 288 A.2d 411,161 Conn. 404 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Richard P. BENTON. STATE of Connecticut v. Peter H. BRELSFORD. |
Henry C. Campbell, Public Defender, for appellant (defendant) in each case.
Thomas F. Wall, State's Atty., for appellee (state) in each case.
Before HOUSE, C.J., and THIM, RYAN, SHAPIRO and LOISELLE, JJ.
Each defendant was charged in separate informations with a count of breaking and entering in violation of General Statutes § 53-76 1 and a count of larceny involving goods of the value exceeding $250 but not exceeding $2000, in violation of General Statutes § 53-63. 2 After a joint trial to a jury, each defendant was found guilty of violating § 53-76 and not guilty of violating § 53-63. Each defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict of guilty as to the first count charged against him and each one also filed a motion for a new trial. Their motions were denied and from the judgments rendered on the two verdicts, both defendants have appealed to this court. By stipulation of both defendants and as ordered by the court, the two cases were combined for the appeal.
The defendants have assigned error in the court's denial of their motions to set the verdicts aside because each is not supported by the evidence and each is inconsistent with the verdict on the second count. A further assignment of error is directed to the court's denial of their motions for a new trial because the state's attorney argued improperly to the jury.
The denial of the defendants' motions to set aside the verdict because it is not supported by the evidence is tested in the light of the evidence printed in the appendices to the briefs. State v. Cobb, 159 Conn. 31, 32, 266 A.2d 393; State v. Mortoro, 157 Conn. 392, 393, 254 A.2d 574; State v. Gyuro, 156 Conn. 391, 397, 242 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937, 89 S.Ct. 301, 21 L.Ed.2d 274. As to the motion to set aside the verdict, the evidence must be given a construction most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict; State v. Raffone, 161 Conn. 117, 121, 285 A.2d 323; but the verdict must be set aside if the evidence was insufficient to justify the jury in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kelsey, 160 Conn. 551, 553, 274 A.2d 151, 152; State v. McGinnis, 158 Conn. 124, 129, 256 A.2d 241.
The appendices to the briefs disclose the following. Miss Katherine Hurd owns property in New Milford consisting of forty-eight acres and having on it a farmhouse, a summer house called the castle and another house near it. The area is wooded, completely undeveloped and isolated. She resides in the farmhouse which is located on the northerly side of Town Farm Road, a hard-surfaced road. From the farmhouse, Town Farm Road runs westerly to a dirt road known as Lover's Leap Road which continues along Lake Lillinonah and passes the driveway leading to the castle. The entrance to the driveway is marked by two stone posts and several signs such as 'Private' and 'Keep Out,' unmistakably marking it as a private driveway. By means of the driveway it takes five minutes to walk from the stone posts to the castle.
The castle, a nine-room summer home, furnished principally with antiques was unoccupied but it contained a burglar alarm. On March 26, 1968, its inner doors were closed, the alarm was reset to two inner doors and a cardboard was passed across a broken glass in the back door. On April 3, 1968, Miss Hurd observed that changes had occurred in the castle since she had inspected and secured it on March 26 in that the cardboard on the back door had been pushed in, the house had been ransacked, antique toilet jars, bowls, pitchers and other articles were missing. On these articles, Miss Hurd had originally placed a value of $300 but now considered $200 as their reasonable value.
A state trooper on patrol, on the night of April 2, was advised that the alarm at the castle was ringing. He and several other officers went to the area. On checking the castle, the inner doors were found open. Two of the officers found a parked Cadillac automobile at the easterly end of the dirt road where it joins Town Farm Road, being a point between the farmhouse and the driveway to the castle. The automobile belonged to the defendant Richard P. Benton. While they were driving from the castle and at a point on the north side of the two stone posts, two of the officers observed white covers on the ground under which they found bowls, pitchers, vases and other articles. These were later brought to the police station where they were dusted for fingerprints and a latent fingerprint was found on one of the articles. The fingerprint was identified as Benton's. These articles were admitted into evidence at the trial and identified as belonging to Miss Hurd and coming from the castle.
Two other officers, investigating in the area, after ten or fifteen minutes, heard someone coming down the road from the direction of the castle. It turned out to be the defendants. They said their car had heated up and would not start, that they were looking for assistance but gave no reasonable answer as to why they had not gone to a lighted farmhouse 400 feet from their parked car. The automobile started with no difficulty and showed no indication of being overheated. One of the officers checked the engine in the presence of the defendants and found it was not overheated.
The two teams of police had earlier executed a pincer's movement. Both teams had moved southerly from the town of New Milford. One team approached the westerly end of Lover's Leap Road from the west by way of River Road. The other team approached the easterly end of Lover's Leap Road by way of Town Farm Road. Within a short time Lover's Leap Road had been traversed and only the defendants and their automobile were found in this isolated area.
Benton claimed he was lost, but was not telling the truth when he said that to the officers. With neither a flashlight nor any other artifical light the defendants were able to locate the bundles of articles later identified as having been in the castle. Benton claimed that prior to parking his automobile at the point between the farmhouse and the driveway to the castle, he and Peter H. Brelsford had parked in the driveway where the two stone posts were located and they sat there drinking; that he, Benton, got out of the car to void, walked ten or fifteen feet past one of the stone posts when he saw 'a pile of stuff wrapped in a rag' and kicked it; that when kicked, it made 'a glass noise' so he 'reached down and started pawing through it.' Benton argues in his brief that this accounts for the presence of his fingerprint on one of the articles. One of the officers had been in close contact with both defendants and had talked with them at some length and neither one gave any indication that he had been drinking.
The question presented by the defendants' claim is whether the trial court abused its legal discretion in denying the motions to set aside the verdicts. State v. McGinnis, 158 Conn. 124, 129, 256 A.2d 241. We decide only whether the evidence was sufficient to justify a finding by the jury that the defendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have often said, proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt excludes every reasonable supposition of innocence. State v. Smith, 156 Conn. 378, 382, 242 A.2d 763; State v. Annunziato, 145 Conn. 124, 136, 139 A.2d 612; State v. Smith, 138 Conn. 196, 200, 201, 82 A.2d 816; State v. McDonough, 129 Conn. 483, 485, 29 A.2d 582.
A conviction of breaking and entering would not be precluded because no one actually saw either or both of the defendants break into the castle. State v. Kohlfuss, 152 Conn. 625, 639, 211 A.2d 143. The jury found the defendants guilty of breaking and entering on the basis of direct as well as circumstantial evidence. This does not necessarily mean that the state's case was weak since there is no legal distinction between direct or circumstantial evidence so far as its probative force is concerned. State v. Smith, supra, 138 Conn. 200, 82 A.2d 816; State v. Colonese, 108 Conn. 454, 460, 143 A. 561. A verdict of guilty must stand if the jury could reasonably have concluded that the cumulative effect of the evidence...
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