State v. De Bery
| Decision Date | 24 February 1954 |
| Citation | 150 Me. 28,103 A.2d 523 |
| Parties | STATE v. DE BERY. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Harold J. Rubin, Bath, for plaintiff.
Blaisdell & Blaisdell, Ellsworth, for defendant.
Before MERRILL, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, WILLIAMSON, TIRRELL, and WEBBER, JJ.
On report. This case is reported on an agreed statement of facts. The defendant is charged with a violation of R.S.1944, c. 19, § 132, as amended, to wit, operating a motor vehicle on a highway in Maine 'after his right to operate motor vehicles had been revoked by the Secretary of State.'
The defendant had been tried in the Superior Court for the County of Sagadahoc, at the June 1952 Term thereof, on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. At the close of the evidence he moved for a directed verdict of not guilty and, upon its refusal, noted exceptions thereto. After verdict of guilty and sentence, he perfected his exceptions which were filed and allowed and are now pending before this Court.
On July 1, 1952, and while said exceptions were pending, an attested copy of the record of his conviction having been certified to the Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of State, without notice or hearing, summarily revoked his right to operate motor vehicles in the State of Maine and revoked his license numbered 96578 issued on the first day of January, 1952. On the same date, to wit, July 1, 1952, notice of this action by the Deputy Secretary of State was mailed to the defendant. On the fourth day of September, 1952 the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a highway in the State of Maine. At the time of such operation he had not received the notice of the claimed revocation of his 'license and right to operate motor vehicles', the letter containing the notice not having been delivered to him.
It is for the operation of his automobile on September 4, 1952 after the aforesaid alleged revocation of his license and right to operate motor vehicles on the highways of this State that the defendant is here being prosecuted.
The Secretary of State assumed to revoke the defendant's right to operate motor vehicles under the following clause of R.S.1944, c. 19, § 121, as amended, which reads as follows: 'The license or right to operate motor vehicles of any person convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be revoked immediately by the secretary of state upon receipt of an attested copy of the court records, without further hearing.' Emphasis ours.
It is for violation of R.S.1944, c. 19, § 132 that the defendant is now being prosecuted. That section provides 'No person shall operate a motor vehicle after his license or right to operate has been suspended or revoked'. Laws 1951, c. 235. The complaint alleges operation after revocation.
Unless the license or right to operate motor vehicles by the defendant had been legally revoked by the Secretary of State as directed in this section of the statute he is not guilty of the offense charged. The revocation of the license or right to operate is one of the essential facts which must be proved to establish the commission of the crime with which the defendant is here charged.
The right of the Secretary of State to summarily revoke the defendant's license or right to operate was dependent upon his conviction of violating the provisions of Section 121 of said Chapter, which is the section making it an offense to operate a motor vehicle 'when intoxicated or at all under the influence of intoxicating liquor'.
The meaning of the word 'convicted' or the word 'conviction' when used in a criminal statute varies with the context of the particular statute in which it is used. Donnell v. Board of Registration, 128 Me. 523, 149 A. 153. In a case such as this, the defendant is not deemed to have been convicted so that the Secretary of State may summarily revoke his license until the case has reached such a stage that no issue of law or fact determinative of his guilt remains to be decided. The end of a criminal case has not been reached if exceptions to the refusal to direct a verdict for the defendant are still pending in the Law Court. Such case is pending notwithstanding verdict and sentence. See R.S.1944, c. 135, § 29.
'They (such cases) shall be marked 'law' on the docket of the county where they are pending, and there continued until their determination is certified by the clerk of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Heald
...statute may have different meanings depending upon the context of the particular statute in which they are used. State v. DeBery, 150 Me. 28, 30, 103 A.2d 523 (1954); Donnell v. Board of Registration, 128 Me. 523, 524-525, 149 A. 153 (1930). In its common and popular sense, the term "convic......
-
Almeida v. Lucey
...901, 75 S.Ct. 576, 99 L.Ed. 1239 (1955); Will v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 447 F.2d 529 (7 Cir. 1971); State v. DeBery, 150 Me. 28, 103 A.2d 523 (1954). ...
-
State v. Mottram
...necessary for the State to deny the possibility of an appeal. This is not the situation wherein an appeal was pending. See State v. DeBery, 150 Me. 28, 103 A.2d 523. The State must maintain its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent has been previously convicted wit......
-
Duncan v. State
...Law Court. A 'conviction' in the appellate stage has been held not a proper ground for revocation of a driver's license (State v. DeBery, 150 Me. 28, 103 A.2d 523), and of a physician's certificate of registration (Donnell v. Board of Registration, 128 Me. 523, 149 A. Ordinarily the 'convic......