State v. Best
| Decision Date | 14 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | SC 20278 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DURANTE D. BEST |
Argued February 21, 2020
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with two counts each of the crimes of attempt to commit murder and assault in the first degree, and with one count each of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a firearm, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the jury before Rodriguez, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealedto this court, which transferred the appeal to the Appellate Court Lavine, Mul-lins and Harper Js., which reversed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial on the murder charge and one count each of the attempt to commit murder and assault in the first degree charges; thereafter the case was tried to the jury before Richards J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).
Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, former state's attorney, and Joseph Corradino, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js. [*]
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence four photographs that depicted the bloody interior of a motor vehicle used to transport to the hospital two victims who were shot by the defendant, Durante D. Best. The defendant claims that the photographs were irrelevant to the criminal charges against him and that, even if relevant, their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect on the jury. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. At the time of the shooting, the defendant lived in a house on Jefferson Street in Bridgeport with his girlfriend, Erika Anderson (Erika), his stepbrother, Joseph Myers, and two other individuals-Jackie Figue-roa and Nelson Stroud. Around mid-afternoon on May 4, 2006, Erika's daughter, Octavia Anderson (Octavia), arrived at the house with her three year old son and Octavia's roommate, Rogerlyna Jones, to pick up her mother for an outing to a carnival. Jones went up to the house and knocked on the door to retrieve Erika, while Octavia stayed in the car with her son. Jones soon returned to the car, however, and informed Octavia that no one was answering the door. Octavia exited the car and encountered Stroud, who told her that the defendant and Erika were inside the house having an argument.Both Octavia and Jones then approached the house, where they found the door unlocked. They entered the kitchen and heard the defendant and Erika arguing in the bedroom.
Octavia called out to her mother and heard her respond, but the door to the bedroom remained closed. Octavia found a large roll of plastic wrap in the kitchen, which she used to bang on the bedroom door while telling the defendant and Erika to ‘‘open up the door.'' Octavia continued to bang on the bedroom door and yelled out to the defendant, ‘‘[if] [y]ou don't open this door, I'm gonna fuck you up.'' Jones added ‘‘we've got backup . . . .'' The defendant opened the door and shot Octavia and Jones each once in the chest. Both women then ran outside toward Octavia's car, and Erika fled after them. Erika watched as the women drove away. When Erika turned around, she faced the defendant, who then shot her once in the chest.
Octavia drove herself and Jones to Bridgeport Hospital, stopping at one point to ask a friend for help. Both Octavia and Jones were bleeding copiously during the ride to the hospital due to the severity of their wounds. All three victims suffered substantial and life threatening injuries as a result of the gunshot wounds inflicted by the defendant. Although Octavia and Erika ultimately survived, Jones was not so fortunate-she died of her injuries shortly after arriving at Bridgeport Hospital.
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), two counts of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a (a), two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1), and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a). On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly denied his request for a jury instruction on self-defense. See State v. Best, 168 Conn.App. 675, 676-77, 146 A.3d 1020 (2016), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 908, 158 A.3d 319 (2017). The Appellate Court concluded that the defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction as to Octavia and Jones but was not entitled to the instruction as to Erika because ‘‘[n]one of the evidence adduced at trial indicate[d] that Erika posed a threat to the defendant.'' Id., 688. Accordingly, the Appellate Court reversed the defendant's conviction as to the murder of Jones, the attempted murder of Octavia, and the assault in the first degree of Octavia, and remanded the case for a new trial on those charges. Id., 689. The Appellate Court affirmed the defendant's judgment of conviction in all other respects. Id.
At the defendant's second jury trial on the murder, attempted murder, and first degree assault charges, the state admitted into evidence various photographs of the crime scene, many of which depicted the victims' blood. The state also moved to admit into evidence four photographs of the bloody interior of the car that Octavia used to drive herself and Jones to the hospital following the shooting. These photographs depict the front compartment of Octavia's Dodge Stratus, where blood can be seen on the seats, console, cup holder, and footwell. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the photographs of the automobile's interior, arguing that they were ‘‘inflammatory and not of any probative value, and ask[ing] that they . . . not be entered into [evidence].'' The state responded that the photographs were ‘‘not particularly graphic by the standards of this courtroom, and they are probative of the nature of the injuries sustained by the two ladies who arrived in the vehicle.'' The trial court overruled the defendant's objection and admitted the photographs into evidence as full exhibits. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of the crimes charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of forty years imprisonment, to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed on the counts pertaining to Erika that remained intact following his first jury trial. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the defendant claims that the four photographs of the bloody interior of Octavia's car were not relevant to the crimes with which he was charged and, therefore, improperly were admitted into evidence. Alternatively, the defendant claims that the photographs were unduly prejudicial because their graphic nature had a tendency ‘‘to inflame the jury's passions or tug on [the jurors'] sympathies.'' The defendant claims that the alleged evidentiary error was harmful because, in the absence of the admission of the photographs, ‘‘the jury may have found reasonable doubt in the varying accounts of the shooting, believed [the defendant's] testimony that he believed he was acting in self-defense, or believed that he fired the revolver recklessly or negligently . . . .''
I
We first address whether the challenged photographs were relevant.[1] ' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilson, 308 Conn. 412, 429, 64 A.3d 91 (2013); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 4-1 (). Thus, ‘‘photographic evidence is admissible where the photograph has a reasonable tendency to prove or disprove a material fact in issue or shed some light upon some material inquiry.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 64, 770 A.2d 908 (2001). The evidence need not be ' (Citations omitted.) Id., 65. ‘‘The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence and [e]very reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.'' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pena, 301 Conn. 669, 674, 22 A.3d 611 (2011).
At trial, the state bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, that the defendant caused the death of Jones in violation of § 53a-54a (a) and inflicted ‘‘serious physical injury'' on Octavia in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1). ‘‘Serious physical injury'' is definedas ‘‘physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of health or serious loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ . . . .'' ...
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