State v. Biechele, Case No. K1-03-653A (RI 12/5/2005)
| Decision Date | 05 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | Case No. K1-03-653A |
| Parties | STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. DANIEL BIECHELE |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Before this Court is Defendant Daniel Biechele's ("Defendant") motion to dismiss one hundred counts of a grand jury indictment pursuant to R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 12. Defendant faces two hundred manslaughter counts based on G.L. 1956 § 11-23-1. The first one hundred counts charge Defendant with involuntary manslaughter resulting from criminal negligence; the second one hundred counts charge Defendant with involuntary manslaughter resulting from the commission of an unlawful act ("misdemeanor manslaughter"). Defendant moves to dismiss counts the misdemeanor manslaughter counts for failure to state an offense under Rhode Island law and for failure to provide fair warning in violation of R.I. Const. art I, §§ 2, 7, 10, art. 6, § 2 and U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV.1 Defendant also challenges the grand jury trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Defendant was the "tour manager"2 of "Great White," a band that performed at The Station, a nightclub located in Warwick, Rhode Island. On February 20, 2003, the Defendant allegedly ignited pyrotechnic devices ("D.O.T. Class C" Fireworks — Classification 1.4) inside the Station as part of the band's performance. The ignition of the pyrotechnics would constitute a misdemeanor if the Defendant was not licensed to possess, control, or use the pyrotechnics under § 11-13-1. The State alleges that the pyrotechnics started a fire inside The Station that proximately caused the deaths of one hundred people.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss along with two supporting memoranda, a general memorandum in support of the motion (Dismiss) and a specific memorandum presenting the constitutional argument (Fair Notice). The Defendant also filed a separate motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy or election.3 The State filed an objection to the motions to dismiss and supporting memorandum (Objection). Defendant replied to the State's Objection with a response memorandum (Response). Both Defendant and State argued before this Court on October 26, 2005 (Hr'g Tr.); the Defendant filed a letter detailing further legal authority (Letter Rebuttal), as well as a Post-Argument Rebuttal Memorandum (Defense Rebuttal). The State also filed a Post-Argument Rebuttal Memorandum (State Rebuttal). Defendant further joined in a supplemental motion (Supp. Motion) to dismiss indictments based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the grand jury indictment.4 The State filed an objection (Supp. Objection), to which the Defendant replied with a Memorandum (Supp. Reply).
Section 11-23-3 requires that "[e]very person who shall commit manslaughter shall be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) years." It is settled law in Rhode Island that because manslaughter is not defined within the statute, it takes the same meaning as defined in common law. State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309, 314, 121 A. 218, 221 (1923). Common law also dictates that manslaughter is classified as either voluntary or involuntary. State v. Vargas, 420 A.2d 809, 815 (R.I. 1980).
Involuntary manslaughter in Rhode Island is defined as "an unintentional homicide without malice aforethought committed either in performance of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony or in the performance of a lawful act with criminal negligence." State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1008 (R.I. 2005); see State v. Lillibridge, 454 A.2d 237, 240 (R.I. 1982). This definition clearly creates two distinct theories of involuntary manslaughter: one based on criminal negligence theory and one based on unlawful act theory ("misdemeanor manslaughter"). Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized this definition, there are few cases discussing the specific nature of the unlawful act theory of manslaughter. See, e.g., State v. Pedro Ortiz, 824 A.2d 473, 485 (R.I. 2003); State v. Wilding, 740 A.2d 1235, 1240 (R.I. 1999); State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I. 1987); State v. Freeman, 473 A.2d 1149, 1151 (R.I. 1984); State v. Kaner, 463 A.2d 1348, 1351 (R.I. 1983). The most instructive misdemeanor manslaughter discussion is found in State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d 170, 177 (R.I. 1993). In McLaughlin, the Rhode Island Supreme Court articulated the two elements that comprise misdemeanor manslaughter. Id. The State "must show first that a misdemeanor occurred and then that such misdemeanor was the proximate cause of the victim's death." Id. McLaughlin was the first Rhode Island case to limit the unlawful act to misdemeanors; it also was the first case to specify that the unlawful act must proximately cause the death. Id.
Defendant first claims that the State failed to allege the Defendant engaged in conduct that constitutes a misdemeanor under Rhode Island law. Defendant also argues § 11-13-1 does not apply to pyrotechnics. Further, Defendant contends § 11-13-1 failed to give adequate warning of the offense, in violation of due process protection. Defendant asserts that the firework misdemeanor's thirty-day statute of limitation precludes the State from bringing a manslaughter charge after thirty-days.5
Defendant contends that even if the ignition of the pyrotechnics constituted a misdemeanor under § 11-13-1, manslaughter could not be appropriately charged because the Defendant lacked the criminal scienter necessary for such a serious conviction. Defendant avers Rhode Island case law requires the misdemeanor underlying a misdemeanor manslaughter charge to be malum in se, and contends the firework statute is malum prohibitum. Additionally, Defendant argues that the indictment requires no criminal mens rea in violation of fundamental due process guarantees and State case law. Finally, Defendant joins his Co-Defendants, Jeffrey and Michael Derderian, in alleging prosecutorial misconduct infected the grand jury trial. See State v. Derderian, K1-03-654 A., K1-03-655A (R.I. Super. Dec. 5, 2005).
The State asserts the clear language of the statute indicates the pyrotechnic devices used by the Defendant required a permit or prior approval under § 11-13-1 ("firework statute"). Further, the State argues that a reasonable person would know that the Defendant's conduct was within the ambit of the firework statute. The State avers the thirty-day statute of limitation for the firework misdemeanor is irrelevant, as the State does not seek to bring charges under the firework statute. Finally, the State contends that there is an element of criminal mens rea imbedded both in the misdemeanor and in the proximate cause required between the misdemeanor and the deaths. Thus, the State asserts that the level of criminal culpability embedded in the misdemeanor manslaughter counts is sufficient to satisfy due process guaranties and is also consistent with Rhode Island case law.
The question of whether pyrotechnic gerbs fall within the ambit of the firework statute is one of statutory interpretation.6 Section 11-13-1 reads:
"Sale, use or possession of fireworks — (a) No person shall... possess or have under his or her control, use or explode, or cause to explode for exhibition or amusement any fireworks D.O.T. Class "B" or "C
The pyrotechnic gerbs allegedly used by the Defendant fit the definition of "fireworks" stated in this section as "any combustible or explosive composition, or any substance or combination of substances or article prepared for the purpose of producing a visible or audible effect by combustion, explosion, deflagration or detonation." Section 11-13-1(a)(emphasis added).
Defendant admits "[t]his language, considered in isolation, could fairly be argued to include pyrotechnics." (Dismiss 14.) However, the Defendant urges the Court to consider how the Rhode Island Fire Safety Code, referenced within the firework statute, defines "fireworks." (Dismiss 14-15.) Defendant correctly indicates the Fire Safety Code refers to pyrotechnics and fireworks separately. See § 23-28.11-3 through § 23-28.11-10. Specifically, the statute under which the Defendant could have obtained a permit makes this distinction, stating:
"Permits. — (a) Permits to possess and display commercial fireworks or pyrotechnics shall be issued by the local fire authority on forms provided by the state fire marshal.
(b) No permit to possess and display fireworks or pyrotechnics shall be issued by the local fire authority until the applicant has first obtained a valid certificate of competency from the state fire marshal. For purposes of this chapter, "pyrotechnics" means a...
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