State v. Binette

Citation33 S.W.3d 215
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. Guy BINETTE.
Decision Date05 October 2000
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee

Jerry S. Sloan, Chattanooga, TN, for the appellant, Guy Binette.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor

General; and Ellen H. Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Jerry H. Summers, Chattanooga, TN, for the amicus curiae, Summers & Wyatt, P.C.

OPINION

WILLIAM M. BARKER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which E. RILEY ANDERSON, C.J., and FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, and ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, Jr., JJ., joined.

This is an appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County, which overruled the defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained by the State after the defendant was stopped by a police officer on suspicion of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant. The defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty and reserved for appeal as a dispositive question of law the issue of the lawfulness of the stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The defendant thereafter sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the following issue: whether reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, existed to authorize a stop of the defendant's vehicle. Having reviewed the record in this case, we hold that the evidence does not support the trial court's finding that the police officer acted with reasonable suspicion when he stopped the defendant. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the conviction as entered by the trial court is vacated, and the charge of driving while under the influence of an intoxicant is dismissed.

On the evening of February 13, 1997, Guy Binette was driving in Chattanooga, Tennessee, when he was stopped by Officer Gerry Davis of the Chattanooga Police Department. Prior to the stop, Officer Davis followed Binette for several minutes and videotaped Binette's driving. During this time, the officer made several statements that were recorded on the audio portion of the tape regarding what he considered to be driving errors made by Binette. He commented that Binette had "already crossed the yellow line twice," observed that "the vehicle just made a hard swerve," and noted that Binette, at one point, was "running about 60 miles per hour in a 45 mile per hour zone." Based upon his observations, Officer Davis decided to stop Binette and subsequently arrest him.

After he was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant, Binette filed a motion to suppress all evidence gained by the State following the stop. He argued that there was no reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts for an investigative stop. At the suppression hearing, Binette testified and denied making the driving errors alleged by the officer. Although Officer Davis did not testify at the hearing, the videotaped recording was introduced without objection. Basing its decision solely on the visual portion of the videotape evidence, the court reached the following conclusion:

There was weaving within the lines, fairly significant weaving about the time the video started up until the time Binette turned and the lights were activated, so I do find that there was articulable suspicion for the stop in this case and so I will overrule the motion to suppress.

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(iv), Binette entered a conditional plea of guilty and reserved as a dispositive question of law for appeal the issue of the lawfulness of the stop. The plea agreement provided for a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in county jail, suspended after serving forty-eight hours in jail; a fine of $360; a suspension of Binette's driving privileges in Tennessee; and a requirement that Binette attend a DUI school. The court sentenced Binette pursuant to the agreement and issued an order holding the sentence in abeyance pending resolution of Binette's appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed the videotape and a majority affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding that Binette did "swerve and weave" within his lane. Binette then sought, and this Court granted, permission to appeal on the following issue: whether reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts existed to authorize a stop of Binette's vehicle.

DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review

In State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996), this Court examined the different standards of appellate review then used by Tennessee courts to evaluate a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on suppression issues. The Court observed that our appellate courts generally applied three different standards of review: preponderance of the evidence, any material evidence, and a standard combining both the preponderance of the evidence and any material evidence standards. See id. at 22-23. The Court resolved the split among Tennessee courts by adopting the following standard for review of suppression issues:

Questions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. So long as the greater weight of the evidence supports the trial court's findings, those findings shall be upheld. In other words, a trial court's findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.

Id. at 23.

While Odom is certainly relevant in determining the question now before this Court, the Odom standard presupposes issues of credibility. We grant trial courts considerable deference on review of these issues because such courts are uniquely positioned to observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses. See State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tenn.1995). But when a court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, such as the videotape evidence in this case, the rationale underlying a more deferential standard of review is not implicated. Consequently, we must determine the standard of review for a trial court's finding of fact on a motion to suppress when they are based on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility.

In the context of workers' compensation cases, this Court has held that "where the issues involve expert medical testimony and all the medical proof is contained in the record by deposition . . . then this Court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of that testimony." Krick v. City of Lawrenceburg, 945 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tenn.1997). The rationale allowing an appellate court to review such evidence de novo without a presumption of correctness is clear: the reviewing court is in the same position as the trial court and is just as capable of reviewing the evidence. See id. Similarly, when a trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress are based solely on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, appellate courts are just as capable to review the evidence and draw their own conclusions. Accordingly, we hold that when a trial court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing are based on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, a reviewing court must examine the record de novo without a presumption of correctness.1

II. Application of Standard of Review

We now turn our attention to the precise issue before the Court: whether specific and articulable facts existed to authorize a stop of Binette's vehicle. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment. See Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968). "Consequently, under both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn.1997).

One exception to the warrant requirement exists when a police officer makes an investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997). Upon turning on the blue lights of a vehicle, a police officer has clearly initiated a stop and has seized the subject of the stop within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. See State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn.1993). Thus, in order for the stop in this case to be constitutionally valid, at the time that Officer Davis turned on his vehicle's blue lights, he must have had reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that Binette had committed, or was about to commit, a criminal offense.

Reasonable suspicion is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the subject of a stop of criminal activity, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), and it is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, see Alabama v. White, 496 U.S....

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