State v. Binion

• Decision Date: 28 December 1994
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Ricky W. BINION, Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 702

900 S.W.2d 702

STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Ricky W. BINION, Appellant.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee at Jackson.

Dec. 28, 1994.

No Permission to Appeal Applied

for to the Supreme Court.

C. Michael Robbins, Asst. Public Defender, Somerville, for appellant.

Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Joel W. Perry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Elizabeth T. Rice, Dist. Atty. Gen., Jerry Norwood, Asst. Dist. Atty. Gen., Somerville, for appellee.

OPINION

HAYES, Judge.

The appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), expressly reserving the issue of whether the seizure of his person and his subsequent arrest were valid. Appellant received a sentence of three years and six months as a Range II offender. The trial court denied the appellant's motion to suppress and entered an order allowing the appeal of the certified question of law. The question presented for review is whether the act of a motorist in lawfully turning his vehicle around approximately 1000 feet from a roadblock is sufficient to give a state trooper "reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle."

After a review of the record we conclude that under the circumstances of this case, the lawful turn without more does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. Therefore, the judgment of trial court is reversed.

On the evening of April 16, 1993, the Tennessee Highway Patrol, in conjunction with local law enforcement agencies, conducted a roadblock on State Highway 18 near Bolivar, Tennessee. The purpose of the roadblock was to check for driver's licenses and vehicle registration violations. The roadblock was conducted pursuant to Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410.

Sometime around 11:00 p.m. of that evening, the appellant was driving north on State Highway 18 near Bolivar. Before reaching the roadblock, the appellant turned into the parking lot of a store located approximately 1000 feet from the roadblock location. The appellant then turned around in the parking lot, and left driving south on State Highway 18, away from the roadblock.

State Trooper Larry McKinnie observed the appellant driving onto and immediately leaving the store parking lot premises. Trooper McKinnie, believing that the appellant was attempting to avoid the roadblock, gave pursuit. Appellant's vehicle was stopped approximately one and one-quarter mile from the roadblock. Trooper McKinnie asked the appellant for his driver's license. The appellant responded that he had a license from Illinois, but that he did not have it with him. Trooper McKinnie asked the appellant to follow him back to the roadblock, and the appellant complied with this request. Upon arriving at the roadblock, Trooper McKinnie ran a computer check on the appellant and discovered that his Tennessee license had been revoked. The computer check also revealed that the appellant had been declared a habitual motor vehicle offender. The appellant was arrested. On September 7, 1993 the Hardeman County Grand Jury indicted the appellant on one count of violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act.

The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence gained as a result of his stop by Trooper McKinnie. At the suppression hearing, the appellant testified that he had been enroute to the store when he saw the flashing blue lights indicating the presence of a roadblock. He testified that he had pulled into the store and gone inside to purchase some cigarettes. According to the appellant's testimony, he was in the store for no more than two minutes, after which he returned to his car and proceeded to head south on Highway 18.

Trooper McKinnie testified at the hearing that he had observed several vehicles turn into the store, but that in each case, someone had exited the vehicle and entered the store. McKinnie testified that the appellant, after turning into the store, "spun around rapidly," and drove off in the opposite direction, without ever leaving his car. McKinnie stated that upon being detained, the appellant told McKinnie that he did not have a Tennessee driver's license. On cross-examination, Trooper McKinnie testified that he had not observed the appellant violating any traffic laws and that the only reason for pulling him over was that he had avoided the roadblock.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court denied the appellant's motion to suppress. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found that the appellant "sort of spun around real fast and abruptly headed back south on State Highway 18 without stopping." The trial court also found that no constitutional rights of the appellant had been violated by Trooper McKinnie.

Findings of fact made by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing are conclusive unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates against those findings. State v. Young, 866 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992). We conclude that the record supports the trial court's findings of fact in this case.

Appellant does not contest the right of the state to conduct a roadblock. This Court in State v. Manuel, no. 87-96-III, upheld the constitutionality of a sobriety roadblock in light of the governmental interest served by a roadblock and the minimal intrusion upon motorists' liberty. See Manuel, slip op. at 6. ¹

It is undisputed that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of federal and state constitutions. A seizure occurs even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), State v. Westbrooks, 594 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tenn.1979). Thus, the question becomes whether the seizure in this case was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-51, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990).

A precondition to the constitutional acceptability of a seizure made as a result of a roadblock is "that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individualized officers." Manuel, slip op. at 2 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). In accordance with these constitutional limitations, the Tennessee Highway Patrol has formulated a set of rules for roadblocks designed to check for unlicensed drivers. These rules are contained in Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410. General Order 410 gives officers the authority to stop vehicles at a roadblock, but is silent as to the officer's authority to pursue vehicles that do not stop at the roadblock. ²

The appellant asserts that the stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional. Specifically, the appellant contends that (1) the absence of specific authority in General Order 410 to pursue an automobile that avoids the roadblock precluded Trooper McKinnie from stopping the appellant and (2) the stop was "without any factual basis."

Under the facts and circumstances present, it is clear that the State Trooper did not have the authority under General Order 410 to stop the appellant. Therefore, the appellant's contention that the stop was unconstitutional on this basis may have merit. However, we find it unnecessary to decide this issue. This issue is pretermitted in view of the dispositive nature of the appellant's assertion that the Trooper had no factual basis upon which to stop the appellant.

The State asserts that Trooper McKinnie had the right to make an investigatory stop of the appellant's automobile based on McKinnie's personal observation that the appellant was involved in criminal wrongdoing. In State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn.1992), the Supreme Court of Tennessee set forth the constitutional standards involved in investigatory stops of automobiles:

A police officer may make an investigatory stop of a motor vehicle when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed. In determining whether a police officer's reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances. This includes, but is not limited to, objective observations, information obtained from other police officers or agencies, information obtained from citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. A court must also consider the rational inferences and deductions that a trained...