State v. Bishop
| Decision Date | 16 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 32A01-0106-CV-238.,32A01-0106-CV-238. |
| Citation | 775 N.E.2d 335 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. Stephen BISHOP, Molly Bishop, Dale Gladden, and Hendricks County, Indiana, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Janet L. Parsanko, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Marvin Mitchell, Mitchell Hurst Jacobs & Dick, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
Appellant, the State of Indiana, commenced an eminent domain proceeding against land owned by Stephen and Molly Bishop.1 Following a jury trial upon the issue of the compensation owed the Bishops, the trial court ordered the State to pay the Bishops $508,185.78. Upon appeal, the State presents three issues which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court improperly denied the State's motion to withdraw its timely-filed exceptions to the appraisers' report;
II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the Bishops to present evidence of the capitalization of income method of valuation; and
III. Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence regarding the cost to relocate three billboard signs onto the residue of the Bishops' property.
We affirm.
A brief summary of eminent domain procedures will help to explain the facts relevant to this case. Indiana Code Sections 32-11-1-1 through XX-XX-X-XX govern the procedures for the exercise of eminent domain.2 Daugherty v. State, 699 N.E.2d 780, 782 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. The process set forth in these statutes has been explained as follows:
Lehnen v. State, 693 N.E.2d 580, 581-82 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Cordill v. City of Indianapolis, 168 Ind.App. 685, 687, 345 N.E.2d 274, 275 (1976)
), trans. denied; accord Daugherty, 699 N.E.2d at 781-82.
In the case at bar, the record reveals that on December 6, 1996, the State commenced this eminent domain action to appropriate certain property in Hendricks County for the construction of a cloverleaf interchange at the intersection of Interstate 70 and State Road 267. The State had previously offered the Bishops $99,400 to purchase the land. See Ind.Code § 32-11-1-1(b) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1995).3 The land at issue is located along I 70 east of Road 267 and is divided by I-70 into northern and southern parcels. Pursuant to the trial court's order of appropriation, entered on October 15, 1997, the State took .681 acres of the northern parcel and.496 acres of the southern parcel, for a total appropriation of 1.177 acres. The residue of the Bishops' land constituted 73.144 acres. Located on the appropriated land were four billboard structures ("billboards") owned by the Bishops.
The court-appointed appraisers entered their report on November 14, 1997, and assessed the value of the land and improvements thereon to be $191,510. On December 9, 1997, the State filed exceptions to the appraisers' report, claiming the appraisers overvalued the land and improvements. See Ind.Code § 32-11-1-8 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1995).4
On March 27, 2000, the State filed a motion to withdraw its previously-filed exceptions and for judgment. The following day, the Bishops filed a response in opposition to the State's motion to withdraw the exceptions.5 On March 31, the State, pursuant to Indiana Code § 32-11-1-8.1 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1995),6 offered to settle the Bishops' claims for a sum of $267,300. On May 4, 2000, the trial court denied the State's motion to withdraw its exceptions and for judgment.
On March 26, 2001, trial began on the issue of the damages owed to the Bishops. At the conclusion of the trial on March 28, 2001, the jury returned a verdict of $595,000. From this the court deducted $191,510, representing the appraisers' award which had earlier been deposited by the State and withdrawn by the Bishops,7 and added $102,195.78 in interest8 and $2,500 in litigation expenses,9 for a total of $508,185.78. The State filed a motion to correct error on April 27, 2001, which the trial court denied on May 1, 2001.
The State claims the trial court erred when it denied the State's motion to withdraw its exceptions to the report of the court-appointed appraisers. Here, although the State timely filed exceptions to the appraisers' report on December 9, 1997, the Bishops never filed exceptions. Thus, the State claims that, as the only party which filed exceptions, it should have been allowed to withdraw the same, thereby eliminating the need for a trial.
The relevant case law on this subject reveals two lines of cases, one of which suggests an absolute right of a party to withdraw exceptions to an appraisers' report. In State v. Redmon, 205 Ind. 335, 340, 186 N.E. 328, 329 (1933), the Court held that, if a party who has filed timely exceptions to an appraisers' report dismisses the exceptions, there is no issue as to damages before the court. In Denny v. State, 244 Ind. 5, 12, 189 N.E.2d 820, 823 (1963), the Court, citing Redmon, stated, "When, as in this case, appellant has withdrawn the amount of the appraisers' award, and the State has withdrawn its exceptions to the award, no issue remained before the trial court which could be submitted to the jury for determination." These cases would appear to support the State's position. However, in Redmon, the Court noted that the trial court had sustained the State's motion to dismiss its exceptions, implying that the trial court had some authority to permit or deny the State's motion to dismiss.
The other line of cases, starting with State v. Blount, 154 Ind.App. 580, 290 N.E.2d 480 (1972), rejects the notion that parties have an absolute right to withdraw previously filed exceptions to an appraisers' report. In Blount, the court-appointed appraisers' report, fixing damages at $5,499.90, was filed on September 15, 1969. Two days later, the State timely filed exceptions to the appraisers' report, but the landowner-defendant filed no exceptions. On December 18, 1969, both parties attended a pre-trial conference, after which the trial court entered a pre-trial order pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 16. This pre-trial order enumerated the issues for trial, stated that the issues were closed, set the trial date, and stated, "this order will control the course of the trial and may not be amended except by consent of the parties and the Court, or by order of the Court to prevent manifest injustice." Blount, 154 Ind.App. at 582,290 N.E.2d at 482. The trial court postponed the original trial date. Nevertheless, on the rescheduled trial date of May 17, 1971, the State appeared, but declined to either proceed to trial or request a continuance. On July 22, 1971, nineteen months after the entry of the pre-trial order, twenty-two months after the filing of the appraisers' report, and over two months after the scheduled trial date, the State moved to withdraw its exceptions. The trial court overruled the motion and the cause eventually went to trial, resulting in an award of $9,000 for the defendant-landowner.
Upon appeal, the State, as it had at trial, relied upon Redmon and Denny to support its argument that it had an absolute right to withdraw its exceptions. The first district of this court disagreed, and held that "The State having sought a jury trial, and having agreed thereto via the pre-trial order, cannot be heard many months later, to complain of being held to that which it sought and to which it agreed to be bound." Blount, 154 Ind.App. at 583-84, 290 N.E.2d at 483. The Blount court further held that the filing of exceptions by either party is sufficient to submit the question of damages to the trier of fact, and that it is unnecessary for a landowner to file exceptions as a condition precedent to his right of recovery, if exceptions have been filed by the condemning party. 154 Ind.App. at 585, 290 N.E.2d at 484. Thus, the Blount decision would appear to have placed a substantial limit upon a party's ability to withdraw previously filed exceptions to an appraisers' report.
370 N.E.2d at 369. Upon the McGills' request, trial was set for June 26, 1975. Six days before trial, however, the District moved to withdraw its exceptions, strike the McGills' exceptions as untimely, and for summary judgment. The trial court granted the District's motion to withdraw, and the McGills appealed, relying upon Blount for the proposition that the District's motion to withdraw...
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State v. Bishop, 32S01-0302-CV-72.
...added $102,195.78 in interest and $2,500 in litigation expenses. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Bishop, 775 N.E.2d 335 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). We granted The State alleges three errors by the trial court: (1) the denial of its motion to withdraw its exceptions, (......