State v. Bishop, 257
| Citation | 158 S.E.2d 511,272 N.C. 283 |
| Decision Date | 12 January 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 257,257 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Josiah BISHOP. STATE of North Carolina v. Raymond L. BASKIN. STATE of North Carolina v. Lester THOMPSON. STATE of North Carolina v. MacArthur McCAIN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Atty. Gen. T. W. Bruton and Asst. Atty. Gen. Bernard A. Harrell, for the State.
W. O. Rosser, Whitakers, and Alfred S. Bryant, Durham, for defendants.
The principal contention of defendants is that the court erred in admitting into evidence the confessions of defendants.
The test of admissibility is whether the statements made by defendants were in fact voluntarily and understandingly made. State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1; State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572, 28 A.L.R.2d 1104; State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259. Although the fact that the defendant was in custody is a circumstance to be considered when considering the voluntariness of a confession, State v. Guffey, 261 N.C. 322, 134 S.E.2d 619, this fact does not of itself render it incompetent. State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 142 S.E.2d 344.
When a confession of a defendant is offered into evidence, and the defendant objects, the trial judge should then excuse the jury and in the absence of the jury hear the evidence of both the State and defendant upon the question of whether defendant, if he made an admission or confession, voluntarily and understandingly made the admission or confession. State v. Rogers, supra; State v. Gray, supra; State v. Conyers, 267 N.C. 618, 148 S.E.2d 569.
The general rule is that after such inquiry the trial judge shall make findings of fact to show the basis of his ruling on the admissibility of the evidence offered, and that the facts so found are conclusive on the appellate courts when supported by competent evidence. Nevertheless, the conclusions of law drawn from the facts found are not binding on the appellate courts. State v. Hines, 266 N.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 363; State v. Walker, 266 N.C. 269, 145 S.E.2d 833; State v. Conyers, supra. However, in the case of State v. Keith, 266 N.C. 263, 145 S.E.2d 841, where the defendant contended that he had made no confession, the court recognized that there is no necessity for findings of fact where there is no conflicting testimony offered on the voir dire.
In the case of State v. Conyers, supra, the trial judge held a preliminary voir dire as to the voluntariness of the defendant's alleged confession, and at the conclusion of the voir dire entered into the record a statement finding defendant's statement to have been made 'freely and voluntarily' * * * The court, citing State v. Barnes, supra, held the court's declaration to be a statement of its conclusion and improperly entered. In this case there was testimony by the defendant which presented a sharp conflict in the evidence upon the voir dire. The holding in Keith was recognized and distinguished in Conyers on the basis that no conflicting testimony was offered.
Here, the trial judge, upon objection, properly excused the jury and in the absence of the jury conducted a voir dire hearing. The court gave both the State and defendants opportunity to offer evidence. The State offered evidence, and defendants chose to offer none. The trial court's finding that defendants were duly warned of their constitutional rights prior to making any statement is supported by competent evidence, and this Court is bound by this finding.
In order to consider fully defendants' contention that the court erred in admitting the statements made by defendants, we must review the court's conclusion that such statements as were made were made voluntarily.
The admissibility of this evidence is to be determined by the facts appearing in evidence when it is received or rejected, and not by the facts appearing in the evidence at a later stage of the trial. State v. Rogers, supra.
The rules of law which we have considered to this point have been rules of law laid down by the North Carolina Supreme Court. It is with pardonable pride that we note that for over one hundred forty years the rule enunciated in State v. Roberts, supra that 'a confession obtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected' has been an approved and applied rule of this Court. Thus, the rationale of Miranda v. State v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, is not new with us, but the broad and farreaching language, which we must acknowledge as binding on us, has had such a massive impact upon criminal jurisprudence and law enforcement that we must construe and apply its language to the facts of the instant case.
The case of Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, erects certain safeguards as to the question of 'in-custody' suspects which require, in effect, that the suspect be warned: (1) that he has the right to remain silent, (2) that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him in court, (3) that he has the right to counsel, either appointed or retained, prior to and during the interrogation, and (4) that if he is indigent, counsel will be appointed for him prior to any questioning, if he so desires.
The most compelling argument offered by defendants is based on that portion of the Miranda opinion which states:
In considering this argument, the pertinent excepts from the voir dire, taken in the absence of the jury, are as follows:
Q. Did he sign any statement in your presence at that time?
A. He signed this.
Q. Did he sign any written confession?
A. No sir.
Q. Did you make any notes as to what he said?
A. No sir.
Q. Did he refuse to make any statements?
A. With reference to this, yes sir.
Q. That's all.
MR. HOLDFORD, SOLICITOR: Did you talk to Raymond Baskin also that day?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Before talking to him did you advise him of his constitutional rights?
A. Yes sir, I did.
Q. Did you use the same form?
A. Yes sir. (Warning as to constitutional rights substantially the same as quoted on page 4 of this opinion).
Q. Did you talk to Lester Thompson?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Before questioning him did you advise him of his rights?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did you use the same form that the city of Rocky Mount had given you and which you have testified from before?
A. Yes sir.
Q. What did you advise him?
A. (Warning as to constitutional rights substantially the same as quoted on page 4 of this opinion).
Q. And did you talk to MacArthur McCain?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Before talking to him did you advise him of his constitutional rights?
A. Yes sir. Lt. Richardson, the Identification officer, was present at that time.
Q. At that time did you use the form provided for you by the city of Rocky Mount Police Department?
A. Yes sir.
Q. State for the record what you advised him?
A. (Warning as to constitutional rights substantially as quoted on page 4 of this opinion) Q. Did either one of these four defendant * * * ask for an attorney at that time?
A. They did not. Each one of them asked to make a telephone call, except one, and right now I am not sure which one that was.
Q. The three that asked, were they allowed to make a telephone call?
A. Yes sir, they were * * *.
Q. Did you threaten these defendants in any way to get them to make a statement?
A. No sir, I did not.
Q. Did you offer them any hope of reward to get them to make a statement?
A. No sir, I did not.
Q. Did you tell them the court would go lighter on them to get them to make a statement?
A. No sir.
MR. ROSSER: Mr. Winstead, did either one of those four defendants make a voluntary statement at that time with reference to this matter?
A. At that time, no.
Q. They didn't have a lawyer at that time, either, did they?
A. No. sir.
Q. Was a lawyer later brought in there to them, about a day later?
A. I understand he was. I don't know it for a fact.
Q. But neither one of them made a statement at that time?
A. No sir.
Q. That is all.
A. They later did, but not at that time.
MR. ROSSER: Mr. Winstead, will you tell for the record if you thoroughly explained those four questions to each defendant, you think they understood them, don't you?
A. I know they did.
MR. HOLDFORD, SOLICITOR: Mr. Winstead, how much later was it that they made the statements to you?
A. Later on in the presence of Lt. Moore and Detective Luper they did make a statement in my presence. Each one of them separately and all together.
Q. How much later was that?
A. The following day, I believe.
Q. The following day when they made a statement, before each one of them made a statement, did you or Mr. Moore again advise them of these rights which you had advised before?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did you go through the same procedure?
A. Yes, sir.'
The evidence above quoted and other evidence in the voir dire examination reveals that defendants were warned of their constitutional rights before being questioned the first day they were in custody, and that they did not make a statement at that time. The record further indicates that they were not pressed for further statement at that time,...
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