State v. Black
| Decision Date | 10 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 48A02–1011–CR–1384.,48A02–1011–CR–1384. |
| Citation | 947 N.E.2d 503 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant–Plaintiff,v.Charles BLACK, Appellee–Defendant. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
The State of Indiana appeals from the trial court's discharge of Charles Black, who had been charged with dealing in cocaine 1 as a Class A felony, possession of marijuana 2 as a Class D felony, possession of a controlled substance 3 as a Class D felony, maintaining a common nuisance,4 a Class D felony, possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon,5 a Class B felony, and was alleged to be an habitual offender.6 The State raises the following issue for our review: whether the trial court erred in granting discharge on the basis of an alleged violation of Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(C) (“ Criminal Rule 4(C)”) where Black and his counsel were present when Black's trial date was scheduled outside the one-year period and yet raised no objection to that date.
We reverse and remand.
On October 22, 2009, the State charged Black with dealing in cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession of a controlled substance, maintaining a common nuisance, and possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. In an amended information, which was filed with the trial court on October 4, 2010, Black was also alleged to be an habitual offender. Appellant's App. at 45–51. On October 23, 2009, the trial court entered a standing discovery order. CCS at 1.7 On December 15, 2009, Black's counsel filed a request for specific discovery relating, in part, to any pertinent video that might be in the State's possession. Appellant's App. at 65. During a status hearing held on January 4, 2010, the State indicated that it was awaiting production of a DVD. CCS at 2. The State's discovery remained outstanding as of a January 13, 2010 pre-trial conference. Id.: Appellant's App. at 65. The parties participated in a February 10, 2010 telephonic pre-trial conference; again, the State's discovery remained incomplete. CCS at 2; Appellant's App. at 66.
On March 15, 2010, the State appeared by counsel, and Black appeared in person and with counsel. The chronological case summary (“CCS”) notation for that date states: “Trial by jury set to commence 8/17/10 at 9:00 a.m. (1st choice),” a date still within the one-year period set forth in Criminal Rule 4(C). CCS at 2; Appellant's App. at 66. A pretrial hearing was held on July 12, 2010, and the August 17 trial date was confirmed. Appellant's App. at 66.
On August 12, 2010, five days before the trial date, Black filed a motion to exclude evidence of drug analysis from trial for the reason that the State had failed to fully comply with discovery. Id. In response, on August 13, 2010, the State filed a “Notice to the Court,” which stated that the requested lab results had been transmitted to the State on August 13 and that the State transmitted those results “to defense counsel by facsimile transmission within one hour o[f] receipt.” Id. at 38.
At an August 16, 2010 hearing on Black's motion to exclude the evidence, the following exchange occurred between Andrew Hopper (the prosecutor), John Tompkins (defense counsel), and the trial court:
MR. TOMPKINS: ... I found out from Mr. Hopper this morning the drugs didn't go to the lab until last week. I don't understand that delay. My client has been in custody since October of '09. We came to the final pretrial in July. Indicated we were gonna go forward with trial. I think at the very latest those drugs should have been submitted to the lab the following week, if not the week of final pretrial once we indicated we were confirming for trial this week. That delay is not the defense's fault. The reason we don't have more and we only got this Friday is because the date that the drugs were submitted. Obviously if they can get a turnaround within a week, I could have had this a month ago if they waited til the final pretrial which I would of understood not going to the expense until we confirmed the trial. But I don't understand why they don't submit it until the week before....
....
....
JUDGE: ... I am unlikely to exclude the evidence because that's like a mistrial. What I'm really interested in is how does this affect your case? We all know, for example, this is a[n] allegation of drug dealing. We all know that there are gonna be lab tests, and it's either gonna say one thing or the other. It ... is what the State is claiming it is, or it's not. And so my question I guess really is are you prepared sufficiently to go to trial tomorrow....
Tr. at 6–8. Defense counsel explained that although he had the lab results, he needed extra time to confirm that the correct protocol in testing the drug sample had been followed, especially in light of the fact that the testing had been done under rushed conditions. Id. at 8–9.
The trial court granted Black's request for a continuance and charged the delay to the State. Thereafter, the trial court set the trial date. Noting that trials in Madison Circuit court traditionally begin on Tuesdays, the trial court inquired into the attorneys' availability for trial. Id. at 10–11. The prosecutor stated that he was unavailable the weeks of September 7 and September 14, 2010. Id. at 11. Defense counsel indicated he was available to begin trial on September 21, September 28, or October 12, 2010; all dates within the one-year deadline under Criminal Rule 4(C). Id. Without further explanation, the trial court set Black's trial for November 23, 2010; a date that was outside the one-year period. Id. at 12. Defense counsel did not object. Id. On August 17, 2010, the trial court, on its own motion, reset the trial for November 16, 2010. Appellant's App. at 2. The CCS reveals that the trial date was reset “with the agreement of the State and [Black's] counsel.” CCS at 3.
On November 10, 2010, Black filed an Objection to Trial Date and Motion for Discharge Under Criminal Rule 4(C), contending that the charges should be dismissed because the trial date was set beyond the one-year limit through no fault of his own. Appellant's App. at 52–53, 66. In response, the State argued that Black waived this error when he learned within the one-year period that the trial was set outside the Criminal Rule 4(C) timeframe yet failed to make a timely objection. Id. at 62. Following a November 15, 2010 hearing on the motion, the trial court issued its order and discharged Black pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C). Id. at 65–69. The State now appeals pursuant to Indiana Code section 35–37–5–2.8
The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Black's motion for discharge pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(C). Specifically, the State contends that there was no violation of Criminal Rule 4(C) because Black did not object to his trial date being set outside the one-year timeframe set forth in Criminal Rule 4(C). We agree.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial....” Article I, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution also guarantees that “[j]ustice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.”
The provisions of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) implement a defendant's speedy trial right by establishing time deadlines by which trials must be held. Dean v. State, 901 N.E.2d 648, 652 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. The rule reads in part:
No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar....
Ind.Crim. Rule 4(C). A defendant may seek and be granted a discharge if he is not brought to trial within the proper time period. State v. Delph, 875 N.E.2d 416, 419 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied (2008).
Under this rule, the State has an affirmative duty to bring the defendant to trial within one year of being charged or arrested, but extensions are allowed for various reasons. Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind.2004). For instance, “[i]f a delay is caused by the defendant's own motion or action, the one-year time limit is extended accordingly.” Frisbie v. State, 687 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied (1998) (citation omitted). A defendant has no obligation to remind the trial court of the State's duty, nor is he required to take any affirmative action to see that he is brought to trial within the statutory time period. State v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind.Ct.App.19...
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