State v. Blackledge
Decision Date | 24 June 1932 |
Docket Number | 40979 |
Citation | 243 N.W. 534,216 Iowa 199 |
Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. H. E. BLACKLEDGE, Appellant |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
REHEARING DENIED MAY 15, 1933.
Appeal from Polk District Court.--O. S. FRANKLIN, Judge.
The defendant was convicted of the crime of conspiracy and appeals from the judgment entered against him.
Affirmed.
John Fletcher, Attorney-general, Carl S. Missildine, County Attorney, and Alexander M. Miller, for appellee.
C. B Hextell and John L. Gillespie, for appellant.
STEVENS J. EVANS, FAVILLE, ALBERT, MORLING, KINDIG, and DE GRAFF, JJ., concur. GRIMM, J., (dissenting).
The indictment in this case, to which a demurrer was interposed and overruled by the court, is as follows:
The indictment in this case is based upon section 13162 of the Code of 1927 which is as follows:
"If any two or more persons conspire or confederate together with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully to injure the person, character, business, property, or rights in property of another, or to do any illegal act injurious to the public trade, health, morals, or police, or to the administration of public justice, or to commit any felony, they are guilty of a conspiracy, and every such offender, and every person who is convicted of a conspiracy at common law, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than three years."
The propositions urged upon which it is claimed the demurrer to the indictment should have been sustained briefly summarized are as follows: that Count I of the indictment fails to state or charge the acts or omissions complained of in ordinary and concise language and with such certainty as to apprise the defendant of the offense charged; that the two counts of the indictment considered separately or together do not charge a conspiracy to commit a criminal offense nor are the means alleged by which the defendant with others conspired to accomplish his design criminal in character.
The propositions stated will be discussed together. Count I of the indictment is substantially in the language of the statute. This, ordinarily, is sufficient. As the indictment must be sustained upon other grounds, we shall not give particular consideration to this phase of the question raised. We, however, desire in this connection to call attention to section 13902 of the Code, which is as follows:
"Upon a trial for conspiracy, a defendant cannot be convicted unless one or more overt acts alleged in the indictment are proved, when required by law to constitute the offense, but other overt acts not alleged in the indictment may be given in evidence."
There is a decided lack of harmony in the various jurisdictions of this country as to the principal question raised by the demurrer and it must be confessed that our own cases are in more or less confusion. There can be no doubt as to the rule established by this court in State v. Jones, 13 Iowa 269, and State v. Stevens, 30 Iowa 391. In the first of the above cases we said:
In the latter case, the rule was clearly stated as follows:
"It has been settled by this court, after a full examination of the English and American authorities, that an indictment for conspiracy must show on its fact 'that the object of the conspiracy is a criminal one, or else, if the purpose thus disclosed does not import a crime, then other facts should be alleged and set forth, so as to show that the means to be employed are criminal'."
The holding in the above cases was recognized and apparently sanctioned in State v. Potter, 28 Iowa 554. There is, however, some departure from the prior holding indicated by the language of the court in this case. We quote briefly:
The decision of the court in State v. Harris & Folsom, 38 Iowa 242, is out of harmony with the preceding cases. The means alleged in the indictment in that case was the use of a writ of replevin to accomplish an illegal purpose. None of the foregoing cases are cited or referred to in the majority opinion in this case. The opinion in State v. Stevens, supra, was written by Justice Miller who, obviously interpreting the opinion in State v. Harris & Folsom as a complete departure from the rule announced in the Stevens case, filed a dissent in which he clearly pointed out that such was the case. Again, discussing an indictment alleged by the defendant to be insufficient to charge a conspiracy, the court in State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa 143, 23 N.W. 370, 372, said:
It will be observed that the court in this case sustained an indictment which charged a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor. The indictment involved in State v. Grant, 86 Iowa 216, 53 N.W. 120, 121, charged a conspiracy to commit a crime. The indictment was sustained. The court, in the course of the opinion, said:
The court in State v. Soper, 118 Iowa 1, 91 N.W. 774, 776, without specifically recognizing the rule of State v. Stevens, supra, and other like cases, said:
"Where the conspiracy is charged to have consisted in the agreement to do an act not in itself criminal by illegal means, then the illegal means contemplated must be described; but, where the offense consists in the...
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