State v. Blassingame, s. 88-0879-C
| Decision Date | 07 February 1989 |
| Docket Number | 88-0880-CR,Nos. 88-0879-C,s. 88-0879-C |
| Citation | 149 Wis.2d 400,439 N.W.2d 645 |
| Parties | NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION. RULE 809.23(3), RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, PROVIDE THAT UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS ARE OF NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT IN LIMITED INSTANCES. STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles Scotty BLASSINGAME, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
Appeal from an order of the circuit court for Marinette county: JOHN P. HOFFMAN, Judge.
Before CANE, P.J., and LaROCQUE and MYSE, JJ.
The state appeals an order suppressing statements made by and property seized from Charles Scotty Blassingame in Georgia, who stands accused of the abduction and kidnapping of eleven-year-old Tammy Maciulis. Blassingame is also charged with consolidated offenses involving another child, but the evidence suppressed does not appear to relate to those offenses. Since her disappearance from her mother's apartment during the early morning hours of July 10, 1987, in Marinette, Wisconsin, Tammy has not been located. In one of several statements, Blassingame claimed that after he ordered her from his vehicle where he had discovered her hiding as he drove to Georgia, he accidentally ran over her and then disposed of her body somewhere near the Wisconsin-Illinois state line. In earlier statements, he indicated that he had delivered Tammy to the custody of either her father or a friend of her father. The trial court suppressed all evidence acquired between Blassingame's initial arrival at the Whitfield County, Georgia, sheriff's office and his extradition court appearance several days later.
This appeal presents a series of related issues: (1) Did probable cause to arrest exist under a collective knowledge doctrine, whereby information known to a Wisconsin police department was imputed to the arresting officers in Georgia? (2) Was Blassingame under arrest when he made his initial remarks and gave written consent to the search of his vehicle by the FBI? (3) Was the parole hold, issued for leaving Wisconsin without permission, an invalid pretextual detention? (4) Did the authorities violate the Miranda-Edwards rules in conversations with Blassingame after he invoked his right to counsel? (5) Were the statements voluntary? (6) Were statements to a Georgia prosecutor an inadmissible "offer to plead guilty" barred by sec. 904.10, Stats., of the Wisconsin rules of evidence?
We conclude that: (1) Blassingame's initial presence at the jail was voluntary; (2) the parole hold was valid, and evidence acquired after Blassingame's arrival at the jail is admissible; (3) Blassingame initiated the conversations that occurred after he invoked his right to counsel, and his fifth amendment rights were not violated; (4) the statements were voluntary; (5) the statements to the Georgia district attorney are barred by the Wisconsin rules of evidence. The order suppressing evidence is therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
In a stance not taken prior to appeal, the state now maintains that there was probable cause to arrest Blassingame on July 13, 1987, even though the police did not recognize it at the time. In support of this position, the attorney general urges adoption of the collective knowledge doctrine, whereby facts and information known to the Marinette Police Department would be imputed to the arresting officials in Georgia. This expansive view of the law of search and seizure is unacceptable in view of the record presented here.
First, this court does not normally review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis.2d 433, 443-44, 287 N.W.2d 140, 145-46 (1983). Second, there is no precedent for imputing uncommunicated knowledge from one police agency to another located in a different jurisdiction where neither agency intends to effect an arrest. This is in contrast to cases imputing collective information within the same department to the arresting officer. See State v. Cheers, 102 Wis.2d 367, 388-89, 306 N.W.2d 676, 685-86 (1981). We therefore decline to review the evidence recited in support of probable cause.
Although Blassingame does not contest the validity of the initial stop by a police officer on the streets of Dalton, Georgia, to place in context the challenged events that followed, a detailed summary of the evidence is necessary.
Shortly after 4 p.m. on Monday, July 13, 1987, a patrol officer of the Dalton Police Department activated his squad car's flashing lights and stopped Blassingame's car. The stop was the result of a BOLO (be on the lookout) from the Marinette, Wisconsin, Police Department. The Marinette authorities had no arrest warrant. The Georgia officer asked for Blassingame's driver's license and auto insurance papers. Georgia statutes impose fines for operating a motor vehicle without possession of a driver's license or proof of insurance. 1 When Blassingame exited his vehicle, the officer directed him to return and wait until Whitfield County sheriff's Detective-Captain Ricky Swiney and FBI Special Agent David L. Rack could arrive at the scene. Upon arrival five or ten minutes later, Rack advised Blassingame that a little girl was missing from Marinette and they wanted to talk to him about it. It is at this point that Blassingame challenges the voluntariness of his presence with the authorities.
Rack described what occurred:
I asked if he would accompany us downtown. I told him specifically that he was not under arrest.
I asked him if he would mind coming with me downtown. I asked him if he would get in my car with me. He wanted to know, well, "What do we do with my car?" and I said, so he got into my car. He sat in the front seat with me on the passenger side. He was not handcuffed.
Swiney's description varied slightly:
Q And what happened once the defendant told agent Rack that he would come to the station and answer some questions?
A He asked was there some--he asked to drive his own car, and we asked him would he mind riding with one of us, and he said he would but he didn't want his car towed. He couldn't afford it, and I told him I would be glad to drive his car if he wanted to, which he said he would--
The trial court, in its bench decision on motions, found that Blassingame had requested to drive his own car.
The distance to the sheriff's office was about a mile. The parties arrived at the sheriff's office between 4:35 and 4:50 p.m. Rack described what occurred next:
When we got to the jail area, which is where the sheriff's office is, where the main administrative offices are for the sheriff's office, we went back into an office which is behind the first set of bars, back past the control center for the jail and, but not back into the area where the cells are themselves. It sits off the booking area or the reception center of the jail and it is next to the command center for the jail where the dispatcher sits. When we got back, it's a, it's a medium-sized room that sits in the main processing area.
When we got there, I told him again that he was not under arrest....
The door to the office where the interview took place was closed. Blassingame was advised of his rights at 4:50 p.m., and he signed a waiver of those rights at 4:55 p.m. At the outset, he denied he knew the missing girl. This remark may be significant because, even though intended as a denial of guilt, it could prove to be a damaging admission. This is so because although he told the FBI that he had no idea who Tammy Maciulis was and that the name meant nothing to him, other evidence in this case suggests that Tammy had been with Blassingame in an apartment just a week before her disappearance and perhaps on another occasion. At 5:10 p.m., Blassingame gave oral and written consent to the search of his vehicle. Prior thereto, he was told that he had a right to refuse. The potential incriminating nature of the seized items need not be recounted here. Other facts are incorporated as relevant to the discussion of the various issues.
Article IV of the amendments to the United States Constitution proclaims "[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures...." Our Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the substantial equivalent in art. I, sec. 11. State v. Anderson, 138 Wis.2d 451, 461-62 n. 3, 406 N.W.2d 398, 403 n. 3 (1987). The fourth amendment protects against arbitrary arrests as well as unreasonable searches. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958). Ordinarily, the law of the place of arrest determines whether the arrest was valid. See Kluck v. State, 37 Wis.2d 378, 389, 155 N.W.2d 26, 31 (1967). Both parties here, however, have tacitly accepted Wisconsin law as controlling. Absent exceptional circumstances, this court does not review errors on its own motion. Maclin v. State, 92 Wis.2d 323, 329, 284 N.W.2d 661, 664 (1979). We therefore apply the Wisconsin law of arrest.
A person is seized or arrested when the actions of law enforcement officials restrict his freedom of movement. State v. Smith, 119 Wis.2d 361, 366, 351 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Ct.App.1984). The test is objective. "A seizure occurs only if, under the circumstances, 'a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' " Id. (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983)). An unlawful arrest does not deprive the court of personal jurisdiction. State v. Smith, 131 Wis.2d 220, 240, 388 N.W.2d 601, 610 (1986). Incriminating statements or property gathered from an illegal seizure, however, are subject to exclusion. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Whether a defendant was...
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