State v. Blay

• Decision Date: 31 August 1904
• Citation: 58 A. 794,77 Vt. 56
• Parties: STATE v. BLAY.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

58 A. 794

77 Vt. 56

STATE

v. BLAY.

Supreme Court of Vermont. Orleans.

Aug. 31, 1904.

Exceptions from Orleans County Court; Haselton, Judge.

Mitchell Blay was convicted of larceny, and he brings exceptions. No error.

Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and TYLER, MUNSON, START, WATSON, and STAFFORD, JJ.

A. W. Forman, State's Atty., for the State.

F. E. Miles and H. F. Graham, for respondent.

TYLER, J. Information for larceny.

Trial, conviction, and sentence. It appeared that on October 29, 1900, the respondent hired a horse and wagon at a livery stable in Derby for the professed purpose of driving to the village of Newport, and promised to return the same day; that he drove to Newport, hitched and left the horse there, and went by train to St Johnsbury; that search was made for the property, but it was not recovered, and has never since been seen by the owner.

1. It also appeared that in February, 1904, an officer arrested the respondent upon a warrant for stealing another horse, and the state was permitted to prove, under exception, that while he was in custody the officer asked him why he stole these horses, and that he replied that he supposed it was "habit." As the answer was not Induced by threats or promises, but was voluntary, it is admissible State v. Carr and Loomis, 37 Vt. 191; State v. Gorham, 67 Vt 365, 31 Atl. 845. The respondent contends that there was no evidence tending to show what horses were referred to by the officer, but we think it was competent for the jury to decide whether or not, in the circumstances, the respondent understood that the question included the Derby horse.

2. It appeared that the respondent, soon after his arrest, was taken before a justice of the peace; that he had no counsel, and was not advised as to his rights. The state offered and was allowed to prove, subject to exception, that a complaint for this larceny was then read to him, whereupon he said, "I am guilty of that, sir." It does not appear by the exceptions nor by the record that the respondent made this statement by way of waiving an examination, but voluntarily, upon being informed of the charge. Therefore it was properly admitted. See Parker v. Couture, 63 Vt 449, 21 Atl. 494, 25 Am. St. Rep. 750.

3. The respondent moved for a verdict upon the ground that there was no evidence of a criminal intent. The respondent pretended to hire the horse and wagon to drive to a specified place, yet if he obtained possession thereof under a false pretense of hiring, but with the felonious intent of converting the property to his own use, and thereby of permanently depriving the owner of it, the taking was criminal. What his intent was at the time of the taking could be learned only from the fact that the property was never returned, and from his statements made after his arrest, if the jury found that the statements were made. It is the general rule that extrajudicial confessions, alone...